University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019
2011

Personal Perceptions And Organizational Factors Influencing
Police Discretion The Case Of Turkish Patrol Officers'
Responsiveness
Hidayet Tasdoven
University of Central Florida

Part of the Public Affairs Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Tasdoven, Hidayet, "Personal Perceptions And Organizational Factors Influencing Police Discretion The
Case Of Turkish Patrol Officers' Responsiveness" (2011). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019.
1800.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/1800

PERSONAL PERCEPTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS
INFLUENCING POLICE DISCRETION: THE CASE OF TURKISH PATROL
OFFICERS’ RESPONSIVENESS

by
HIDAYET TASDOVEN

B.S., Security Sciences Faculty, Police Academy, Turkey, 1997
M.S., Ankara University, Turkey, 2005

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Public Affairs Program
in the College of Health and Public Affairs
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2011

Major Professor: Naim Kapucu

© 2011 Hidayet Tasdoven

ii

ABSTRACT
Police officers make decisions at the street level in a variety of situations that have direct
impact on quality of life, justice in society, and individual freedom. These decisions inherently
involve the exercise of discretion, since successfully performed police tasks are linked to the
officer‘s choosing among alternative courses of action. Appropriateness of unsupervised
decisions taken under street contingencies remains questionable in terms of police-behavior
legitimacy.
Law enforcement agencies seek ways to control excessive discretion to avoid undesired
consequences of police discretion and maintain organizational legitimacy. Traditionally,
organizations developed reward and sanction structures that aimed to shape officer behavior on
the street. Recent perspectives, on the other hand, emphasize that it is imperative to manage
discretion by employing a value-based approach that requires the agency to encourage
subordinates in the exercise of certain behaviors simply because they are believed to be right and
proper. This approach depends primarily on beliefs, values, and attitudes of employees rather
than external contingencies of environment.
Drawing on expectancy and value-based approaches, this study examines the factors
affecting patrol officers‘ discretionary decisions to enforce law in the Turkish National Police
(TNP). The reward expectancy concept was derived from the expectancy theory of motivation,
which uses extrinsic rewards in structuring discretion. Regarding the value-based approach,
public service motivation (PSM) represents the intrinsic motives of officers in this study, while
selective enforcement corresponds to the attitudes of officers. Discretionary behaviors of officers
on the street were conceptualized as responsiveness, which refers to the degree to which officers
iii

are willing to respond to street contingencies. The study tested the mediating role of work effort
between reward expectancy/responsiveness and public service motivation/responsiveness
relationships.
Samples of the study were drawn from uniformed patrol officers in seven provinces of
Turkey. A self-administered questionnaire was used to collect data. Responses of 613 patrol
officers were analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM). The study developed four
latent constructs and validated their measurement models by using confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA). Structural equation modeling was used to investigate causal and confirmatory
relationships among latent variables.
Findings of the study suggested that reward expectancy did not have a statistically
significant relationship to responsiveness. The study did not find a significant association
between reward expectancy and work effort of officers. This finding was found to be attributable
to the fact that officers do not believe in the fair distribution procedures of rewards and they do
not value organizational rewards. Public service motivation of respondents, on the other hand,
indicated a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship with both work effort and
responsiveness. These results indicated that intrinsic motives of officers in the TNP are more
powerful in explaining officer responsiveness to street contingencies. As hypothesized, officer
attitudes toward selective enforcement negatively influenced officer responsiveness, indicating
that officers‘ beliefs and values influence their discretionary behaviors. Among the demographic
characteristics of participants, only age of officer indicated a negative significant relationship to
responsiveness. This finding suggested that motivation decreases as age increases. Contrary to
iv

other findings in the literature, this study found that intensity perceptions of respondents was
positively associated with responsiveness.
The study revealed some policy, theoretical, and methodological implications. The
findings suggested that the TNP should either completely eliminate the existing reward system or
revise it to motivate officers to be responsive. A leadership practice that promotes PSM and
discourages selective enforcement was also suggested. Contrary to research that emphasizes the
role of extrinsic motivation on police discretion, this study empirically reported that intrinsic
motivation has an even stronger effect on officer behavior and needs to be taken into account in
future studies.
The study contributes to an understanding of police discretionary behavior in the TNP,
which has unique characteristics of structure, culture, and law. The limitations of the study in
terms of its dependency on officer perceptions and concerns about construct validity were
discussed and future research was suggested.
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CHAPTER.1.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of the study, beginning with a statement of the
problem and definition of terms. Then significance, context, and purpose of the study are
addressed. The chapter concludes with a statement of the research questions and a chapter
summary.
1.1. Statement of the Problem
Police officers make decisions in a variety of situations at street level that have direct
impact on citizens‘ liberty and their quality of life. These decisions are discretionary in nature,
since it is almost impossible to set specific rules in advance on who will be stopped or arrested
by a police officer. Specifying these rules would make them unmanageable, conflicting, and
inconsistent. Unspecified rules give discretionary power to lower-level employees in the
organization (Wilson, 1989).
In his seminal study, Lipsky (1980) highlighted the importance of lower-level employees‘
role in the implementation of any policy. Empirical research mostly supported his argument that
there are ―street level bureaucrats‖ who are not only practitioners but also policymakers at the
street (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). What makes them part of policymaking is their
opportunity to choose among various actions when they contact their clients. In this context,
firefighters, social workers, and police officers are regarded as street-level bureaucrats among
others who work the streets, serve citizens, and enforce laws.
Despite police decisions‘ impact on justice in society and individual freedom, little
attention has been given to police functions in terms of understanding police discretion. Until the
1

late 1950s, even the existence of police discretion was not admitted. In 1956, a survey of the
American Bar Foundation (ABF) aimed to analyze daily operations of the criminal justice
system, and results of that survey helped gain a deeper understanding of the complexity of police
work (Ohlin & Remington, 1993). The ABF study discovered that the nature of the police
profession gives especially lower-level officers the choice of whether to act as well as which
action to take in different situations; it also revealed that enormous discretion is exercised by
street-level patrol officers. Another finding of the study was that the unpredictability of situations
necessitates flexibility of police response to various situations.
Broad ranges of discretionary police behaviors brought discretion as an essential issue to
the attention of scholars and practitioners in the administration of justice. It is widely accepted
that police discretion is unavoidable because of at least two factors: scarcity of resources and the
ambiguity of law (Brown, 1981). Brown (1981) suggested that insufficient resources to
accomplish public functions leads police agencies to determine priorities and allocate resources
based on priorities set by the agencies‘ decision mechanisms. Similarly, police officers also need
to set their own priorities and spend their time and effort according to these precedences. As a
second factor, ambiguity of law is a common issue in practicing daily enforcement activities,
since it is not realistic to expect that every single situation that practitioners are likely to confront
in daily practice would be addressed by legislators. Other scholars add the third contributor to
police discretion: the complexity of police work (Groeneveld, 2005). The requirement to respond
to so many incidents that cannot be handled with the limited resources at hand results in selective
enforcement as an inescapable issue. Police enforce the law selectively by deciding whether the
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law has been violated and whether to act, based on personal judgments concerning both the
interpretation of law and the particular situation.
It is widely accepted in the literature that a certain degree of discretion needs to be left in
the hands of officers to allow them to perform their duty. Specifying rules for every single
situation an officer might face at street level is not possible. On the other hand, uncontrolled
discretion might have negative consequences both for the organization and society. Based on his
investigation, Davis (1977) found the selective-enforcement approach problematic, since
selective-enforcement decisions of officers are not guided by agency leadership. He argued that
imbalanced implementation of policies harms justice in society. He also argued that open and
evidence-based policies must be made and implemented in coordination with agencies in the
criminal justice system.
Another concern about discretion is that decisions made on the street and based on
individual judgments are prone to be discriminatory, arbitrary, or both. Indeed, many scholars
argue that enforcement decisions are often affected by suspect characteristics, especially race and
gender. If this argument is valid, ―the discretionary nature of police decision-making poses a
constant challenge to fair and impartial application of law‖ (Smith, Visher, & Davidson, 1984,
p. 235) and, consequently, discretionary decisions become discriminatory. Finally, discretionary
decisions of ―street-level bureaucrats‖ are found to be questionable in terms of their
correspondence with the choices of policymakers (Lipsky, 1980) and the community‘s priorities
(Wortley, 2003).

3

Law enforcement organizations seek ways to control excessive discretion to avoid the
undesired consequences of police discretion and maintain organizational legitimacy. However,
the police discretion literature does not give a clear picture of how to control police discretion
(Mastrofski, 2004). Only a few studies suggested that extrinsic rewards motivate officers to
behave in a way that the organization expects. In this regard, monetary incentives and career
advancements have been seen as appropriate ways of controlling police discretion. However,
many of these studies ignore intrinsic components of motivation when they seek ways to effect
organizational control of discretion. This study, on the other hand, aims to investigate both
extrinsic and intrinsic motivators that are expected to increase officer responsiveness in the
enforcement of law.
1.2. Definition of Terms
The study uses several concepts, including police discretion, exercise of discretion,
responsiveness, selective enforcement, reward expectancy, and public service motivation.
Discretion concerns an officer‘s perspective as to how much resource should be allocated to
enforce a law in terms of time and effort. Although police discretion can be defined in different
ways, Davis‘ (1969) definition of police discretion is widely accepted by scholars. He suggested
that ―[a] public officer has discretion whenever effective limits on his power leave him free to
make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction‖ (p. 4). He also proposed that
exercise of discretion refers to a decision of an officer for a given circumstance based on known
facts and laws.
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To be able to define selective enforcement, the term ―full enforcement‖ needs to be
understood. According to Wilson‘s (1968) description, departments adopt in principle a full
enforcement policy, which refers to the enforcement of all laws and statutes by officers to all
criminal activities. Practical difficulties in implementation of this policy reveal a selective
enforcement concept that occurs when officers decide not to initiate a criminal justice process
based on personal judgments or prefer to impose lower-level sanctions instead of strictly
enforcing the rules (Davis, 1975; Wortley, 2003).
Reward expectancy means that workers will be motivated by extrinsic rewards when they
believe their effort will lead to higher performance and their performance will be rewarded by
the organization. Although expectancy theory originally suggested expectancy, instrumentality,
and valence components, these three concepts are combined into one single module that is
conceptualized as reward expectancy for purposes of this study.
One another concept of the study is public service motivation, which has been seen as a
predictor of work effort and responsiveness of employees. Public service motivation is defined as
―an individual‘s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public
institutions or organizations‖ (Perry & Wise, 1990, p. 368).
1.3. Context of the study
The Turkish National Police (TNP) is a hierarchically structured and highly centralized
organization under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Turkey. It serves the urban population of
the country, which is 70% of the whole population. Its headquarters, the General Directorate of
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TNP, is located in the capital city, Ankara. General Directorate executes its operations by local
police departments in each of 81 provinces of the country.
General Directorate is mainly responsible for developing strategies, making law
enforcement policies, and coordinating local operations. In this regard, most of the
responsibilities of General Directorate are considered to be administrative functions. These
functions are carried out by means of more than 30 subdivisions under the supervision of
General Directorate.
Local police departments are mainly responsible for the day-to-day operations of law
enforcement and order maintenance. Although local departments have some administrative
functions, their main focus is maintaining public order, preventing smuggling, managing traffic,
and performing other street policing activities. Police chiefs of local police departments report
both to the headquarters of the TNP and the governor of the province, who is the appointed
representative of the central government.

All police officers in the TNP are recruited by a central mechanism and trained either in
the National Police Academy (for ranked officers) or one of 26 police vocational schools (for
police officers) in the country. In relation to the country‘s associate membership in the European
Union, criticism of human rights violations revealed the need for better education of police
recruits. First, a six-month basic education was expanded to a two-year education in the police
vocational schools. Second, authorities decided to recruit candidates from among 4-year
university graduates.
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Trained officers are appointed to one of the provincial police departments by the central
organization. All members of the TNP are subject to rotation after serving in a province for a
certain period. Officers are appointed to various provinces in the country several times in their
professional career by a central rotation system.
Patrol divisions of police departments in the provinces are responsible for patrolling in
their patrol zones on a 24-hour basis. Their primary duties are responding to criminal or
suspicious activities on the street and investigating these incidents by stopping cars and people,
searching cars and people, questioning people, and making arrests when necessary. Their
responsibility of enforcing the law is divided into two broad categories: reactive policing, which
refers to responding to dispatcher calls, and proactive policing, which occurs when officers act
on their own initiative (Crank, 1998). The present study investigates self-initiated stopping and
questioning activities of patrol officers in Turkey.
Since this study aims to examine to what degree officers are motivated by organizational
reward, it is plausible to review the rewards offered by the Turkish National Police (TNP). One
reward offered by the TNP to its members is the salary reward, which is regulated by general
guidelines that apply to all members of the organization when their success is to be recognized.
Local departments are in charge of the implementation of the guidelines. The same guidelines
regulate recognition by appreciation letter for officers who were found to be successful on the
job. The TNP also offers officer career development for both police officers and ranked officers.
This career development might take one of two forms: appointment to a better work unit or
promotion to a higher rank.
7

Specialized units such as the organized crimes unit or the intelligence department usually
choose their personnel among younger police officers in non-specialized units such as patrol
departments. While appointment to a better work unit usually depends on achievements in
policing and good performance appraisals, promotion to a higher rank depends on performance
appraisals and completing a certain number of years at the current rank. Performance appraisals
are evaluations of officers by their supervisors based on multiple criteria. This study
operationalized salary reward, appreciation letters, appointment to a better work unit,
performance appraisals, and verbal supervisory recognition as indicators of organizational
(extrinsic) rewards.
1.4. Purpose of the Study
A large body of literature suggests that variation in police behavior in terms of exercise
of discretion is influenced by individual-, organizational-, situational-, and community-level
factors. Many empirical studies use arrest decisions, use of force, and citation decisions as a
functional tool of police discretion (Fisk, 1974). And the great majority of empirical research
uses data collected in observational field studies. Relatively less research effort was directed
toward understanding what accounts for officers‘ decisions to stop and search a car or question a
person.
The purpose of this study is to draw on motivation theory to explore the factors that affect
Turkish patrol officers‘ discretionary decisions to enforce the law. More specifically, the study
seeks to identify the role of reward expectancy and public service motivation on responsiveness
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of patrol officers in stopping vehicles and questioning people, while at the same time investigate
the negative influence of selective enforcement on responsiveness.
The study goes beyond prior research that aimed only at understanding how a reward
expectancy of officers for extra pay and career advancement shapes their decisions to enforce the
law. It aims to investigate the role of both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on willingness to
exert work effort, which is considered a strong predictor of officer responsiveness. The study
also takes into account officer attitudes toward selective enforcement that are assumed to
negatively influence responsiveness and reduce engaging in stop-and-question activities. In
summary, the study assumes that work effort (which is affected by extrinsic and intrinsic
motivation) and discretionary selective enforcement affect stop-and-question responsiveness of
patrol officers.
1.5. Research Questions
This study primarily focuses on the impact of organization and individual attitudes on
police behavior during the discretionary decision-making process. In this context, the study seeks
answers to the following research questions:
RQ1: What is the role of the organization in controlling discretionary decisions of patrol
officers in everyday law enforcement activities?
RQ2: What is the impact of reward expectancy on officers‘ responsiveness in terms of
stopping/questioning activities?
RQ3: Does public service motivation influence responsiveness of patrol officers?
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RQ4: Do attitudes toward selective enforcement affect responsiveness of patrol officers?
1.6. Significance of the Study
This study is significant in three different aspects. The study provides not only theoretical
but also methodological contributions to the police discretion literature by investigating
discretion in a hierarchical police organization.
First, it provides a theoretical framework that was not used in previous studies.
Mastrofski (2004) argued that police discretion literature does not go beyond categorizing factors
affecting discretion. This study‘s contribution to the literature becomes vital when the scarcity of
theoretically grounded studies in the police-discretion literature is taken into account
(Schulenberg, 2004). Only a few studies test expectancy theory by shedding light on an
organization‘s role in increasing productivity (conceptualized as responsiveness in this study)
and controlling discretion (Dejong, Mastrofski, & Parks, 2001; Mastrofski, Ritti, & Snipes,
1994). Many studies use secondary data gathered for different purposes and apply theory to the
available data if theory is used. This study, on the other hand, uses data gathered specifically to
test its theoretical framework.
Second, the study was conducted in a hierarchical police organization that is centrally
structured and managed. Scholars intensified efforts to understand variation in police behavior in
different police agencies from state- and local-level law enforcement organizations. However,
discretion in large hierarchical police agencies is almost unknown. Turkish Police operates under
a hierarchically structured central organization, as opposed to many local police agencies in the
United States. This study contributes to understanding of police discretionary behavior in this
10

particular structural, cultural, and legal environment, one that is different from the U.S. One
other contribution is that the study reveals policy implications for the Turkish National Police
(TNP), where police discretion is an untouched research area. When it is considered that many
European countries have national police forces, the results of the study may well be applicable to
other law enforcement agencies.
Third, the methodological strength of the study comes from the use of confirmatory
factor analysis with structural equation modeling (SEM). Structural equation modeling is a
powerful tool used to develop measurement models for given latent constructs and to validate
them before putting them into a structural equation model (Byrne, 2006). Selective enforcement
and responsiveness concepts are measured by using confirmatory factor analysis in this study.
1.7. Chapter Summary
By directing attention to the law enforcer‘s behaviors in communities, scholars and
practitioners have questioned the discretionary decisions of patrol officers for the last several
decades. To date, there is almost a consensus that police behavior must be controlled in a
contemporary society. However, it is extremely difficult to reach consensus on what is an
appropriate decision under street contingencies and how to regulate undesired and improper
behaviors of individual officers. How to address these challenging issues in police practice and
determine the causes of police behavior are widely discussed in the literature.
Empirical investigations revealed that determinants of discretionary decisions on the
street fall into four categories: organizational, situational, individual, and environmental.
Although previous studies have examined the role of various organizational, situational,
11

individual, and environmental characteristics they did not specifically focus on the influence of
motivational and attitudinal factors on police discretion. As such, this study provides further
insight into the effect of external and internal motives on police responsiveness on the street in
the enforcement of law. Even though earlier research in police discretion has identified arrest
rates per individual officer as a measure of discretion, little analytic attention has been given to
broader measurement tools of discretion. This study attempts to fill this gap by studying the
responsiveness of officers to various kinds of enforcement activities, rather than focusing on
arrest decisions only.
The next chapter reviews the literature by focusing on police discretion and the factors
that contribute to the emergence of discretion. Then, it examines discretion-control strategies by
taking a motivational perspective.
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CHAPTER.2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The first part of this chapter reviews the police discretion literature in four broad
categories: situational, environmental, individual/attitudinal, and organizational. The second part
of the chapter focuses on how to control police discretion, taking a motivational perspective on
regulating officer behavior. The role of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in controlling
discretionary actions on the street is discussed within motivation theory. The concept of reward
expectancy, derived from the expectancy theory of motivation, and public service motivation,
which come from the intrinsic motivation literature, are investigated in terms of their influence
on work effort and responsiveness. Finally, the third part illustrates the conceptual model of the
study, which proposes the use of motivation to increase responsiveness while considering
attitudes toward selective enforcement.
2.1. Determinant of Police Discretion
Arrest decisions of police officers were mostly examined by conducting observational
field studies to reveal discretion in police work and its determinants. Researchers studying arrest
decisions have focused on individual, situational, and organizational determinants of police
discretionary behavior. Much research has been conducted to explain how variation in police
behavior is affected by organizational influence and environmental factors, individual officer
characteristics, demographics of officers, and also by officers‘ beliefs, values, and attitudes.
Under situational factors, variables attributed to suspected offenders or the relationship between
victim and suspect, involvement of weapon, seriousness of offence, and intoxication of suspect
were investigated. Organizational factors studied included bureaucratization (hierarchical
13

structure of department), professionalism (having a wide range of specialty units, educated and
trained officers), department size, and whether the agency has an arrest policy. A considerable
amount of research emphasized organizational factors affecting police arrest decisions based on
Wilson‘s (1968) argument that suggested that behavior of individual police officers is a function
of departmental characteristics and goals (Eitle, 2005; Friedrich, 1977; Groeneveld, 2005;
Mastrofski, Ritti, & Hoffsmaster, 1987; Robinson & Chandek, 2000). Other research focused on
environmental factors by looking at community characteristics and social control in the
community (Klinger, 1997).
2.1.1. Situational Determinants of Discretion
Situational factors have been found to be more important determinants of officer
decisions than other variables such as officer characteristics and attitudes, organizational
influence, and community-level determinants. The importance of situational factors arises from
their consistency across many previous studies conducted in a variety of settings. Since legal
factors affect discretion, it is not surprising that officers make more arrests when crimes are
serious, when weapons are used, when suspects are intoxicated, and so on, compared to
situations involving extra-legal factors (Klinger, 1996; Robinson & Chandek, 2000; Worden,
1989).
One variable found to be related to officer behavior is seriousness of offence. Scholars
investigating the seriousness of offence operationalized it as felony versus misdemeanor (Black,
1971; Friedrich, 1977; Smith, 1987). Previous research consistently reported that officers make
more arrests for serious crimes.
14

Literature indicated a strong relationship between the demeanor of suspect and police
decisions. Police officers are more inclined to arrest hostile citizens (Black, 1971). Oppenlander
(1982) reported that an arrest probability is higher when suspects resist officer demands in
police–citizen encounters. Disrespectful behaviors of offenders increase the likelihood of an
officer making an arrest and using force toward those suspects (Engel, Sobel, & Worden, 2000;
Worden, 1989; Worden & Shepard, 1996). On the other hand, Klinger (1996) argued that
suspects‘ demeanor affects officer behavior only when offenders behave in an extremely hostile
manner.
Another variable whose impact on police decisions has been investigated is the
demographic characteristics of suspects. Studies examining gender differences in police
discretion usually suggest that men are more likely to be arrested or stopped by police (Friedrich,
1977; Sealock & Simpson, 1998; Visher, 1983). These results are interpreted by scholars to
mean that police perceive males to be more dangerous than females. Some studies, on the other
hand, detected no gender difference in police decisions (Klinger, 1996; Smith & Visher, 1981)
Previous studies on police discretion mostly found that race is a strong predictor of stop,
search, question, and arrest decisions of police. They consistently reported that blacks are more
likely to be stopped and/or arrested (Black, 1971; Friedrich, 1977). Similarly, use of force was
found to be more likely toward racial minorities, especially blacks (Smith & Visher, 1981; Smith
et al, 1984; Worden 1995). Scholars have different interpretations of these results. Some
suggested that this figure can be explained by more frequent disrespectful behaviors of blacks
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toward police. However, others argued that race does not affect police decisions when
seriousness of offence is controlled for (Smith & Visher, 1981).
Research also indicated that the relationship between victim and suspect influences the
decision to arrest. More arrests are made when there is no relationship between offender and
victim. An arrest is less likely in cases where the offender and victim are relatives or friends
(Black 1971; Friedrich, 1977). Supporting these studies, Worden and Pollitz (1984) reported that
officers are less likely to make an arrest when the victim and suspect are married, while
Robinson and Chandek (2000) asserted that marital status has no effect on officer decisions to
arrest.
Time of shift was also investigated as a situational variable, based on the idea that patrol
officers are less likely to make an arrest or stop when they have time constraints, since
paperwork is considered time consuming. However, many studies have not detected any
significant relationship between time of shift and officer decisions. This disparity in result has
been attributed to different operationalizations of the variables (Robinson & Chandek, 2000).
Previous studies have also indicated that an arrest is more likely when a weapon is
involved in the incident (Eigenberg, Scarborough, & Keppeler, 1996, Smith, 1987), when the
offender is intoxicated (Worden, 1989), when the victim is injured (Feder, 1996) or when
witnesses or audiences are present (Smith & Visher, 1981).
As reviewed here, situational factors have consistently been shown to exert a strong
impact on arrest decisions of patrol officers. However, scholars reported their inadequacy in
developing a theory of police discretion, since they did not have suitable tools to investigate
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other policing practices such as stop, search, or questioning suspects (Worden, 1989).
Furthermore, determining the effect of situational factors on arrest decisions does not provide
policy implications for practitioners to control police discretion.
2.1.2. Environmental Determinants of Discretion
Police discretion research suggests that even when situational characteristics are very
similar, policing practices differ depending on community characteristics. Police officers develop
behavior models that are acceptable in the community where policing is practiced. As a
consequence, Miller and Bryant (1993) suggested that police behavior is shaped by where the
police–citizen encounter takes place and where the citizen lives. Werthman and Pilliavin (1967)
proposed that police should separate areas into different jurisdictions depending on perceived
racial composition, activity level, and crime rates of the neighborhood. This classification could
form the basis for officers to make speedy decisions and ultimately develop behavior patterns in
these communities. Klinger (1997) argued that police response to a specific neighborhood is
largely influenced by officer perceptions of what appropriate behavior is in that community. In
circumstances when police believes that a community does not deserve services, the community
gets a lower level of services by police. In this context, white and affluent communities are more
likely to be served by police.
The crime rate in a community also determines the policing strategy to be implemented in
that community. Empirical investigations indicated that police are more inclined to behave
harshly in communities with higher crime rates (Fyfe, 1981). Alpert, Macdonald, and Dunham
(2005) argued that officer perceptions about neighborhood characteristics reveal controversial
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issues in policing practices. They specifically suggested that ―the perception of high crime rates
in certain communities leads to greater police deployment, which yields higher arrest rates,
which, in turn, [is] interpreted as evidence of a higher crime rate‖ (p. 411).
As discussed in the previous section, it is argued that the race of individuals has an
impact on police decisions to make stops, make arrests, and use force toward citizens. In addition
to this, the relationship between racial composition and police response to situations within
certain communities was researched by researchers. Smith (1986) reported that police exercise of
authority in neighborhoods is influenced by the rational composition of that community.
Minority status becomes very essential in predicting police behavior when an individual from a
minority is involved in an incident in a community that has a different racial population.
Specifically, black persons in a white neighborhood are more likely to be perceived as suspicious
by police. Based on these findings, Alpert et al. (2005) suggested that the effect of race on police
decisions should be studied by taking it into account together with the racial composition of the
community.
Many researchers argued that variations in police behavior can be explained by the
degree of informal social control in the community. Lower-level informal social control requires
greater formal social control. In other words, a negative relationship exists between informal
social control in a community and use of police control in that community (Alpert, Dunham, &
Piquero, 1997). Socio-economic characteristics of neighborhoods also affect a community‘s
expectations of police; consequently, priorities of police differ from one community to another
(Dunham, Alpert, Stroshine, & Bennett, 2005; Novak, Frank, Smith, & Engel, 2002).
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Community characteristics reviewed in this section demonstrated an effect on police
behavior. Higher crime rates in a community, minority status, and lower informal control
increase punitive police practices such as use of deadly force and higher arrest rates. Studies on
environmental factors suggested that the primary determinant of officer behavior in a given
community is officer perception of community characteristics.
2.1.3. Individual and Attitudinal Determinants of Discretion
Individual factors are investigated in two categories. First, individual characteristics of
officers have been seen as correlates of police decisions. Many studies examined the relationship
between officer characteristics, such as gender, age, race, educational level, social class, and
experience, and police behavior. Those studies produced mixed results concerning the influence
of individual characteristics on officer decision-making (Lanza-Kaduce and Greenleaf, 1994).
Some scholars examining the impact of officer gender on variations in police behavior
suggested that police behavior on the street is influenced by officer gender while others reported
a weak or no relationship between the two. In a study investigating officer values and goals on
decision-making, it is reported that female police officers have a different set of values from
male police officers, ultimately resulting in more involvement of female officers in family
disturbances (Homant & Kennedy, 1985). Other studies also indicated that male officers are
more likely to make an arrest than their female colleagues (Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 1996).
Worden (1995) and Terrill and Mastrofski (2002), on the other hand, suggested that gender has
no influence on discretionary officer decisions.
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A few studies found that officer behaviors are linked to the race of the officer. Dunham et
al. (2005) indicated that nonwhite officers are less likely to issue a ticket than other officers in
traffic violations. In terms of providing support to community members, black officers were
found to be more supportive than white officers (Sun & Payne, 2004). A large body of literature,
however, did not detect any impact of officer race on officer behavior (Terrill & Mastrofski,
2002; Walker et al., 1996; Worden 1995).
Another individual-level variable that is related to police behavior is work experience of
officers. Stalans and Finn (1995) concluded that years of experience reduces the likelihood of an
arrest, confirming previous studies (Bittner, 1990; Muir, 1977). Confirming these results, Terrill
and Mastrofski (2002) also found a negative relationship between years of experience and the
level of force use.
Educational level of officers and discretionary choices of officers are also weakly related.
Fyfe reported that officers with higher levels of education tend to use less force than others,
while others argued that there is a weak relationship between education and officer behavior
(Worden, 1990).
Along with officers‘ characteristics, officer decisions are thought to be correlated with
officers‘ values, beliefs, and attitudes. According to Goldstein (1977), officers‘ responses in
certain situations are derived from their perceptions on what policing means. Similarly,
Mastrofski , Worden, and Snipes (1995) have reported that officers engage in policing activities
based on their beliefs as to what is best for the community. A developmental process forms
officers‘ attitudes toward their role, community, and citizens that leads them to build up an
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interpretive framework for understanding situations as they arise. They use their own attitudes
and policing style to make decisions about who is suspicious, who is to be arrested, and whose
actions need to be investigated.
Although many scholars argued that officer attitudes can help in understanding of
discretionary behavior, the literature suggests that the relationship between attitudes and
behavior is not strong enough to judge whether a certain set of values guarantee a certain kind of
behavior. Not surprisingly, empirical research on the impact of attitudes on behavior has
revealed inconsistent results.
Overall, studies on individual characteristics of officers did not produce consistent
findings and did not reveal a strong impact on behavior. Empirical evidence on individual
determinants‘ effects on officer decisions is not strong. The mixed results of the research suggest
that further research is required to test possible associations between these factors and police
behavior. Similarly, even though officer attitudes failed to produce consistent results in
explaining discretionary decisions of officers, the link between these two variables requires
further empirical investigation. The next section is specifically dedicated to examining officer
attitudes toward selective enforcement.
Police are legally responsible to enforce law impartially without any exception based on
full-enforcement policy. However, this policy is ―neither possible nor desirable because of
conflicting organizational goals, diverse situational demands and the dependence of police on the
communities they serve‖ (Smith & Visher, 1981, p. 167).
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Police officers face a variety of minor and serious deviant actions that are described as
crime by law. In these situations, they have the choice whether to appeal to the criminal justice
process. Because of the ambiguity of misdemeanor laws and the limited time available to deal
with criminal cases, officers make decisions about the importance and priority of cases they
confront. Priority perceptions of patrolmen about deviant behaviors urge them to intensify their
effort on the enforcement of certain crimes rather than enforcing the law equally under every
circumstance. The basic question for an officer is whether to focus on felonies only or to apply
the law to all criminal actions regardless of their seriousness. Brown (1981) reported that most
officers in the three departments investigated in his study believed that an officer should not
ignore minor crimes and should not focus only on serious crimes. Nonetheless, he argued that
―no patrolman entirely escapes the necessity of priorities‖ (p. 194) , since an officer who makes a
great deal of stops and arrests for minor crimes may become unavailable for more serious crimes
such as murders or robberies. Even though attitudes toward discretionary enforcement differ by
the policing orientation of patrolmen, it is widely accepted that all officers engage in
discretionary selective enforcement behavior.
Officers find some parts of patrolling work more important or interesting than others.
Some officers, for example, work on drug addiction cases, since they perceive that addiction
causes many other crimes, such as burglaries and violent crimes, while others concentrate on
drunk drivers, as they see driving under the influence as a major cause of traffic accidents. In this
manner, the individual priorities of officers may lead to ―informal patterns of specialization‖ on
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crime. These tendencies are reflected in patrol behaviors as long as officers have the ability to
work certain kind of crimes and the autonomy to choose their own course of action.
It is important to note here that minor violations put more discretionary power into the
hands of patrol officers than serious crimes. For example, no officer has the freedom to ignore
murder as opposed to a minor traffic violation (Mastrofski et al., 1994).
2.1.4. Organizational Determinants of Discretion
Research on organizational characteristics of police agencies indicated that decisions of
police officers are related to departmental characteristics (Chappell, MacDonald, & Manz, 2006;
Groeneveld, 2005; Mastrofski, 1981; Mastrofski et al., 1987; Smith, 1984). Officers‘ decisions
are affected by organizational values, demands, and constraints. In other words, police officers
from different organizations with various characteristics may behave differently under the same
or similar circumstances (Smith, 1984).
In his pioneering work, Varieties of Police Behavior, Wilson (1968) suggested that
attitudes and behaviors of officers on the role of police are shaped by organizational
characteristics and goals. Furthermore, the political climate in a community makes police
organizations distinguishably different from each other. Wilson (1968) identified three types of
police organizations: watchman, legalistic, and service style police departments. Watchman style
organizations operate under an order maintenance philosophy. The primary goal of these
agencies is maintaining order. In these types of organizations, officers selectively enforce the law
by ignoring minor crimes and invoking the law for major crimes that are perceived as important
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by citizens and local politicians. Because of low organizational budgets, officers receive
generally low pay. Educational standards are low (if any), and in-service training is not
encouraged by the agency. They are far from organizationally complex; instead, they have large
bureaucracies with little specialization.
In legalistic style departments, higher arrest rates and traffic citations are seen as
indicators of higher officer performance. Legalistic organizations‘ philosophy can be
summarized as ―law is law, no exceptions.‖ Officers in these departments tend to exercise less
discretion. Desirable behavior as identified by their administrators is that of a strict enforcement
strategy based on widespread procedures and rules. These organizations encourage their
members to advance in their education and training by rewarding them for continuing education.
Entry to the agency requires meeting higher education standards, and officers are paid higher
salaries in return. The agency‘s mission is achieved by many different highly specialized
subunits, and there is competition among officers for higher ranks within special units.
Service style organizations are similar to legalistic departments in that they also have a
high level of professionalism. However, they have considerably fewer hierarchical levels and
less administrative control compared to legalistic departments. They rely on a decentralized
control mechanism. The main goal is keeping the peace, and the community‘s needs are taken
into account; problem-solving is a widely used strategy. They rarely invoke their power to arrest,
since the main idea is solving problems in society without invoking the law.
A few studies examined organizational influence on individual officers‘ behavior using
Wilson‘s typology. They investigated organizational correlates of police behavior, including
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bureaucratization, professionalism, and department size (Chappell et al., 2006; Groeneveld,
2005; Mastrofski et al., 1987; Smith, 1984).
Mastrofski et al. (1987) tested three possible explanations of organizational impact on an
individual‘s behavior. According to their study, the rational model emphasizes the importance of
setting organizational goals, making formal policies, and monitoring the implementation of rules
at the street level for the administration of the organization. In this model, performance of street
level officers is evaluated, and compliance with organizational regulations and consequently
higher performance are rewarded. The main assumption of the model is that the bureaucratic
structure of the organization has a strong impact on the daily tasks of employees and their ability
to control their behavior. Similarly, the constrained rational model also acknowledges the impact
of the administration on daily decision-making practices of individual officers. However, based
on Wilson‘s (1968) propositions, the constrained rational model highlights the limited capacity
of higher-level management in controlling officer decisions on the street. This model recognizes
the practical issues concerning the applicability of policies made by the administration. Unlike
the rational model, it takes into account the environment of organizations by acknowledging that
political cultures shape the selection of an agency‘s leadership and ultimately the police practices
in that community. The constrained rational model, therefore, suggests that organizations can
shape the exercise of discretion, albeit in a narrower scope than that proposed by the rational
model. While the constrained rational model offers limited organizational control, the loosely
coupled model proposes that the influence of an organization is reasonably insignificant, since
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bureaucratic mechanisms of agencies are not closely tied with street-level officer decisions.
Instead, it emphasizes the impact of environment, culture, and peer influence.
In investigating the three proposed models, Mastrofski et al. (1987) reported that
organizational size is an essential element in evaluating the validity of these models. Based on
their analysis, they found that officer decision-making is widely influenced by the policing
environment and peer culture in larger bureaucratic departments, while organizational policies
become an essential instrument in regulating officer behavior in smaller departments. Higherlevel compliance with the formal policies in smaller agencies indicated that the rational model
can explain the administration‘s influence on officer behavior, while the loosely coupled model
accounts for the wider exercise of discretion in larger police departments.
Another study (Smith, 1984) examined organizations‘ effects on officer decisions by
recognizing four different organizational styles based on Wilson‘s (1968) organizational
typology. The study‘s primary conclusion was that there is no global decision-making model
among law enforcement agencies. Officer decisions on the street mainly depend on the context
of the organization where those decisions are made. Patrol officers working in legalistic
agencies, for example, have a tendency to make more arrests than their colleagues in other types
of departments. Therefore, the organizational context in which discretionary decisions are made
should be taken into account in order to enhance understanding of police behavior (Smith, 1984).
Research examining organizational determinants of discretion found that organizational
complexity and large bureaucratic structures negatively affect the probability of making an
arrest. Maguire (1994) investigated the impact of organizational context and structure on arrest
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rates in child abuse cases. He concluded that larger police departments make fewer arrests than
smaller departments. Mastrofski et al. (1994) studied the role of informal and formal
characteristics in driving-under-the-influence situations. They reported that officers in smaller
agencies made more arrests than their counterparts in larger agencies. They attributed these
results to lower organizational control in larger departments. The study revealed that policies and
rules are strictly enforced in smaller departments, while informal characteristics of the larger
organization dominated officer behaviors, resulting in a wider exercise of discretion.
McCluskey, Varano, Huebner, and Bynum (2004) looked for further evidence on
organizations‘ role in shaping the daily practices of police officers. They argued that
organizational goals are dynamic in nature and that they affect the priorities of organizations.
Changes in policy at the organizational level influenced the officers‘ exercise of discretion in
arrest and referral of juveniles.
Despite evidence suggesting the influence of organizational characteristics on police
discretion, some scholars argued that the police discretion literature overestimates the importance
of the role organizations can play in controlling discretionary officer decision (Chappell et al.,
2006). By looking at the relationship between organizational structure and officer decisions,
they concluded that even though Wilson‘s classification provides a theoretical basis to study the
impact of organizational context on decision-making, it needs to be reconsidered in the light of
contemporary policing approaches. In fact, some studies concluded that the degree of
bureaucratization has a positive association with the probability of arrest (Brown, 1981; Murphy,
1986; Smith & Klein, 1984), while other research has not detected any relationship between
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decision to arrest and bureaucratization (Smith et al., 1984). Inconsistency in the results of
research has been explained by the lack of consensus on how to operationalize bureaucratization
(Eitle, 2005).
In short, the literature suggests that organizational characteristics, such as departmental
size and degree of bureaucratization and professionalism, have an impact on discretionary
decisions of officers. Organizational style was also found to be associated with the behaviors of
patrolmen. Even though some scholars (for example, Chappell et al. (2006)) argued that the data
need to be revisited according to contemporary policing approaches, Wilson (1968)‘s
organizational typology seems to be relevant to some degree in today‘s policing environment.
Clearly, an organization can influence its members‘ choices on the street by regulating them via
organizational policies, rules, and reward/sanction structures.
The literature review revealed that situational factors have the strongest impact on
determining officer choices in making decisions under contingencies of the street. However, it is
also plausible that officer decisions may vary in very similar situations based on the community
characteristics where the policing is practiced. The two most-cited environmental factors that
contribute to the development of officer behavior patterns are racial composition and community
crime rates. Research also indicated that officers do not behave automatically in a given situation
within a community; instead they interpret situations based on their own personal attitudes and
individual characteristics. Studies also reported that attitudes toward policing and discretion and
perceptions of community and citizens help in choosing a course of action when decisions are
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made. Attitudes toward selective enforcement, for example, help officers decide whether to
invoke the law and whether to apply lower-level sanctions than the law requires.
Previous work mainly investigated organizational factors that are likely to account for
variation in police behavior within the organizational theory framework. In this regard, a few
empirical studies reviewed in this section analyzed the validity of the rational, constrained
rational, and loosely coupled models (Eitle, 2005; Mastrofski et al.,1987). A majority of them
concluded that the degree to which an organization can direct behaviors of line officers depends
on the size and structure of the organization.
The following section reviews the literature on controlling police discretion and provides
an overview on how to structure police discretion.
2.2. Controlling Discretion
As discussed in previous sections, individual, situational, environmental, and
organizational factors among various determinants of police decisions have been discussed
widely in the police discretion literature. Many studies found that situational factors have the
strongest impact on daily police decisions (Smith & Visher, 1981; Worden, 1989). However,
organizations have no influence on situational determinants of police discretion, although they
are very powerful in determining the decisions of officers (Mastrofski, 2004).
Controlling police discretion can be investigated in at least two broad categories. First,
organizations may choose to shape officer decisions on the street by using external rewards to
motivate them to behave in the way that the organization wants to be followed. Second,
organizations can promote values and beliefs of their members to have concurrence on
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organizational and individual values so that employees perform their job in a desired way. The
first category basically refers to extrinsic motives‘ influence on police discretion, while the
second category suggests that intrinsic motives and attitudes of officers need to be considered in
shaping behaviors of officers. The following sections discuss both extrinsic and intrinsic
motivation and individual attitudes in relationship to police discretion.
2.2.1. Motivational and Altitudinal Perspectives in Controlling Discretion
The first perspective suggests that to be able to influence officer behavior, organizations
can intervene in some factors, such as organizational structures, incentive/sanction schemes, and
organizational policies that are conceptualized as organizational factors in the literature (Jenkins,
Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998). In fact, many law enforcement organizations develop reward
structures, since they see them as an appropriate way of controlling police discretion. Various
monetary and promotional rewards are used to motivate officers to increase organizational
efficiency and effectiveness by increasing officers‘ responsiveness. Widely used organizational
rewards include promotion opportunities, overtime payment, and official recognition for greater
arrest, stop/search, and citation productivity. This approach, however, is far from being flawless,
and the success of reward instrumentality in shaping police behavior is questioned. As stated by
Mastrofski (2004),
Police organizations find control of this sort highly problematic because the organizations
are limited in their capacity to manipulate what employees really care about, and the
systems of control themselves are cumbersome, elaborate, conflicting, and often (as a
consequence) only loosely connected to the day-to-day world of the decision makers
whose activities they are intended to direct. (p. 104)
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The second approach emphasizes that it is imperative to manage discretion by using a
value-based approach. This approach requires the administrator to promote to subordinates the
exercise of certain behaviors simply because they are believed to be right and proper. Some
scholars conceptualized this second approach as ―self-regulatory,‖ since it primarily depends on
internal motives of employees rather than external eventualities of environment (Tyler, Callahan,
& Frost, 2007).

This approach basically highlights individuals‘ instinctive inclinations as

primary motives of human behavior. These intrinsic motivators are supposed to be independent
from external drivers for a behavior. The values held by organization members can help
members to engage in behaviors and activities that are encouraged by the organization. The key
aspect of this approach is that individual and organizational values and goals must be consistent
to achieve compliance with organizational policies and ultimately exert control on police
discretion.
For purposes of this study, incentive and sanction structures of organizations were
conceptualized as reward expectancy and considered in the first category of controlling
discretion. The reward expectancy model recognizes that workers follow their own self-interest,
and thus their aims would maximize their utility in the workplace. Theoretical roots of this model
can be traced to fundamental principles of economic theory that make human behavior
dependent on cost/benefit calculations. It emphasizes that employees are instrumentally
motivated and mainly interested in the outcomes offered by the organizations (Tyler et al., 2007).
Intrinsic motives of employees are examined in a second category, since it basically
refers to the values of officers. Many researchers argued that intrinsic rewards also have a role in
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motivating employees (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Intrinsic motivation examines whether
the job is meaningful to employees, whether employees feel personally responsible for results of
their work, and whether they know the outcomes of their activities (Hackman & Oldham, 1980).
Previous research indicated that intrinsic motivators, such as feelings of personal
accomplishment and pride, contribution to the social good, and helping others, affect work-effort
performance.
In the early years of motivation research, extrinsic and intrinsic motivators were thought
to be independent and their powers additive (Cameron & Pierce, 2002). However, more recent
studies revealed that their combination may not increase motivational force. Instead, some
scholars argued that extrinsic rewards actually undermine intrinsic motivation. This argument
has been widely discussed in the literature, and some evidence was found of a crowding-out
effect of monetary rewards over intrinsic rewards, especially in certain settings and conditions
(as cited in Oh & Lewis, 2009: Canton, 2005; Frey, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Several other
studies reported contradictory results, indicating that pay and other monetary incentives are
primary motivators and they do not undermine intrinsic motivation (as cited in Oh & Lewis,
2009: Cameron, Banko, & Pierce 2001; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996).
The studies comparing the relative influence of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on
performance found that intrinsic motivators‘ impact on employee behavior was stronger than
extrinsic ones, especially in the public sector (Cherrington, 1980; Rainey, Traut, & Blunt, 1986).
These findings are consistent across studies.
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The following sections focus on the reward-expectancy concept (an extrinsic motivation)
and public service motivation (an intrinsic motivation).
Officer attitudes also can be investigated under a value-based approach, since employees
bring their ideas, attitudes, and values into an organization. The literature suggests that officer
attitudes toward citizens, toward policing styles, and toward enforcement of law may differ
substantially from one another (Paoline, 2004). The literature provides some insight into the
impact of attitude on police behavior; however, this effect was not consistently supported by
empirical research even though some studies reported that attitudes are important in shaping
behavior.
This study attempts to examine the role of extrinsic motivation, intrinsic motivation, and
selective enforcement on police discretionary decisions. As discussed earlier, extrinsic rewards
offered by organizations were investigated in the scope of a traditional approach to research,
while intrinsic motivation and selective enforcement attitudes were investigated in the valuebased approach. This study conceptualizes extrinsic motivation as reward expectancy and takes
public service motivation as a type of intrinsic motivation. Attitudes toward selective
enforcement were studied as a separate concept that has a role on police decisions.
2.2.2. Reward Expectancy
The rewards expectancy concept of this study is mainly derived from the expectancy
theory of motivation. Three main components of the expectancy theory suggested by Vroom
(1964) were combined into the reward expectancy concept. The basic premise of the concept is

33

that employees‘ motivation is a function of their effort to increase performance, their belief that
high performance will lead to rewards, and their perception of the value of those rewards.
Expectancy theory is accepted as a model of behavioral choice and used widely in the
industrial psychology field. Since its emphasis is on an attempt to explain how workers make
decisions to obtain what they value, it is helpful in understanding patrol officers‘ discretionary
decision-making. Three major components (expectancy, instrumentality, and valence) of the
theory and two additional aspects (capability and opportunity—originally included in
expectancy) are shortly described.
Expectancy: This first component of the theory refers to the belief that certain types of
actions lead to a certain level of performance. This belief is derived from past experience and the
perceived difficulty of the task, and it encompasses three subcomponents. The first
subcomponent refers to the fact that workers must believe that their effort will result in
achievement of a desired level of performance. It is predicted that employees will not exert effort
in the absence of this belief. Second, workers also need to perceive that they have the ability and
skills to perform the expected duty. Capability of employees was found to be a strong predictor
of higher performance in different work settings. Third, in addition to effort and capability,
employees should believe that they have enough opportunity to perform a given job. Officers‘
unassigned time is taken as opportunity by several studies.
Instrumentality: Instrumentality refers to the perception that when workers achieve
performance expectations, they will receive rewards (outcomes) attached to that level of
performance. These outcomes may be rewarded in various forms: promotion, increase in pay, or
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recognition of accomplishment. Potential rewards are not necessarily perceived by workers as
instrumental unless they are closely linked to certain levels of performance.
Valance: Valence is defined as orientation toward rewards (outcomes). It refers to what a
worker in the organization values in terms of extrinsic rewards. Workers in an organization are
less likely to behave in a desired way unless they believe that the value of performance outcomes
outweighs the cost of the effort required to perform the task.
Based on assumptions of expectancy theory, in the first instance, officers on the street
need to perceive that performing stop-and-question is a departmental priority and that they are
expected to perform this task. Then, they should believe that they have the capability and
opportunity to do so. Third, they should perceive that they will receive rewards when they
achieve desired levels of performance in terms of stop-and-question. Finally, they should really
want to obtain what the organization or supervisors offer.
A few studies used expectancy theory to explain officer productivity and the
organizational rewards relationship. In a study that used expectancy theory, Mastrofski et al.
(1994) investigated the variation in number of arrests by officers for driving-under-the-influence
(DUI) cases. Research has indicated that officer capability of making DUI arrests, opportunity to
do so, and perceived incentives of the organization increased the number of arrests. However, in
the Mastrofski et al. research, instrumentality was negatively correlated with DUI arrests,
meaning that officers who believed that their arrest performance was instrumental in receiving
organizational rewards made fewer arrests. Another study came up with similar findings by
suggesting that officers‘ engagement of problem-solving activities was influenced by their status
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as community policing officers, by having the opportunity and being capable of problem solving,
and by being evaluated based on their problem-solving performance (Dejong et al., 2001). In
another study, the officers who made the greatest number of arrests were those who perceived
that making a drug-related arrest would be rewarded by their department, those whose
organization considered drug enforcement as a priority, those who thought that they had enough
time to investigate drug cases, and officers who had special drug training (Johnson, 2009a).
Even though these researchers used motivation as a theoretical basis for their
investigation, all of them took an extrinsic motivational perspective by using an expectancy
theory framework. Only Mastrofski et al. (1994) included intrinsic factors in the expectancy
context. This study, however, introduces public service motivation, which considers one form of
the intrinsic motivation as a separate construct in the model.
2.2.3. Public Service Motivation
Public service motivation has been considered a particular type of intrinsic motivation
(Crewson 1997; Petrovsky, 2009; Steijn, 2008) that ―is concerned with [the] well-being of
others‖ (Petrovsky, 2009, p. 5). Public service motivation refers to individuals‘ willingness to
work for the interests of people and the welfare of society (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008). First,
according to the propositions of Perry and Wise (1990), individuals with higher public service
motivation were inclined to choose jobs in public organizations. Second, a positive relationship
exists between employees‘ public service motivation level and their job performance. Finally,
employees with a high level of public service motivation are less likely to be motivated by
extrinsic rewards. These arguments have been investigated by scholars for two decades.
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Research indicates that public service motivation can predict performance and other job-related
outcomes, such as organizational commitment and job satisfaction. One of these studies
(Crewson, 1997) indicated that government employees value their service more than do their
counterparts in the private sector. Crewson also reported that their commitment to their
organizations was higher than that of private workers. Rainey (1997) compared public and
private organizations and found that public workers are more concerned with helping others and
doing something that is meaningful for the community and they are less concerned with
utilitarian rewards when compared to employees in private organizations. The assumption of a
positive relationship between public service motivation and performance was also investigated
by Naff and Crum (1999). They concluded that public service motivation positively affected job
satisfaction and employee performance.
2.2.4. Work Effort
Although a great deal of research investigated the association between motivation and
performance, most studies overlooked the role of effort, which is considered to be an essential
component of the motivation/performance models. One reason for neglecting this concept is that
effort is thought to be the same concept as motivation. However, more comprehensive
definitions made a distinction between the two constructs by considering motivation as a
determinant of effort. In one of these definitions, Brown and Peterson (1994) suggested that
―effort represents the force, energy or activity by which work is accomplished‖ (p. 71). Scholars
pointed out that effort is a fundamental component that needs to be regarded as linking
motivation and performance (Brown & Peterson, 1994; Naylor, Pritchard, & Ilgen, 1980). Effort
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has at least two main dimensions: duration and intensity (Brown & Leigh, 1996; Kanfer, 1991).
Previous research suggested that work effort positively affects the performance of workers (Blau,
1993; Brown & Leigh, 1996). Brown and Leigh (1996) emphasized that effort mediates the
relationship between motivation and outcomes of the work. Even though responsiveness in our
model does not directly represent performance, it is considered a work outcome. Thus, it is
plausible that the level of work effort will positively influence responsiveness.
Even though employees are highly motivated by extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, their
responsiveness will not necessarily increase, since other factors may negatively affect their
responsiveness. The police discretion literature, in fact, indicates that some selective enforcement
attitudes were found to be negatively related to police responsiveness. Therefore, work effort is
included in the study as separate concept. The concept refers to an intention to work hard;
however, it may not become a behavior. Brockner, Grover, Reed, and DeWitt (1992) recognized
work effort as ―one of the key determinants of … job performance‖ and suggested that ―any
change in … performance can most likely be attributed to change in work effort‖ (p. 414).
2.3. Police Suspicion and Responsiveness to Situations
Most studies on police discretion are observational field studies, and the great majority of
them investigate arrest decisions (Dunham et al, 2005; Novak et al., 2002; Smith, Novak, Frank,
& Lowenkamp, 2005). Other research investigated post-arrest decisions and criminal-charge
decisions of officers (Phillips & Varano, 2008). Arrest data are methodologically easy to use for
statistical analysis, and they answer many research inquiries on explaining officer decisions.
Determinants of arrest and post-arrest decisions do not necessarily apply to other areas of officer
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decision-making, such as decision to stop, search, and question people. Therefore, they are of
limited use in research seeking to understand overall police behavior and develop theories of
police behavior (Worden, 1989). For example, they do not ―address why an officer selects a
particular individual for a stop thereby transforming some citizens into suspects while ignoring
other citizens‖ (Dunham et al., 2005, p. 367). Early stages of the decision-making process, such
as what makes a person suspicious in the eyes of police officers, remain an unknown area
because of the scarcity of research on the early stages of police behavior.
Studies examining stop/search decisions of law enforcers also focused on determinants of
officer decisions by investigating police–citizen encounters that take place after initial contact is
made. Schafer, Carter, Katz-Bannister, and Wells (2006) pointed out that patrol officers make
decisions at three points of enforcement activities during traffic encounters. The first point, based
on their classification, is the initial decision whether to stop a vehicle. The second stage includes
the decision to search the car and/or those in the car. At the final step, police officers decide what
sanction to apply if they decide to do so. Our review of the literature and legal requirements
suggest that at least two more steps should be added to this process. First, between steps one and
two police officers are likely to engage in a questioning activity, which is a transition step from
stop to search. This step is essential in order to be able to make a decision between two courses
of action. These two are either ending the encounter if the factors causing this stop are no longer
valid or else going to the next step by deciding that further investigation is required. The second
stage that is necessary to be added in this process prior to the stop is ―suspicion,‖ which forms
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the basis for the decision to stop. Suspicion has a psychological component that is developed in
the human mind through learning.
Police officers form a cognitive frame that comprises beliefs and judgments about
persons, groups, locations, and situations with certain characteristics based on their personal
observations about them. This cognitive frame is readily available in the mind and is triggered
when officers come across a person or situation with similar characteristics (Alpert et al., 2005).
This frame helps in developing a ―perceptual shorthand‖ that allows them to respond quickly to
street contingencies and to make speedy decisions on situations they encounter (Schafer et al.,
2006). In particular, they can easily identify persons who do not belong in an environment or
situations that do not fit the officer‘s definition of ―usual.‖ Police officer training and
occupational culture make them more suspicious about people and situations than regular
citizens. These predispositions are more likely to be biased rather than objective and accurate
evaluations of persons, places, or situations (Alpert et al., 2005). This brings up a controversial
issue debated for decades by scholars as well as practitioners. The inclination to see people as
suspicious helps officers do their job easily by allowing them make immediate decisions, but it
also causes inappropriate suspicion of innocent people. Thus, police stop, question, and search
many people who are not typically suspects and expose them to police intrusion.
Officer suspicion can be better understood when the criteria used to form suspicion are
investigated in detail. In their study on formation of suspicion Dunham et al. (2005) determined
that police become suspicious based on behavioral and non-behavioral criteria. As discussed
above, non-behavioral criteria are more likely to be prejudiced than behavioral ones, since the
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roots of the former are found in personal judgments based on personal inclinations, while the
roots of the latter are in the behaviors of the subject individuals. Dunham et al. found that
behavior of a suspect played a major role in the development of officer suspicion. Even though
they found that some stops were made based on non-behavioral criteria, behavioral criteria were
primarily responsible in generating suspicion. Findings of the study concluded that violation of
traffic rules was the most-cited behavior of individuals that led to suspicion. Officers usually
made a stop after they became suspicious about a person; however, not all suspicions resulted in
a stop. The authors argued that most of stops were legitimate, since the behavior of suspects
significantly influenced officer stop decisions compared to the lower impact of non-behavioral
factors.
Review of the literature reveals that it is necessary to take all components of officer
decisions on the street into account, including the suspicion process, making a stop, and
questioning persons.
Next, the concept of responsiveness is developed to contribute to a comprehensive
understanding of police behavior.
2.3.1. Responsiveness
Officer time during the shift is conceptualized as either assigned (committed) or
unassigned (uncommitted). Assigned time of officers refers to time spent in responding to
dispatch calls of 9-1-1 or citizen-initiated encounters. Unassigned time, on the other hand, is
defined as time free from assigned activities. Workload studies revealed that unassigned time
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constitutes a considerable portion of officers‘ overall time on a shift. Some studies found that
two-thirds of officer shift time is uncommitted (Worden, 1989), while others reported that onefourth of their overall shift time is uncommitted (Smith et al., 2005). Unassigned time during the
shift provides the greater opportunity to assess police discretion, because it is during unassigned
time that officers make choices as to whether to initiate an activity.
This study aimed to examine to what degree officers are prone to invoke the law by
responding to street contingencies. For this purpose, six scenarios were developed that describe a
situation and ask for a likely officer response for given situation. Officers are not on assignment
for a supervisor or on a service call by a citizen, so variation in officer-initiated responsiveness
during uncommitted time is measured. Responsiveness covers both decisions to stop and
question as well as the suspicion process that occurs prior to a stop. Scenarios used to measure
responsiveness contain behavioral and non-behavioral aspects of suspicion.
The concepts developed for purposes of this study assess what motivates officers to be
more responsive in their unassigned time. For instance, this study examines to what degree
organizational rewards and public service motives encourage officers‘ responsiveness to street
contingencies, while the effect of selective enforcement attitudes on responsiveness is
investigated. However, the use of the concept is certainly not limited to these factors; it is also
useful to understand police behavior in terms of impact of organizational structures,
environmental characteristics, or police occupational culture, and so on.
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2.4. Conceptual Model and Hypotheses
Within the context of organizational theory, Scott (1998) brought together varying views
of organizational theory in three main conceptualizations: rational, natural, and open systems
(loosely coupled models). Rational system theorists, in his conceptualization, see organization as
an ―instrument designed to attain specified goals‖ (p. 33). The rationality of an organization
determines to what extent it can achieve its goals. Rationality refers to a design that helps
accomplish organizational goals efficiently. Rationality requires, first, clearly defined
organizational goals and, second, a formulization that is expected to govern behaviors of the
organization‘s members. A rational system basically makes an effort to predict and regulate
behavior through goal setting, formulization, and organizational structure.
Natural system theorists argue that behaviors of an organization‘s members are not only
governed by explicitly stated formal goals but also by informal goals and informal structure.
They accept the existence of formal structure; however, they find questionable the impact of
structure in shaping behaviors of workers. Based on arguments of natural system perspectives,
informal structure is formed by individual characteristics and relationships among them. This
approach emphasizes the human aspect of organizations, as noted by Scott (1998): ―Individual
participants are never merely hired hands but bring along their heads and hearts: they enter the
organization with individually shaped ideas, expectations and agendas, and they bring with them
differing values, interests, and abilities‖ (p. 59). An informal organization is essential in
predicting employee motivation by stressing the social psychological aspect, rather than an
economic approach. Mayo (1945) argued that the assumption of the economic approach that
43

suggests that individuals pursue their own self-interest does not apply to a majority of normal
behaviors in normal situations.
From an open systems view, organizations consist of partially autonomous components
that are dependent on each other. Interdependent parts of organizations are not closely related.
Members and groups in an organization are viewed as loosely coupled elements, and the
dynamic nature of their interrelation is emphasized by open system scholars (Leavitt, Dill, &
Eyring, 1973). This perspective has at least three applications in organizational contexts: the
structure of organizations loosely coupled with the behavior of their members, work units in an
organization loosely connected to each other, and the goals of employees loosely coupled with
their behavior.
Mastrofski et al. (1987) applied these theoretical perspectives in a discretionary decisionmaking setting. They argued that if the rational model is valid, the bureaucratic structure of the
organization heavily influences the daily decisions of officers. They conceptualized the second
approach as a constrained rational model, and they expected a limited capacity of the
organization in governing the activities of line officers. By following the arguments of loosely
coupled system theory, they hypothesized that officer decisions will be affected by officers‘
work environment rather than by the rules and regulations of the agency. Their analysis indicated
that officer decisions in larger agencies are considerably affected by the peer culture and policing
environment. On the other hand, smaller departments were more successful in shaping officer
behaviors. The rational model became more valid in smaller agencies, indicated by higher
compliance with organizational rules. The loosely coupled model was found to be more valid in
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larger departments, allowing officers wider discretionary decision-making opportunities (Eitle,
2005; Mastrofski et al., 1987).
This study has some applications from the organizational theory perspective. The rational
system model, for example, argues that an organization‘s clearly specified goals will be pursued
by its members when formal rules and policies are set to regulate worker behavior. In this regard,
one would expect that the reward/sanction structure of organizations will lead to more
responsiveness by reducing the exercise of discretion. Natural perspective suggests that members
of an organization will come into the organization with their individual characteristics, values,
and ideas that lead to the development of an informal organizational structure. Based on this
perspective it can be argued that individual predispositions of individuals will have an essential
role in determining work outcomes. This study, thus, proposes public service motivation, a
personal inclination, will lead to higher levels of responsiveness on the street. The open systems
model points out that individual parts of an organization are loosely coupled. Organizational
structure and policies are less likely to be connected to officer decisions and behaviors. Even
when an organization aims to increase the responsiveness of officers on the street by attempting
to control the exercise of discretion, organizational and personal goals may still be loosely
coupled.
As discussed previous sections, this study uses a motivational and attitudinal perspective
to explain officer responsiveness and give insight into controlling police discretion. Research on
controlling police discretion emphasized the influence of formal structures, policies,
rules/regulations, and reward/sanction structures on officers‘ behavior practices. As proposed by
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the rational model, a reward-and-sanction schema of an organization, which is one of formal
regulations set by the agency administration, is likely to govern worker behaviors. In our model,
police officers are expected to increase their responsiveness to be able to maximize their utility
by the means of rewards offered by the organization.
In this regard, many studies concluded that employees who are motivated by extrinsic
rewards offered by their organization tend to perform well and produce more work outcomes.
For example, Johnson (2010) reported that officers who believe that their organization will
reward arrests made in domestic violence cases tend to make more arrests. Johnson (2009a)
reported similar findings in an earlier study: Officers who perceive that higher administration
prioritizes drug activities and will reward drug-related arrests produced higher arrest rates. Based
on this previous theoretical and empirical evidence, the present study proposes that reward
expectancy, which is a form of extrinsic motivation, will positively influence officers‘
responsiveness. The first hypothesis was formulated as follows:
H1: Reward expectancy of police officers positively affects their work effort in enforcing
the law.
Some studies, however, suggested that the relationship between motivation and
performance (or work outcomes) will be mediated by work effort, the duration and intensity of
energy spent on an activity. Dejong et al. (2001) empirically investigated the impact of extrinsic
rewards on discretionary policing activities and reported that the expectancy and instrumentality
of officers influenced the amount of time spent on problem-solving activities. Therefore, the
study proposes the second hypothesis as follows:
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H2: Reward expectancy of officers positively affects their responsiveness to street
contingencies.
Intrinsic motivational perspective, on the other hand, proposed that personal
predispositions of employees will lead the performance of work outcomes. Employees who are
intrinsically motivated by their work are more likely to exert effort on the job (Brehm & Gates,
1997). Perry and Wise (1990) argued that workers with higher public service motives will
choose mostly government jobs and will perform better in their job. Indeed, empirical
investigation provides for this proposition, consistently reporting that public service motivation
leads to higher work outcomes in performance, organizational commitment, and job satisfaction.
It is plausible that intrinsically motivated employees will exert desired behaviors especially when
a convergence between organizational values and individuals‘ innate preferences exist (Tyler et
al., 2007). Naff and Crum (1999), by studying the association between public service motives
and behaviors of federal employees, concluded that there is a ―significant relationship between
public service motivation and federal employees‘ job satisfaction, performance, intention to
remain with the government, and support for the government‘s reinvention efforts‖ (p. 5). Their
study was repeated by Alonso and Lewis (2001), who reported that public service motivation
positively affected the performance of employees. Taylor (2008) examined the relationship
between public service motivation and work-related outcomes in an Australian context. The
study found that employees with higher public service motivation are more likely to have higher
job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Since responsiveness is taken as a work-related
outcome it was anticipated that public service motivation would increase responsiveness.
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H3: Public service motivation positively affects police officers’ responsiveness to
contingencies on the street.
As stated previously, work effort was expected to link motivation and responsiveness.
Therefore, the study hypothesizes that public service motivation, a specific type of intrinsic
motivation, will lead to higher effort of patrol officers in the workplace. The fourth hypothesis
states the relationship between public service motivation and work effort.
H4: Public service motivation positively affects police officers’ work effort in terms of
enforcing the law.
Motivation literature suggests that even when officers are motivated by external and
internal motives, the motivation may not turn into a behavioral outcome, since there may be
factors that prevent the direct influence of motivation on final outcomes. Effort refers to the
extent to which employees intensify their energy to their job or, in other words, how hard they
work. Some studies highlighted the fact that motives of employees do not necessarily result in
higher performance. Although relatively less research focused on effort, studies investigating its
role in performance models usually found that effort needs to be considered between motivation
and performance constructs. Brown and Peterson (1994) examined effort‘s impact on job
satisfaction and performance, and they concluded that effort has a positive impact on both
constructs. Another study that investigated the job involvement, work effort, and performance
relationship determined that effort had a mediating role between job involvement and
performance (Brown & Leigh, 1996). There is reason to believe that work effort will have an
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impact on responsiveness of officers. Based on the empirical evidence, the following hypothesis
is formulated:
H5: Police officers’ work effort positively affects their responsiveness to daily situations.
Psychological research also highlights the relationship between employee attitudes and
their behaviors even when the relationship is not very strong (Paoline, 2004). Attitudes toward
selective enforcement are very likely to increase leniency in police–citizen encounters. Shafer
and Mastrofski (2005) argued that there are several reasons for non-enforcement or partial
enforcement of laws by police. Police discretion research mostly studied the factors that lead to
enforcing the law and making an arrest. The factors that contribute to not making an arrest and
not issuing a citation or not stopping a car were not investigated widely in the literature.
Research indicated that officer attitudes toward selective enforcement affect their choices on the
street (Brown, 1981; Davis, 1975). Therefore, one hypothesis of this study is that officer
responsiveness is expected to be influenced by selective enforcement attitudes. The conceptual
framework with the illustration of study hypotheses is demonstrated in Figure 1.
H6: Attitude toward selective enforcement negatively affects responsiveness of patrol
officers.
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Figure 1 Conceptual Model of the Study
As discussed so far, the study hypothesizes that extrinsic and intrinsic forms of
motivation will affect the responsiveness of patrol officers in Turkey. Higher work effort is also
expected to increase responsiveness of officers in terms of law-enforcement activities. On the
other hand, selective enforcement attitudes of officers will have a negative effect on
responsiveness. The study also proposes that work effort will mediate the relationship between
motivation (both extrinsic and intrinsic) and responsiveness.
2.5. Chapter Summary
In this chapter, police discretion, determinants of discretion, and motivational
perspectives on administrative control of discretion were reviewed, and a conceptual model of
the study was presented at the end of the chapter.
50

Discretion occurs when an officer chooses a course of action among possible alternatives.
Officer decisions on the street are low-visibility decisions made in the absence of administrative
and supervisory control. Therefore, police are regarded as gatekeepers of the criminal justice
system. A majority of scholars believed that discretion is an inescapable aspect of police work.
Taking into account the undesired consequences of discretion, the importance of establishing
control mechanisms was emphasized.
Literature reviewed in this chapter revealed that research on how to control discretion is
very limited. Several studies took extrinsic motivational perspectives, while the role of intrinsic
motivation was widely ignored by police behavior scholars. Studies examining the impact of
extrinsic motivation suggested that organizations have an influence in regulating police
discretionary actions using organizational reward and promoting extrinsic motivation. Review of
the intrinsic motivation literature indicated that intrinsic sources of employee motives play a
considerable role in predicting worker behavior. This study hypothesizes that public service
motivation, a subset of intrinsic motivation, will influence the discretionary activities of police.
The last section of the chapter provides the conceptual model of the study, which
includes responsiveness, reward expectancy, selective enforcement, public service motivation,
and work effort. Responsiveness refers to the extent to which officers respond to situations on
the street. Two other concepts of the model, reward expectancy and public service motivation,
originated from the motivation literature and represent two forms of the primary forces of human
motivation. The concept of work motivation is a mediating variable between responsiveness and
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motivation (extrinsic and intrinsic). Responsiveness, in turn, is expected to be influenced by
work effort and selective enforcement.
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CHAPTER.3.

METHODOLOGY

This study aimed to investigate factors that are hypothesized to influence police
responsiveness. First, the study examines the impact of reward expectancy and public service
motivation on work effort; then it assesses the effect of work effort and selective enforcement on
police responsiveness. The study is designed to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Reward expectancy of police officers positively affects their work effort in enforcing
the law.
H2: Reward expectancy of officers positively affects their responsiveness to street
contingencies.
H3: Public service motivation positively affects police officers’ responsiveness to
contingencies on the street.
H4: Public service motivation positively affects police officers’ work effort in terms of
enforcing the law.
H5: Police officers’ work efforts positively affects their responsiveness to daily situations.
H6: Attitude toward selective enforcement negatively affects responsiveness of patrol
officers.
This chapter is organized in three subsections. The first section reviews the study
variables, their dimensions, measurement levels, and operational definitions. The study includes
three exogenous variables (reward expectancy, public service motivation, and selective
enforcement) and two endogenous variables (work effort and responsiveness). The second
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section focuses on the research procedure, with information on the sampling method, participants
in the study, data collection methods, and the survey instrument. The final section is dedicated to
statistical analysis methods, including five steps of the SEM model validation in both the
confirmatory factor analysis and the structural equation model.
3.1. Study Variables
The study uses responsiveness as an endogenous variable and reward expectancy, public
service motivation, and selective enforcement as exogenous variables. Table 1 indicates the
operational definitions of the endogenous and exogenous variables.
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Control Variables

Exogenous Variables

Endogenous Variables

Table 1 Operational Definitions of Study Variables
Variable name

Explanation

Responsiveness

Officers‘ self-reported probability
of giving a response in a given
situation

Work effort

Self-rated single item indicating
1 item—ordinal
officers‘ willingness to exert effort

Reward expectancy

Officers‘ perception of
performance/reward linkage and
the value of rewards

15 items—ordinal

Public service motivation

Individuals‘ predispositions
toward public interest and public
service

10 items—ordinal

Selective enforcement

Officer attitudes toward selective
enforcement

8 items—ordinal

Age

Officer‘s age when survey is
conducted

1 item

Educational level

The highest degree completed by
officer

1 item

Department

The department in which the
officer works

1 item

Gender

Gender of officer

1 item

Intensity

Perceived intensity of department

1 item—ordinal
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Number of items/
measurement level

6 items—ordinal

3.1.1. Responsiveness
A large body of the police decision-making literature has used arrest decisions as a
functional tool for measuring police discretion (Brown, 1981; Chappell et al., 2006; Eigenberg et
al., 1996; Eitle, 2005; Feder, 1996; Klinger, 1996). Arrest rates have been used for a long time as
the primary source of data in police discretion studies. More recently, researchers have begun
using other forms of police activity to reach a broader understanding of police discretion. Data
on police decisions to stop, question, and search are used to investigate determinants of
discretionary decision-making. A limited number of studies examined pre-stop and post-stop
decisions of patrol officers (Norris, Fielding, Kemp, & Fielding, 1992; Schafer et al., 2006;
Smith & Petrocelli, 2001; Spitzer, 1999).
This study employs a relatively new approach to measure police discretionary actions,
recognizing the need for a broader understanding of discretion. Use of responsiveness is a new
approach in terms of conceptualization and its measurement method. It covers more behaviors of
police such as stopping, searching, questioning, and initiating legal processes when compared to
arrest decisions of police. Furthermore, the study uses confirmatory factor analysis to validate
the measurement model of the construct. The concept of responsiveness is developed for
purposes of this study to measure the extent to which officers are likely to act when they
encounter situations that require police response.
To measure the concept, the study uses six scenarios. In each scenario a situation that
involves a minor violation is described. Based on a review of the literature discussed in the
previous chapter, all elements of police decisions to stop are included in the scenarios. In this
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regard, situations have element of both behavioral and non-behavioral aspects of police
suspicion. For example, the situations in Scenario 1 and Scenario 4 describe the behavior of a
suspect (behavioral), while Scenario 3 describes only the appearance and environment of the
suspect (non-behavioral). In addition, scenarios are designed so that they contain most
components of the police decision-making process on the street, such as suspicion prior to a stop
(Scenario 1), questioning activity to decide on the next step (Scenario 2), and whether to take
action after the fact (Scenario 5). Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of making a stop,
questioning a person, or initiating a legal process in the described situations by using a five-point
scale.
3.1.2. Work Effort
Employees‘ effort level was measured in several different ways in a limited number of
studies. The most frequently used methods were self-reported assessment, co-worker ratings, and
supervisor evaluations of how hard an employee works. When employees‘ effort is measured
based on self-reporting, employees are usually asked to rate how hard they work when compared
to other employees who perform similar duties. Another type of question asked them how many
times they do extra work in a certain period even when it is not necessary (Patchen, Pelz, &
Allen, 1965). Other studies asked employees to what extent they agree that they work hard
(Brehm & Gates, 1997; Gould-Williams, 2003).
This study uses self-reported work effort measures based on the idea that ―the basic
strategy for determining how hard people work is to ask them‖ (Frank & Lewis, 2004, p. 37).
The questionnaire includes a single item to measure work effort: How much effort do you think
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that you exert at your work when you consider your capacity? The scale to respond to this
question ranges from 0% to 100%.
Even though self-evaluations of work effort are criticized for not being objective and for
being less reliable measures (Baldwin & Farley, 2001), many studies used them as major sources
of information on work effort (Brehm & Gates, 1997; Patchen et al., 1965; U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, 1983). Furthermore, self-assessments are found to be correlated to other
measures of effort such as co-worker assessments and supervisor ratings of willingness to exert
effort. Another aspect of self-reported work effort is that employees are likely to overestimate
their effort level. For purposes of this study it is not considered a critical concern as long as there
is no evidence that one subgroup of respondents consistently overestimated their effort compared
to others in the sample.
3.1.3. Reward Expectancy
In the police discretion literature, only a few studies use an expectancy theory
perspective. Mastrofski et al. (1994) used expectancy theory to explain police officers‘ arrest
behavior in driving-under-the-influence (DUI) cases. Recently, several articles examined various
police activities using the same perspective and very similar operationalization of variables based
on expectancy theory. This theoretical approach was applied to police problem-solving strategies
(Dejong et al. (2001), arrest activity in drug-enforcement cases (Johnson, 2009a), domestic
violence arrests (Johnson, 2010), and security check activities of officers (Johnson, 2009b). The
primary study (Mastrofski et al., 1994) used four components to reflect the theory‘s assumptions:
(a) effort/performance expectancy, (b) instrumentality, (c) performance/reward expectancy, and
58

(d) reward/cost balance. This conceptualization was followed by almost all studies using an
expectancy perspective on police discretion (Dejong et al, 2001; Johnson, 2009b; Johnson,
2010).
This study, on the other hand, develops and uses a reward expectancy concept even
though it uses the same theoretical perspective. First, the primary components of the expectancy
theory of motivation proposed by Vroom in 1964 (expectancy, instrumentality, and valence)
formed a basis to develop the construct. The survey questionnaire included several items from
these assumptions of the theory. Second, these components were incorporated into one concept
instead of three or four components. Finally, operationalization of the reward expectancy concept
differed substantially from those mainly used in other police discretion literature.
Mastrofski et al. (1994) investigated the first component in two categories: capability and
opportunity. In their study, capability is operationalized by using officers‘ educational level and
hours of DUI training. Opportunity, on the other hand, was measured by two indicators: swing
midnight shift and nonsupervisory time. The first indicator was operationalized as ―the
percentage of time during the past year that an officer was assigned to the swing or midnight
shifts, those offering the greatest opportunity for DUI apprehension‖ (p. 130). The second
indicator was described as officers‘ unassigned time, the time during which officers have the
opportunity to manage their own time. However, the theory is a cognitive theory of motivation;
that is, it completely depends on the perception of workers rather actual capability and
opportunity of officers. Based on this assumption, this study aimed to measure officers‘
perception of their own capability of enforcing the law. Similarly, the respondents were asked
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how much opportunity they perceived they had to stop vehicles and question people, rather than
the study‘s measuring their actual opportunity to do so.
Effort expectancy measures to what degree officers perceive that their performance will
increase when they increase their effort level. In our case, expectancy refers to officers‘
perceptions that a greater number of stops and searches will improve their job performance.
Instrumentality refers to officers‘ beliefs that a described level of performance will
resulted in outcomes. In the context of this study, outcomes are considered as extrinsic rewards:
promotion, cash rewards, and official recognition of accomplishments. The literature suggests
that reward has been seen as an incentive to change employees‘ behavior and encourage them to
achieve a desired level of performance. However, some officers do not perceive incentives as
rewards, while others do. For example, overtime work offered by police departments has been
seen by officers who have part-time jobs outside the department as a punishment; others view it
as a reward. Similarly, being promoted to sergeant is not always perceived as a reward (Walsh,
1986). In the TNP setting where this study was conducted, overtime payment and day-off
rewards are not applicable. As suggested in expectancy theory literature, intrinsic rewards are not
included in the reward expectancy model; instead they are conceptualized as a different latent
variable. Respondents were asked to rate how likely they think it is that their performance will
lead to obtaining these organizational rewards.
Valence refers to how much an employee values rewards offered by the administration.
When the perceived value of rewards outweighs the efforts necessary to achieve them, a worker
is motivated to achieve the desired performance and ultimately receive the rewards. Because of
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the subjective nature of reward definition in police functions, the performance–reward linkage
has remained undefined in many studies. In our study, to find out to what degree police officers
value organizational rewards, respondents were asked to rate how they assess the importance and
attractiveness of organizational rewards.
In short, a 15-item questionnaire was designed to measure reward expectancy. The scale
contained questions about how likely officers were to achieve assigned tasks (expectancy), to
what extent they believed performance would lead to rewards (instrumentality), and how much
they valued the organizational rewards (valence).
3.1.4. Public Service Motivation
Perry (1996) proposed a construct that refers to ambition to work for public interest rather
than self-interest. He conceptualized this construct as public service motivation and argued that
employees with higher public service motivation will choose public sector jobs and perform in
their job better than other employees (Perry, 1996). He also developed a scale to measure the
construct that consists of six dimensions and forty items. The shorter version of the
questionnaire, which contains 24 items in four dimensions (self-sacrifice, attraction to policy
making, compassion, and civic duty), was developed in 1997. This version of the scale was
found to be an appropriate operationalization of the construct and the ―gold standard‖ of
measurement (Petrovsky, 2009). Shorter versions were developed or used for the measurement
of public service motivation in various other studies. For example, Coursey, Perry, Brudney, and
Littlepage (2008) used the compassion, self-sacrifice, and civic-duty dimensions of Perry‘s
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(1997) scale to examine determinants of public service motivation. Coursey and Pandey (2007)
found Perry‘s (1997) scale too long to be used in public administration research and developed a
10-item three-dimensional scale by eliminating the self-sacrifice dimension of the instrument.
Their analysis suggested that their instrument was valid and reliable to measure the public
service motivation construct. However, they noted that ―researchers who believe that the selfsacrifice dimension is particularly pertinent to their hypotheses should certainly consider its
inclusion‖ (p. 563). Given its importance, the self-sacrifice dimension originally suggested in
Perry‘s scale was included in this study. However, the attraction to policy making and the
compassion dimensions were eliminated. In other words, only the self-sacrifice and civic-duty
dimensions were included in the survey instrument to measure public service motivation.
Respondents were asked to what extent they agree with each of ten statements in the scale. The
scale uses a self-rated five-point Likert rating as mentioned in previous sections.
3.1.5. Selective Enforcement
This study uses a selective enforcement scale derived from Wortley‘s (2003) attitudestoward-police discretion scale. The Wilson (1968) policing typology formed the basis of his
work on developing an attitudes-toward-discretion questionnaire. As proposed in the original
typology, service-style police prefer exercising discretion, which refers to selective enforcement,
to solve community problems. Legalistic police departments, on the other hand, refuse to enforce
the law selectively, since their full-enforcement policy requires enforcement of all cases
regardless of the seriousness of the crime and whether the situation could be solved in any other
way. The watchman-style police tend to enforce only serious crimes and ignore minor crimes so
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that they can maintain order in society. In short, one would expect that the legalistic style police
tend to enforce all laws in all situations. Service-style police requires selective enforcement if the
problem could be solved without enforcing the law and applying a sanction. Watchman-style
police would enforce the law in serious cases, ignoring minor cases. Based on these propositions,
Wortley constructed a scale consisting of two subsets of items to measure officer attitudes
toward discretion. The first subscale, called the Service-Legalistic scale, aimed to measure
flexibility of police officers in enforcing the law. The second subscale was designed to measure
the watchman orientation of police officers. Both scales contain items whose primary goal was
the measurement of the selective enforcement concept. For purposes of this study, selective
enforcement items from both scales were adapted for use, regardless of whether they belonged in
the service-legalistic or watchman scale.
3.1.6. Control Variables
The effects of five variables are controlled in this study, since the aim of the study was to
examine the impact of motivational and attitudinal variables on police responsiveness. Based on
the discretion literature reviewed in the previous chapter, it was determined that it is important to
control for departmental and individual level variables in order to precisely determine the
influence of exogenous variables on responsiveness. Department size was found to be vital in the
assessment of police discretionary behavior. Previous research on determinants of discretionary
decision-making reported that officers in smaller departments were more likely to strictly enforce
the law in similar situations that lead to higher rates of arrests and stop/search than larger
departments (Eitle, 2005; Mastrofski et al., 1987, Smith, 1984).
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In this study, officer perceptions of intensity, the belief concerning how intensely the
officers work, are also controlled for. The other three control variables are demographic
characteristics of police officers. Even though the literature produced mixed results on the role of
individual characteristics of police officers on exercising discretion, the study controlled for the
effects of officer age, education, and gender.
3.2. Research Procedure
This section focuses on the procedures followed for addressing sampling, data collection
methods and procedures, the survey instrument, and its reliability.
3.2.1. Sampling
The aim of this study was to examine the factors influencing responsiveness of patrol
officers in Turkey. Accordingly, the population of the study was sworn and uniformed patrol
officers working in 81 police departments of the TNP in each province. Being subunits of local
police departments, patrol squads are subunits under the auspices of local police departments and
are primarily responsible for patrolling and maintaining safety in their district. According to TNP
statistics, 39,764 police officers worked in the patrol squads of local police departments for the
year 2009.
The study used a stratified random sampling method to obtain a representative sample of
patrol officers in Turkey. The largest police department in terms of personnel in each of seven
geographical regions in Turkey was chosen as the sample domain (see Appendix F). These seven
departments are Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Diyarbakir, Adana, Samsun, and Erzurum. Officers
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from the largest departments in the regions are included in the study. The departments chosen
have diverse characteristics in terms of size and structure because regional characteristics differ
from one another. The largest department in the East Anatolia Region (Erzurum) is very small
compared to the largest department in the Ege Region (Izmir), supporting greater
representativeness of the sample. Furthermore, each officer working for the TNP is subject to
reassignment from one department to another. This rotation procedure makes samples drawn
from any department more homogeneous. The number of officers needed to participate in the
study was calculated based on the number of patrol officers in each department.
3.2.2. Data Collection
Dillman‘s (2000) ―tailored design method‖ emphasized the importance of personalized
contact methods and reducing costs of responding for participants to increase response rate. To
achieve a higher participation, this study primarily used an electronic survey method because of
the relative ease of this type of survey for both researcher and respondent. To determine who
would be surveyed, the researcher obtained a personnel roster of patrol officers in Turkey by
ensuring that no personal information of participants would be collected or used in the study. The
participants who had email addresses on file were contacted via personalized emails that
instructed them to follow the link in the email to access and complete survey questionnaire on
the web.
The researcher reached subjects who did not have listed email addresses via their
personal phone numbers. They were also provided the link of the survey and asked to complete
the online survey. Only a small proportion of subjects could not be reached by either email or
65

phone calls. Two follow-up emails were sent or phone calls were made for the subjects who did
not respond to either initial contact. However, the major problem in administrating the survey
was the accessibility of the Internet by respondents. The primary responsibility of the subjects
was patrolling on the street, which took them away from computer and Internet access.
Considering that this is an issue for most of study subjects, the researcher used another strategy
to overcome this difficulty.
The researcher decided to choose at least one contact person from each department where
a sufficient number of respondents were not achieved even after follow-up contacts. They
assisted the researcher in explaining the purpose of study and distributing and collecting printed
questionnaires. Overall, the study reached a response rate of 71% by using multiple methods to
collect data. A response rate of 71% is well above the rates for most studies conducted on the
TNP (Dayioglu, 2007; Kucukuysal, 2008; Sahin, 2010).
3.2.3. Survey Instrument and Reliability
The questionnaire was developed to measure four constructs that are the subject of this
study. The survey instrument includes five sections, that is, one section for each construct and
one additional section to observe the demographics of respondents (see Appendix C).
The first section aims to measure the reward-expectancy construct derived from the
expectancy theory of motivation. The construct consists of five subsections: expectancy,
capability, opportunity, instrumentality, and valence. Each component is measured by more than
one item in this section, afterward to be aggregated into one item in the model. The questions in
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this section were designed by using five-point Likert scale that ranges from ―strongly disagree‖
to ―strongly agree‖: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = agree;
5 = strongly agree.
The second section of the survey instrument measures how likely respondents are to be
influenced by public service motivation. The survey instrument developed by Perry (1997) to
measure public service motivation is a widely accepted and widely used measure of the concept.
However, many other studies obtained and employed shorter scales by selecting relevant items
from the original instrument to measure the construct in relation to their area of focus. This study
also chose 10 items for the operational measurement of concept for purposes of the study. In this
regard, two relatively less relevant dimensions (attraction to policy making and compassion)
were eliminated from the four-dimensional PSM scale. After excluding one item from
commitment to the public interest/civic duty and two items from self-sacrifice, these two
dimensions were used in the study. Consequently, participants were asked to rate to what extent
they agreed with ten statements used to measure public service motivation level.
The third section of the questionnaire consists of ten items that are borrowed from
Wortley‘s (2003) attitudes-toward-police-discretion scale. This scale‘s aim was measuring police
discretion based on Wilson‘s (1968) police typology of legalistic, watchman, and service-style
policing. In his study, two subscales, service-legalistic scale and watchman scale, served to
measure to what extent officers are likely to exercise selective enforcement of the law. Since
both questionnaires aimed to measure selective enforcement attitudes, 8 relevant items out of 22
items in the original questionnaire were included in this study.
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The construct of responsiveness is measured by six hypothetical case scenarios, each of
which describing a situation related to patrol officers‘ daily work. First, police discretion
literature was reviewed for scenario-development purposes. Then, a few of the case scenarios
obtained from different studies were found to be useful for measurement of responsiveness.
Finally, the scenarios were adapted to the context of the study after discussion with many ranked
officers from patrol squads in Turkey. Respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of
responding to the situation described in each scenario. The five-point scale ranged from ―very
unlikely‖ to ―very likely.‖
The last section is designed to gather information on the demographic characteristics of
patrol officers. Demographic variables included in the questionnaire are age, educational level,
and years of experience of officers. Age of officers was measured in five categories: under 30
years old, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59 and older than 59. Educational level of participants was
measured in five groups: high school, two-year college, bachelor of arts/science, master of
arts/science, and Ph.D. Data on officers‘ gender were collected by dichotomous variable: male,
female. Intensity was measured by two items in the questionnaire and they were aggregated into
one variable in the model.
After development of the survey instrument, it was translated into Turkish, the native
language of participants in this study. The Turkish version of the questionnaire was also
translated into English and compared to the original version to ensure appropriateness of
translation (see Appendix D for Turkish version of questionnaire.)
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The constructs included in the survey instrument were measured by several indicators
that are borrowed either from an original measurement of that concept or developed for use in
this study, for example, ten questions from Perry‘s (1997) PSM questionnaire and eight items
from Wortley‘s (2003) police discretion scale. The reward expectancy concept was adapted from
the expectancy theory of motivation, while the measurement of responsiveness was developed
specifically for this study. It is useful to note that even though some constructs in this study were
employed in prior studies, reliability scores reported in those studies do not necessarily apply to
this survey instrument, since all items were not included in this study. Furthermore, reliability of
responsiveness was analyzed for the first time in this study. Although several procedures have
been used to determine the reliability of an instrument, Cronbach‘s Alpha is the most broadly
used criterion to assess the consistency of results produced by a particular questionnaire. Despite
a lack of common consensus, the literature suggests that a measurement tool showing a
Cronbach‘s Alpha score higher than 0.70 is accepted as highly reliable (Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994). Garson (2009) reported that a cut-off level of .60 is also accepted by some researchers as
an adequate internal consistency measure. This study used a Cronbach‘s Alpha procedure to
evaluate the internal consistency of the measurement device. During validation of the
measurement models, subscales were reduced to only the relevant items by eliminating some
variables in order to increase the reliability coefficient. Each construct in the study was measured
with several questions to ensure that the scale had enough items to measure each construct, even
after some items were removed.
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3.3. Statistical Method
The study uses Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to investigate causal relationships
among two endogenous and three exogenous variables. SEM is a powerful statistical tool that
allows the study of causal pathways among variables and also calculates latent and measurement
errors (Hoyle, 1995; Wan, 2002). SEM is used to model a causal relationship that is represented
by multiple equations and at the same time allows inclusion of unobserved variables where
measurement errors are taken into account. This method is especially useful for validation of
theoretically grounded models.
The following section introduces the five-step validation process of latent variables and
the structural equation model used in this study.
3.3.1. Five-Step Model Validation Process
The model-validation process was conducted in five steps, both for validation of
measurement models and validation of the covariance structural model.
Model Specification: The first stage required the researcher to determine which latent and
observed variables would be included in the model. There was also a need to specify relations
among exogenous and endogenous variables. There are two types of risks in specifying a model:
excluding variables and relations that must be included and including every possible variable and
relation in the model. The former will create a misspecified model while the latter will violate
parsimony. Parsimony refers to the simplicity of equation models, which should use as few
parameters as possible. To avoid these two problems Schumacker and Lomax (2004) suggested
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that a careful literature review and a robust theoretical basis must be taken as reference when an
a priori model is specified. Kenny (2009) defined the specification as a ―statement of the
theoretical model either as a set of equations or as a diagram.‖
Two types of parameters, free parameters (that are estimated from observations) and
fixed parameters (set to zero), are used when specifying an SEM model. Specifying fixed and
free parameters is essential because doing so provides a model that is to be compared to a sample
population variance/covariance matrix to capture the model fit. Although researchers are free to
choose fixed and free parameters, they are strongly advised to specify the model based on a
careful literature review and a robust theoretical basis (Hoyle, 1995).
Model Identification: This step includes acquiring values for the set of parameters to be
estimated in a specified model. It basically refers to whether a unique solution for all parameters
in an equation exists. Situations where a unique value for each parameter of model is not found
indicate under-identified models. In identified models, on the other hand, at least one solution is
obtainable from the sample variances/covariance structure. Models that contain only one solution
for their parameter estimates, in other words the number of variances/covariances equals the
number of free parameters in the model, are considered just-identified models. In structural
equations, if an optimal solution is obtainable among possible solutions the models are referred
to as over-identified models. Over-identified models are preferable, since they provide a degree
of freedom to test the model fit (Division of Statistics and Scientific Computation, 2002;
Schumacker and Lomax, 2004)
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Model Estimation: This stage refers to a statistical estimation of the free parameters from
the sample data. Estimation gives information about how close the sample and estimated
covariance matrices are. Among several methods of estimation (generalized least squares,
asymptotically distribution free estimator, weighted least squares) maximum likelihood is the
most widely used estimation procedure (Hoyle, 1995; Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, &
Müller, 2003;). Amos software also uses maximum likelihood as the default estimation method.
The maximum likelihood method chooses values for the parameters of a model that indicate the
most likely distribution of data. This procedure assumes that the observed data have a
multivariate normal distribution and are in a large enough sample size (Hox and Bechger, 1998;
Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003; Ullman, 1996). One of most important features of maximum
likelihood is that as stated by Schermelleh-Engel et al., ―If the observed data stem from a
multivariate normal distribution, if the model is specified correctly, and if the sample size is
sufficiently large, ML provides parameter estimates and standard errors that are asymptotically
unbiased, consistent, and efficient‖ (2003, p. 26).
The Amos software chooses one indicator and assigns a regression weight of 1 to the
factor loading of that indicator to estimate factor loadings of other indicators.
Model Fit Assessment: This step is also critical since the primary purpose of developing
and testing a model is to seek a model that fits the data well enough to explain actual
relationships in observed data (Hoyle, 1995; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). A hypothesized
equation model is thought to fit data to the degree that a variance/covariance matrix of models
converge to the observed variance/covariance matrix. Unlike the case with other statistical
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methods, there is no single significance test to evaluate models in SEM. Therefore, a variety of
fit indices must be taken into account at the same time to assess to what extent a covariance
structure of data is explained by the implied model (Schermelleh-Engel et al, 2003; Wan, 2002).
Several of these indices could be used to assess model fit, but it is a matter of judgment to
conclude whether a particular model fits the data well, since each index will yield a somewhat
different result. Recently, Schermelleh-Engel et al. (2003) reviewed the most widely used
goodness-of-fit measures and provided a useful recommendation as to which goodness-of-fit
indices to report in evaluating model fit. Based on their recommendation, the fit indices reported
in this study are indicated in Table 2.
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Table 2 Goodness of Fit Indices and Criteria for Model Validation

Index

Explanation

Chi-square (χ2)

χ2 assess the difference between population
covariance and proposed model covariance
(Schermelleh-Engel et al, 2003).
LR refers to the difference of model χ2 for the default
and modified models for one degree of freedom
(Garson, 2009)

Likelihood Ratio (χ2 /df)

P value
Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

Good fit

p indicates whether the value of chi-square is
significant (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
RMSEA evaluates the close fit of model to the
population instead of exact fit to overcome problems
associated with exact fit in practice (SchermellehEngel et al, 2003; Browne & Cudeck, 1993).

Standardized Root Mean
Square Residual (SRMR)
Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)

TLI is useful for comparison of model-implied and a
null model (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004).
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) CFI is known as noncentrality measure and indicates
improvements from independence model
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Kenny, 2010).
Probability (p-close)
―The p value examines the alternative hypothesis that
the RMSEA is greater that .05‖ (Kenny, 2010)
Hoelter's Critical N (CN)
CN determines the sample size that needs to be
reached to conclude / decide that model is
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Criteria
Acceptable fit

Low

Low

χ2 /df ≤ 2

2 < χ2 /df ≤ 4

p > .05

.01 ≤ p ≤ .05

RMSEA ≤ .05

.05 < RMSEA ≤ .08

SRMR ≤ .05

.05 < SRMR ≤ .10

TLI >97

.90 ≤ TLI < .97

CFI >97

90 ≤ CFI < .97

> .05

.05 ≤ p ≤ .10

>200

>75

statistically fits the data (Bollen & Liang, 1988).
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Model Modification: In situations for which model-fit indices indicate a poor fit to the
observed data researchers should respecify the model for a better model fit (Schumacker &
Lomax, 2004). There are several ways of searching for a model that theoretically and empirically
fits the data. Based on a review of SEM method literature two major methods are identified as
suitable for model modification:
Fixing free parameters involves fixing parameters that were free in the initial
specification. The fixing procedure can be conducted by eliminating a parameter from the model.
This action is exercised based on two criteria: first according to the estimated value of
parameters and second according to significance level. According to the parsimony rule it is
plausible to exclude the parameters that do not considerably contribute to the model fit.
However, there is no consensus on the cutoff level of parameters to be eliminated from the
model. For this study .40 was set as a threshold for the value of parameter estimates to retain in
the model even though .30 was suggested as a criterion (Malthouse, 2001). Second, whether the
estimates of free parameters were statistically significant at the .05 level was examined to decide
whether to eliminate them from the model. Nonsignificant parameters were excluded from the
model to obtain a simpler model that reflects the covariance structure. However, like many other
scholars, Schumacker and Lomax (2004) suggested that ―if a parameter is not significant but is
of sufficient substantive interest, then the parameter should probably remain in the model‖
(p. 71). Accordingly, some parameters were allowed to remain in the model even when their
estimated values were not significant.
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Freeing the fixed parameters that were fixed in the initial specification is the second
method for model modification. This approach requires inclusion of parameters in the model that
were not specified in the initial hypothetical model. The most widely used procedure to modify a
model is by use of modification indices that are provided by the software program. These indices
indicate the expected decrease in chi-square by inclusion of measurement error covariance.
Modification indices were assessed to determine how much the value of chi square could be
lowered by correlating the pairs of error terms.
It is important to note that model modification by including new parameters and
eliminating existing parameters increases the likelihood of making a Type I (false positive) error
(Hoyle, 1995). Substantive theoretical guidance needs to be taken into account when a better
model fit is searched. The theoretical framework of this study was the primary guide while a
model with better fit was sought.
The five-step model-validation process was applied to both the measurement and
structural equation models of the study. The measurement model is considered a subarea of the
structural equation model to confirm that the measurement models of latent variables are valid.
Latent variables (or constructs) are unobservable variables that are measured by indicators that
are observed variables. Once the measurement models are validated, the latent variables are put
into the structural model and evaluated by using goodness-of-fit indices in a similar way to the
way the measurement model was validated.
This study uses one endogenous variable (responsiveness), three exogenous latent
variables (reward expectancy, public service motivation, and selective enforcement), and one
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observed variable (willingness to exert effort). The measurement models and structural equation
model of the study are illustrated and discussed in following sections.
3.3.2. Measurement Models
In this section, the specified measurement models (reward expectancy, public service
motivation, selective enforcement, and responsiveness) are illustrated. Each latent variable was
measured by several indicators that were specifically derived from underlying theories of this
study. Figure 2 illustrates the initial specification of the hypothesized measurement model for
reward expectancy.
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Figure 2 Measurement Model of Reward Expectancy
The reward expectancy latent variable that was derived from the expectancy theory of
motivation is measured by fifteen indicators. Each indicator is represented by one item in the
survey instrument.
Ten indicators were used to specify the public service motivation measurement model.
The diagram drawn to measure the PSM construct is shown in the Figure 3. Although PSM was
measured by more items in previous research, for purposes of this study 10 indicators were used
for specification of the construct.
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Figure 3 Measurement Model of Public Service Motivation
The measurement model for the selective enforcement latent construct consists of eight
observed variables as shown in Figure 4. Each of those was represented by one question in the
questionnaire.
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Figure 4 Measurement Model of Selective Enforcement
The endogenous latent variable of the study (responsiveness) is measured by six items
that comes from respondent ratings of a given scenario related to stop/question decisions of
officers. Figure 5 shows this model.
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Figure 5 Measurement Model of Responsiveness
3.3.3. Structural Equation Model
The structural equation model was specified by including exogenous (reward expectancy,
intrinsic rewards, and selective enforcement) and endogenous (responsiveness and work effort)
variables of the study into a diagram (see Figure 6). The relationships among variables were
specified based on a review of the theoretical assumptions and previous studies in the literature.
Demographic variables and organizational size were used as control variables to precisely
capture the influence of exogenous variables on the endogenous variables.
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Figure 6 Structural Equation Model for Determinants of Responsiveness
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3.4. Human Subjects
Studies that require human subjects‘ participation need to be approved by an Institutional
Review Board (IRB) before the study is started (see appendix A for UCF IRB approval).
Individuals‘ rights are guaranteed under law to prevent any harm to participants. Target
participants of this study were invited and encouraged to take part in the study on a voluntary
basis. Informed consent that included all explanations about the study was obtained before the
survey was conducted.
Any questions revealing personal identity, including name, badge number, etc., were not
included in the questionnaire to ensure confidentiality. In addition, subjects‘ personal
information was not revealed to the public. Moreover, information gathered from participants on
their perceptions on the subject matter of survey and demographic variables was kept
anonymous. And finally, questionnaires were secured to prevent third-party access to them.
3.5. Summary of Chapter
The hypotheses of the study were summarized, exogenous variables (reward expectancy,
public service motivation, selective enforcement), endogenous variables (work effort and
responsiveness), and control variables (age, educational level, departmental size, intensity) were
presented in a table and explained in detail with their measurement method. Research procedures
were explained by specifically stating sampling and data collection procedures as well as
providing information on the survey instrument and its reliability. In the statistical method
section, measurement models of the study variables and the structural equation model were
illustrated in figures and their validation methods were explained in five steps. Model-fit indices
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and model-fit criteria were demonstrated in a table. Finally human subjects and ethical
considerations related to the subjects were addressed at the end of the chapter.
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CHAPTER.4.

FINDINGS AND RESULTS

This chapter presents the study findings in four sections: The first part is the descriptive
analysis section, which includes findings of response rate and frequency distributions of the
study variables, including control variables. Correlation matrices are also presented in this
section to demonstrate the correlation between indicator variables of the study constructs.
The second section of the chapter focuses on conducting confirmatory factor analyses for
latent variables of the study. Four latent constructs were validated by using a five-step procedure
introduced in Chapter 3. The findings of the reliability analysis for each dimension of the survey
instrument are presented in this section.
Validated measurement models based on confirmatory factor analysis are put into a
structural model along with the control variables in the third section of the chapter. The step-bystep model-validation procedure was conducted for validation of the structural equation model.
Generic and revised models are illustrated and model-fit values are presented. In the final
section, six hypotheses of the study are tested, based on findings produced by the structural
equation analysis.
4.1. Descriptive Analyses
This section reports first on the study response rate. The second part of the descriptive
analysis presents findings on the characteristics of participants of the study as demonstrated in
frequency tables of the control variables. The third part shows correlations among indicator
variables of the constructs presented in tables and a discussion (see Appendix E for Frequency
Tables and Correlation Matices)
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4.1.1. Response Rate
For data-collection purposes, the survey instrument was distributed to 889 patrol officers
in seven provinces in the seven regions of Turkey. Of the 889 police officers, 630 participated
either by filling out the online questionnaire or returning the paper form to the researcher for a
71% response rate. Subjects with more than 30% missing values were eliminated from the
sample. This procedure resulted in 613 participants in the study. To deal with missing values
under the threshold (30%), a data imputation method was implemented. All missing values in
data were filled in with the most frequent response (mode) for each variable. The response rate
per province is presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Analysis of Response Rate

Department

Number of
distributed
instruments

Number of
respondents

Percent

Response rate
per department

Istanbul

307

261

42.6

85.0

Ankara

196

103

16.8

52.5

Izmir

144

89

14.5

61.8

54

43

7.0

79.6

105

77

12.6

73.3

Erzurum

35

25

4.1

71.4

Samsun

46

15

2.4

32.6

887

613

100.0

Diyarbakir
Adana

Total
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According to the response rates by province as shown in Table 3, the highest response
rate was in Istanbul (85%). Excluding the response from Samsun, more than half of the
distributed survey instruments were returned in each province.
4.1.2. Descriptive Analyses of Control Variables
Four variables were included in the study to control their possible effect on the study
variables. Educational level, age, and gender of participants were demographic characteristics of
the participants and were used as control variables. The possible influence of department size
and perceived intensity of the department was also controlled for. The frequency distributions of
the control variables are indicated in Table 4.

88

Table 4 The Frequency Distributions of the Control Variables

Attribute
Education

High school

Gender

Department

Intensity

Cumulative
percent

52

8.5

8.5

2-year college

261

42.6

51.1

Bachelor‘s

278

45.4

96.4

22

3.6

100.0

Under 30 years

335

54.6

54.6

30–39

201

32.8

87.4

40–49

71

11.6

99.0

50–59

6

1.0

100.0

Female

20

3.3

3.3

Male

593

96.7

100.0

Istanbul

261

42.6

42.6

Ankara

103

16.8

59.4

Izmir

89

14.5

73.9

Diyarbakir

43

7.0

80.9

Adana

77

12.6

93.5

Erzurum

25

4.1

97.6

Samsun

15

2.4

100.0

Low

27

4.4

4.4

Moderate

135

22.0

26.4

High

451

73.6

100.0

Master‘s
Age

Frequency Percent
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Attribute
Education

High school

52

8.5

8.5

2-year college

261

42.6

51.1

Bachelor‘s

278

45.4

96.4

22

3.6

100.0

Under 30 years

335

54.6

54.6

30–39

201

32.8

87.4

40–49

71

11.6

99.0

50–59

6

1.0

100.0

Female

20

3.3

3.3

Male

593

96.7

100.0

Istanbul

261

42.6

42.6

Ankara

103

16.8

59.4

Izmir

89

14.5

73.9

Diyarbakir

43

7.0

80.9

Adana

77

12.6

93.5

Erzurum

25

4.1

97.6

Samsun

15

2.4

100.0

613

100.0

Master‘s
Age

Gender

Department

Cumulative
Frequency Percent
percent

Total

Educational level of respondents was measured by four categories. The first category was
high school, which represented 8.5% of all participants. Officers with a 2-year college degree
(42.6%) or a bachelor‘s degree (45.4%) constituted 88% of survey participants. The number of
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patrol officers who were graduated from a master‘s program was smallest in the sample. There
were no Ph.D. degree holders among the participants of the study.
More than half of survey participants (54.6%) were under 30 years of age. There were
201 officers in the second category of age, 30–39. Considerably fewer patrol officers were in the
40–49 age range. Of 613 respondents, only 6 were between 50 and 59, representing a very small
portion of participants.
Only 20 female officers participated in this study, while the number of male respondents
was 593. This figure indicates a very small percentage (3.3%) of female participants when
compared to the percentage of male officers (96.7%). Only 4.5% of respondents reported their
departments to be low intensity, while 22.1% believed that their department had a middle-level
workload. Most respondents believed that their department had a high-level workload when
compared to other department in the country and other work units in the same department.
The survey instrument was distributed to 887 police officers from seven provinces to
improve the representativeness of sample. The number of respondents from each province and
their percentages are shown in Table 4. Of the 613 respondents, 261 Istanbul police officers or
42.6% participated in the survey. Ankara was at the second place in terms of number of
participants (103). It was followed by Izmir (89), Adana (77), Diyarbakir (43), and Erzurum
(25). The number of participants (15) from Samsun was smallest among other departments. It
was not unexpected that different numbers of respondents participated, because the number of
participants from each province was proportionally calculated. Even though the number of
subjects varied by province the response rate per province did not differ considerably.
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4.1.3. Descriptive Analysis of Responsiveness
One of the endogenous variables of the study, responsiveness, was developed to
determine to what degree patrol officers are responsive to everyday situations that require
enforcement of law even though they are not major criminal incidents. Six scenarios served to
measure this concept. Table 16 indicates frequency and percentage distributions and the
construct.
The first item (R1) asked participants the likelihood of making a stop in the situation
described in Scenario 1. More than 63% of respondents reported that it is very likely that they
would make a stop in the given situation. Almost 30% of them also indicated that it is ―likely‖
that they would make a stop. In the second scenario (R2), respondents were asked to rate how
likely they would be to initiate a criminal justice process in the situation with the person who
failed to provide identification. The percentage of respondents (45.4%) was highest for the
response of ―likely‖ to initiate a process. This figure was followed by 36.9%, representing
participants who see the probability of initiating a process as ―very likely.‖ Items R3, R4, and
R5 had the same pattern as R2; that is, the highest number of respondents rated the items as
―likely,‖ and the answer ―very likely‖ was the second highest-rated choice even though the
percentages differed slightly. A majority of respondents reported that they saw the probability of
enforcing the law as ―very likely‖ in the situation described in the last scenario (R6).
Overall, frequency tables of responsiveness indicated that patrol officers agreed or
strongly agreed to stop a car, question suspected persons, initiate a criminal justice process in
given situations, or, in other words, take action in the described situations.
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4.1.4. Descriptive Analysis of the Work Effort
One of the endogenous variables of the study was measured by a single item. Participants
rated their effort level at work compared to their capacity by answering the item ―How much
effort do you think that you exert at your work when you consider your capacity?‖ The scale
ranged from 0% to 100% at 5% intervals.
Table 17 demonstrates the frequency distributions of the work effort. According to
responses to the item, approximately 10% of all participants stated that they exert 50% or less
effort, and approximately 75% of participants stated that they exert 75% or more of their
capacity. Almost one-fifth of participants, which was the highest percentage (mode), think that
they work with their full capacity and exert 100% effort when they perform their job.
4.1.5. Descriptive Analysis of Reward Expectancy
The survey instrument contained 18 items that aimed to measure to what extent the
respondents believe that they have the ability and opportunity to perform at a higher level,
whether they believe that higher performance is instrumental for extrinsic rewards, and how
much they value organizational rewards. A five-point Likert scale ranging from ―strongly
disagree‖ to ―strongly agree‖ was used to collect responses from participants.
As seen in Table 18, the first item (RE1) asked the respondents whether they believe that
making vehicle stops increased their chance of capturing criminals. The accumulated number of
respondents (268) who reported that they either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement
was at least two times greater than the total number of participants who either disagreed or
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strongly disagreed with the statement (127). The second item (RE2) aimed to measure to what
extent officers think that success of an officer depends upon making vehicle stops and
questioning persons. For this item, the number of respondents who rated either ―disagree‖ or
―strongly disagree‖ reached 230 (37.5%), while the number of respondents who agreed or
strongly agreed was 168 (27.4%). Most of the respondents (71%) agreed or strongly agreed that
they have training and all technical information to stop vehicles and question people (RE3). The
total percentage of participants (39.9%) who reported that they agreed or strongly agreed that
they have the required equipment to stop vehicles and question people (RE4) was greater than
the aggregated percentage of those (29.4%) who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the
statement. The same pattern occurred in RE3 and RE4 and was also observed in RE5. Similarly,
a greater number of patrol officers agreed (246) than disagreed (153) that they have the
opportunity to make vehicle stops and question people in their unassigned times. ―Neither agree
nor disagree‖ was the most frequently rated attribute for the first two items, indicating that
responders were uncertain in many cases.
The next five items in the questionnaire asked respondents to what extent they believe
that they will receive cash rewards (RE6), an appreciation letter (RE7), appointment to a better
work unit (RE8), supervisory recognition (RE9), or a better performance evaluation score
(RE10) when they perform better. Most of the respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with
the items except for RE8 (appointment to a better work unit). This result indicates that officers
do not believe that they can receive cash rewards, appreciation letters, supervisory recognition,
or better performance evaluation scores even if their performance were better. They perceived
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that the only realistically obtainable reward was appointment to a better work unit when their
performance improved.
The last five items‘ purpose was measuring the extent to which officers value extrinsic
rewards offered by the organization. Respondents were asked to rate the value of cash rewards
(RE11), appreciation letters (RE12), appointment to a better work unit (RE13), supervisory
recognition (RE14), and better performance evaluation scores (RE15). Surprisingly, a majority of
participants reported that these rewards were not important to them.
4.1.6. Descriptive Analysis of Public Service Motivation
A ten-item subsection of the survey instrument was designed to measure public service
motivation. A descriptive analysis of the public service motivation latent variable is presented in
the Table 19.
A considerable number of respondents reported their agreement (agree and strongly
agree) with the nine statements in the questionnaire. The percentage of agreement ranged from
43.7% (PSM9) to 86.1% (PSM3). Only one item, PSM1 was agreed to by 205 (33.4%) and
strongly agreed to by 91 (14.8%) respondents, meaning that it is hard for them to get intensely
interested in what is going on in their community.
4.1.7. Descriptive Analysis of Selective Enforcement
This concept was designed to measure to what extent officers believe that police should
use discretion in their daily decisions. In other words, it aimed to measure to what degree officers
are inclined to enforce the law selectively instead of implementing aggressive full enforcement.
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Eight items were included in the questionnaire to determine attitudes toward selective
enforcement. Table 20 demonstrates the frequency distributions of responses obtained from the
sample.
Patrol officers participating in this study either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the
first two statements, which aimed to find out to what degree police should ignore minor crimes
(SE1) and not get involved in family disputes (SE2). The cumulative percentages of
disagreement with these two items are 54.6% and 64.3%, respectively. Frequency statistics of the
third item (SE3) indicate that approximately 50% of respondents stated that they agree or
strongly agree that making stops and searches will cause them more trouble than it is worth. The
findings for SE4 indicate that a considerable number of participants (441) believe that police
need to consider the spirit of the law before initiating a legal process. The accumulated
percentage of respondents reached approximately 70% who agreed that the law is the law: police
can make no exceptions (SE5). Item SE6 indicated a high disagreement rate, meaning that
respondents do not agree that ―if police don‘t enforce minor offenses, it will only encourage
more serious crime.‖ A small portion of participants (14%) agreed with the statement
―Sometimes the best way for police to keep things running smoothly is to turn a blind eye to
some offenses.‖ Figures for the last item (RE8) revealed that most respondents (61.5%) think
that police can intervene to solve a dispute without invoking a criminal justice process.
4.1.8. Correlations among Indicators of Constructs
Based on the values of correlation coefficients illustrated in Table 21, all variables are
positively correlated with each other at the .01 level. The weakest relationship was between R6
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and R3 (.343), while the strongest association was between R2 and R3 (.469). These values
indicate that all variables used as indicators of responsiveness were moderately and positively
correlated with each other.
Table 22 illustrates correlations among indicators of variables that were used as
indicators of reward expectancy. Correlations among variables ranged from .002 (between R15
and R5) to .720 (between R6 and R7) when their absolute values were taken into consideration.
Even though negative correlation between some variables exists, directions of most correlations
were positive. The strongest positive relationship was found between R6 and R7 (.720), while
the strongest negative relationship was detected between R5 and R7 (-.215). Based on these
figures it can be suggested that correlations among variables were moderate or low.
The correlation metrics presented in Table 23 suggest that all indicator variables of
Public Service Motivation except PSM1 indicated a statistically significant association with each
other at the .001 level. All relationships were in the positive direction, ranging from .182
(between PSM4 and PSM9) to .572 (PSM7 and PSM8).
Correlation metrics of selective enforcement are demonstrated in Table 24.
4.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), the first stage of structural equation modeling
(SEM), was conducted to assess the validation of the measurement models. CFA was used to
find out to what extent the proposed measurement models are consistent with the covariance
between factors. Schumacker and Lomax (2004) suggested that ―factor analysis attempts to
determine which sets of observed variables share common variance-covariance characteristics
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that define theoretical constructs or factors (latent variables)‖ (p. 154). The five-step validation
process (model specification, model identification, model estimation, model-fit assessment,
model modification) described in the methodology section was applied to each construct of the
study.
4.2.1. Responsiveness
The endogenous latent variable of the study, responsiveness, was validated in the
following steps.
Model Specification: The measurement model for responsiveness was specifically
designed based on a theoretical framework and the discretion literature. A proposed
measurement model for this construct with six indicators was illustrated in Figure 6. The
following steps were taken to validate the specified measurement model of responsiveness.
Model Identification: A regression weight of one of the six indicators was set to 1 to
estimate the values of the other indicators in the model. A degrees-of-freedom value of 9
suggested that there was more than one solution for the model implied, which indicates that the
model is over-identified.
Model Estimation: Amos produced estimation values for each parameter in the model by
using a maximum likelihood estimation method once the model was identified. The output file
produced by Amos documented the estimates of the parameters in the measurement model of
responsiveness.

98

Model Assessment: The measurement model of responsiveness was assessed at this step
to find out the appropriateness of indicators and model fit. The first parameter estimates were
evaluated based on the value of a critical ratio: whether their factor loadings were significant at
the .05 level. All critical ratios for regression weights were statistically significant, representing
values greater than 1.96. Then, factor loadings of indicators were assessed based on the cutoff
level established for this study. All factor loadings were greater than .40, which is the threshold
used to retain indicators in the model. Finally, to determine how well the model fits the data,
goodness-of-fit statistics were used. The model assessment process indicated that there was room
for improvement of model fit, even though some of the fit indices were within the acceptable
limits.
Model Modification: The generic model was modified with minor changes to improve
overall fit. Since all parameter estimates of indicators were significant and higher than the cutoff
level (.40), no indicator was eliminated from the model. Evaluation of modification indices
suggested that chi-square values could be reduced by connecting error terms. Error terms e5 and
e6 were connected, since their connection promised the largest decrease in chi square and the
highest improvement in model fit. The revised measurement model is illustrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 7 Revised Measurement Model for Responsiveness
After revision of the model, parameter estimates of the model were received from the
Amos output and documented in Table 5. The values of standardized estimates were well above
the threshold level, ranging from .543 to .698. Critical ratios for all indicators of responsiveness
were greater than 1.96, which suggests all indicators were loaded on the factor significantly.
Table 5 Parameter Estimates for the Revised Measurement Model of Responsiveness
Unstandardized
estimate

Standardized
estimate

Standard
error

Critical
ratio

P

R1

<---

Responsiveness

1.091

.654

.104

10.469

***

R2

<---

Responsiveness

1.226

.641

.118

10.348

***

R3

<---

Responsiveness

1.405

.705

.127

11.086

***

R4

<---

Responsiveness

1.252

.592

.123

10.157

***

R5

<---

Responsiveness

1.225

.583

.110

11.102

***

R6

<---

Responsiveness

1.000

.550

*** Regression weight is significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).
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After modifications, goodness of statistics for the measurement model of responsiveness
was assessed according to model-fit criteria. Table 6 indicates goodness of fit indices for both the
generic and revised models.
Table 6 Goodness of Fit Statistics for the Measurement Model of Responsiveness
Criteria
Good fit
Acceptable fit

Index

Model indices
Generic Revised

Chi-square (x²)

Low

Low

40.783

17.915

Degrees of Freedom (DF)

>0

=0

9

7

Likelihood Ratio (x²/df)

≤2

≤4

4.531

2.559

P value

≥ .05

≥ .01

.000

.012

Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

≤ .05

≤ .08

.076

.050

Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual (SRMR)

≤ .05

≤ .10

.0343

.0224

Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.943

.975

Comparative Fit Index (CFI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.966

.988

Probability (p-close)

≥ .05

≥ .10

.031

.440

Hoelter's Critical N (CN)

> 200

> 75

254

481

As seen in Table 6, indices for the revised model of responsiveness are within the
suggested limits. The value of the critical ratio (4.531), which was not acceptable for a good
model fit, was reduced to 2.559 after revision of the model. All other values of the indices also
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indicated a considerable improvement in the revised model. Therefore it is plausible that the
revised measurement of responsiveness fit the data reasonable well.
4.2.2. Reward Expectancy
Model Specification: The reward expectancy measurement model was specified based on
the expectancy theory of motivation. As seen in Figure 2, the proposed model consisted of
fifteen indicators, each represented by one item in the questionnaire.
Model Identification: This step aimed to find out whether the proposed model is
identifiable from observed data. The degrees-of-freedom value (90) documented in the Amos
output file indicated that more than one unique estimate can be obtained from the observations,
which suggests the model is over-identified.
Model Estimation: A maximum likelihood (ML) procedure was used to construct
parameter estimates of the model. These estimates were assessed in the next steps to assess the
appropriateness of individual indicators for the latent construct.
Model Assessment: The measurement model was evaluated based on estimates and
goodness-of-fit statistics to decide whether the model was validated. The assessment of the ML
estimates table revealed that RE3 was nonsignificant at the .05 level. The indicators with
significant regression weights also were assessed to determine whether they had high enough
factor loadings. The indicators RE1, RE2, RE4, RE5, RE6, R7, and RE8 did not load on the
factor at the .40 level or higher. The model-fit assessment also indicated that the values of the
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goodness-of-fit indices were not within the acceptable limits, meaning that the generic model
does not fit the data.
Model Modification: It was necessary to modify and respecify the model based on the
model assessment. First, RE3 was eliminated from the model, since its critical ratio was
nonsignificant as noted in the previous section. Then, analysis was conducted again to develop
regression weights of the remaining indicators. The indicators with factor loadings lower than
.40 were also excluded from the model in an effort to search for a model that fit the data better.
Even though these procedures improved the model fit by reducing the chi-square value, they did
not come up with a model that fit the data well enough.
As a next step, the modification indices of Amos were evaluated to identify how much
the chi-square value could be reduced by connecting error terms of the indicators. Pairs of errors
in the modification indices were connected by beginning with one that brought about the highest
level of improvement in model fit. For each run, one pair of errors was connected to allow the
software to calculate goodness-of-fit statistics and modification indices. This operation was
repeated five times and the following error terms were allowed to be free: RE9-RE10, RE9RE14, RE10-RE15, RE11-RE14, RE13-14 and RE10-RE14.
As seen in Figure 8, standardized regression weights of the indicators were within the
acceptable level based the predetermined criterion (.40) with one exception. Even though the
regression weight of R10 was below the threshold level (.39) it was retained in the model
because of its substantial importance. The evaluation of figures in Table 7 also suggested that
each of them indicated a statistically significant relationship with the latent construct. RE14 had
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the largest factor loading (.841), while RE10 indicated the lowest factor loading on its factor
(.388).

Figure 8 Revised Measurement Model for Reward Expectancy
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Table 7 Parameter Estimates for the Revised Measurement Model of Reward Expectancy
Unstandardized
Estimate

Standard
error

Standardized
estimate

Critical
ratio

P

RE9

<----

Reward Expectancy

.468

.047

.420

10.054

***

RE10

<----

Reward Expectancy

.448

.049

.388

9.144

***

RE11

<----

Reward Expectancy

1.000

RE12

<----

Reward Expectancy

1.013

.046

.820

21.833

***

RE13

<----

Reward Expectancy

.965

.048

.773

19.963

***

RE14

<----

Reward Expectancy

1.054

.057

.841

18.425

***

RE15

<----

Reward Expectancy

1.013

.050

.774

20.430

***

.806

*** Regression weight is significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).

The measurement model for reward expectancy was evaluated after the required
modifications were made. Goodness-of-fit indices for the generic and revised models are shown
in Table 8.
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Table 8 Goodness of Fit Statistics for Measurement Model of Reward Expectancy
Criteria
Good fit
Acceptable fit

Index

Model indices
Generic
Revised

Chi-square (x²)

Low

Low

2073.028

32.671

Degrees of Freedom (DF)

>0

=0

90

8

Likelihood Ratio (x²/df)

≤2

≤4

23.034

3.959

P value

≥ .05

≥ .01

.000

.000

Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

≤ .05

≤ .08

.190

.070

Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual (SRMR)

≤ .05

≤ .10

.1427

.0254

Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.448

.972

Comparative Fit Index (CFI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.527

.989

Probability (p-close)

≥ .05

≥ .10

.000

.089

Hoelter's Critical N (CN)

>200

>75

34

300

The poor model fit was improved after revision of the model based on model
modification indices. The only index that was not within acceptable limits was P-value (.000).
This result can be attributable to sample size, since this value is inclined to be significant for
large sample sizes.
4.2.3. Public Service Motivation
Public service motivation refers to the willingness of an employee to work in the interest
of the public (Perry & Wise 1990). It is used in this study as one of the predictors of
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responsiveness. The public service motivation concept was represented in the survey
questionnaire by 10 items.
Model Specification: As a latent variable of the study, a ten-factor measurement model
was developed for this construct, which constitutes the first step (model specification) in the
validation of the measurement model. As seen in Figure 2, it was proposed that public service
motivation can be measured by ten indicators.
Model Identification: After specification of the model, one of the factors was chosen as a
scale factor to obtain values for the other indicators. Amos software was run to assess whether
the model is identifiable, in other words, whether estimates for the ten indicators of the model
can be obtained from the data. The value of degrees of freedom (17) indicates that the
measurement model for public service motivation is an over-identified model.
Model Estimation: The maximum likelihood estimation method was used to conduct
confirmatory factor analysis. The Amos output file provided estimates of free parameters in the
model, including factor loadings of indicators.
Model Assessment: At this stage, the degree to which the observed variance/ covariance
matrix supported the specified measurement model for public service motivation was assessed.
For this purpose, parameter estimates received from the maximum likelihood procedure were
reviewed to determine significant and non-significant regression weights. The values of the
critical ratio were greater than 1.96, indicating that factor loadings of indicators were
significantly related to the construct at the .05 level. However, the critical ratio of PSM8 was
.431, which was not significant at the .05 level. Next, the value of the regression weights were
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evaluated based on the threshold determined for this study. One factor loading was lower than
the predetermined cutoff level: PSM3 had a factor loading of .38, which was lower than the
acceptable level. Last, the goodness-of-fit statistics produced by Amos were assessed based on
the criteria listed in the methodology section to find out how well the proposed measurement
model fit the data. The evaluation of fit statistics for the measurement model of public service
motivation revealed that the proposed model does not fit the data well.
Model Modification: Because of the poor model fit, in an effort to search for a model that
would fit the observed data better the generic model was respecified in the following steps. This
process could be handled by either fixing free parameters or freeing fixed parameters in the
generic model. PSM8 was eliminated from the model because of the non-significant critical
ratio. Similarly, PSM3 was excluded from the model since it did not have a large enough factor
loading on the latent. After these procedures, the model-fit indices suggested that the model fit
the data better when compared to the generic model. However, the values of the indices were still
not within acceptable limits based on the determined criteria. At this point the modification
indices were assessed to find out whether the model fit could be improved by connecting pairs of
error terms. For this purpose, six pairs of errors were allowed to be free, one pair of errors at a
time (d17- d18, d18-d20, d18-d24, d17-d21, d23-d24, d24-d25). The revised measurement model
of public service motivation is illustrated in the Figure 9.

108

Figure 9 Revised Measurement Model for Public Service Motivation
The revised measurement model of eight indicators loaded on the factor was above the
threshold (.40), and their relation to the factor was statistically significant (Table 9). Values of
standardized regression weights were between .42 and .77.
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Table 9 Parameter Estimates for the Revised Measurement Model of Public Service
Motivation
Unstandardized
Estimate

Standardized
estimate

Standard
error

Critical
ratio

P

PSM2

<---

Public Service Motivation

.548

.421

.065

8.460

***

PSM3

<---

Public Service Motivation

.697

.519

.066

10.608

***

PSM5

<---

Public Service Motivation

1.067

.661

.082

13.000

***

PSM6

<---

Public Service Motivation

1.000

.626

PSM7

<---

Public Service Motivation

1.005

.744

.071

14.123

***

PSM8

<---

Public Service Motivation

1.149

.772

.080

14.370

***

PSM9

<---

Public Service Motivation

1.017

.595

.087

11.641

***

PSM10

<---

Public Service Motivation

.997

.578

.085

11.722

***

*** Regression weight is significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).

After the measurement model was modified based on the modification indices, model fit
was improved considerably. Table 10 indicates the goodness-of-fit indices for the generic and
revised measurement models of public service motivation.
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Table 10 Goodness of Fit Statistics for Measurement Model of Public Service Motivation
Index

Good fit

Criteria
Acceptable fit

Model indices
Generic
Revised

Chi-square (x²)

Low

Low

245.636

27.112

Degrees of Freedom (DF)

>0

=0

35

14

Likelihood Ratio (x²/df)

≤2

≤4

7.018

1.937

P value

≥ .05

≥ .01

.000

.773

Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

≤ .05

≤ .08

.099

.039

Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual (SRMR)

≤ .05

≤ .10

.0614

. 0191

Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.0614

.983

Comparative Fit Index (CFI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.877

.992

Probability (p-close)

≥ .05

≥ .10

.000

.138

Hoelter's Critical N (CN)

>200

>75

125

535

As seen in Table 10, some of the fit statistics that were not within the acceptable criteria
(Likelihood Ratio, P-value, RMSEA, TLI, CFI, P-close and CN) met either the good-model-fit or
acceptable-model-fit criteria after model modification. The revised measurement model of public
service motivation was considered as a valid model based on the indices presented in Table 10.
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4.2.4. Selective Enforcement
Selective enforcement, one of the exogenous variables of the study, aims to measure
officer attitudes toward enforcing the law selectively or, in other words, exercising discretion.
The validation process of the measurement model for the concept is described below:
Model Specification: A specific diagram of the measurement model consisting of eight
indicators was drawn in the methodology section (Figure 4). The items for this construct were
borrowed from Wortley‘s questionnaire (2003), which measures officer attitudes toward police
discretion.
Model Identification: To find out whether the specified model is identifiable, Amos
software was run with the value of one of the indicators assigned 1 as a regression weight. This
procedure indicated that more than one solutions for the proposed model is available from
observed data, suggesting that the model is over-identified. (DF:7)
Model Estimation: A unique value for each parameter in the model was obtained from
sample data using the maximum likelihood estimation method.
Model Assessment: Based on parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit statistics, the
degree of model fit was assessed. First, parameter estimates were evaluated to find out whether
the factor loading values were significant. Except for SE4, all critical ratios of indicators were
significant at the .05 level. On the other hand, factor loadings of SE5 and SE6 were lower than
the cutoff level set the study. Finally, fit indices were assessed to determine to what degree the
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implied measurement model fits the data. The model-fit indices did not demonstrate an
acceptable level of model fit (Table 12).
Model Modification: Modifications on the generic model were necessary to improve the
model fit. First, the non-significant indicator (SE4) was eliminated from the model. After
exclusion of this indicator the values of other indicators were assessed based on the threshold
level. At this point factor loadings of SE5 and SE6 were still lower than the expected level.
Therefore, these indicators were eliminated from the model. The diagram of the revised model
with five indicator is presented in the Figure 10.

Figure 10 Revised Measurement Model for Selective Enforcement
The parameter estimates of the model are documented in Table 11 after nonsignificant
indicators were eliminated and pairs of errors were connected. P values of indicators were
significant at the .05 level, and critical ratios were in acceptable ranges.
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Table 11 Parameter Estimates for the Revised Measurement Model of Selective
Enforcement
Unstandardized
estimate

Standardized
estimate

Standard
error

Critical
ratio

P

8.698

***

7.250

***

SE1

<---

Selective Enforcement

.984

.625

.093

SE2

<---

Selective Enforcement

1.000

.656

.098

SE3

<---

Selective Enforcement

.710

.412

SE7

<---

Selective Enforcement

.735

.473

.113

7.922

***

SE8

<---

Selective Enforcement

.560

.399

.087

6.424

***

*** Regression weight is significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).

After evaluation of parameter estimates, goodness-of-fit statistics were assessed to
determine how well the proposed measurement model fit the data. Table 12 demonstrates that
goodness-of-fit scores in the revised model were considerably improved when compared to the
generic model.
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Table 12 Goodness of Fit Statistics for Measurement Model of Selective Enforcement
Criteria
Good fit
Acceptable fit

Index

Model indices
Generic
Revised

Chi-square (x²)

Low

Low

277.949.

14.394

Degrees of Freedom (DF)

>0

=0

7

4

Likelihood Ratio (x²/df)

≤2

≤4

13.897

3.598

P value

≥ .05

≥ .01

.000

.006

Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

≤ .05

≤ .08

.145

.065

Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual (SRMR)

≤ .05

≤ .10

.1073

.0319

Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.400

921

Comparative Fit Index (CFI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.571

.968

Probability (p-close)

≥ .05

≥ .10

.000

.204

Hoelter's Critical N (CN)

>200

>75

70

404

Except for the P-close value, all other goodness-of-fit statistics for the measurement
model of selective enforcement suggested a good model fit. Even though the P-close value was
not greater than .01, it was improved when compared to its value in the generic model (.000).
4.3. Reliability Analyses
Reliability refers to the extent to which an instrument produces consistent measurement
across various settings and times. Reliability is vital to any research in order to draw conclusions.
Among other methods, Cronbach‘s Alpha is the most widely used reliability-assessment
procedure. This method is used to assess the internal consistency of an instrument, and it
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produces values between 0 and 1. Higher scores indicate higher internal consistency and
consequently higher reliability of the instrument.
Four subscales of the survey instrument in this study were evaluated based on a
Cronbach‘s Alpha reliability coefficient. It is important to note that the reliability analyses were
conducted after the factors for items that seemed not to belong were excluded from the
measurement models during the model-validation process. Responsiveness was measured by six
items and an SPSS scale reliability procedure produced a coefficient of .796. A Cronbach‘s
Alpha score was calculated for reward expectancy by using seven items in the scale after
removal of some items in the original questionnaire. The Cronbach‘s Alpha score for this
construct was .873. The reliability coefficient of PSM, which was measured with eight items,
was .836. For the last subscale of instrument, selective enforcement, the Cronbach‘s Alpha value
was .619, which is relatively low compared to other scales in the instrument. The results of the
reliability analysis indicated that subscales that were used to measure responsiveness, reward
expectancy, and public service motivation constructs are highly reliable. Even though the Alpha
score for selective enforcement was not as high as those of other scales it was at an acceptable
level. Garson (2009) argued that the Alpha might be low if the construct was measured by fewer
items. In fact, the selective enforcement concept was measured by five items, fewer than other
measures of the study.
4.4. Structural Equation Model
This section is the third section of findings and presents the validation process of the
structural equation model and reports estimates and goodness-of-fit statistics of the structural
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model. Study variables were put into a structural model to test the relationship among exogenous
and endogenous variables. The same methodology, a five-step validation process, was used to
validate the structural equation model. The process is explained and illustrated in the following
steps:
Specification: All study variables, including the validated measurement models,
mediating variables, and control variables, were put into a structural model to detect
hypothesized relationships among variables. The theoretically informed conceptual model was
taken as the basis to design the model (Figure 11).
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Figure 11 Generic Structural Equation Model for Factors Affecting Responsiveness
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Model Identification: The specified model was run to determine whether a unique
solution for the model parameters exists in the observed sample data. The analysis revealed that
parameter estimates can be obtained from the variance/covariance structure of the data set. That
is, the structural equation model is an over-identified model.
Model Estimation: The default estimation method of Amos software, the maximum
likelihood, was used to acquire parameter estimates of the model. The analysis output provided
the unstandardized and standardized estimates, critical ratios, and P-values of the model
parameters as well as model-fit indices to be used for model-assessment purposes.
Model assessment: Evaluation of model estimates indicated that some of the parameters
had

nonsignificant

relationships.

The

relationship

between

reward

expectancy and

responsiveness was not significant at the .05 level. In addition, reward expectancy did not
produced a statistically significant relationship with work effort either. These relationships
produced very low regression values (-.01 and -.04, respectively). In addition, these relationships
were not in the expected direction. Some of control variables also indicated nonsignificant
associations with endogenous variables. Department, education, and gender were not significant
at the .05 level, while intensity and age were found to be related to responsiveness. Other
structural relationships among variables were significant and in the anticipated direction. All
correlation paths between error terms that were added in the validation process of the
measurement model were statistically significant. Parameter estimates of the generic structural
equation model are presented in Table 13.
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Table 13 Parameter Estimates for the Generic Structural Equation Model
Unstandardized
estimate

Standardized
estimate

Standard
error

Critical
ratio

P

Work Effort

<---

Reward Expectancy

.130

-.042

.126

-1.037

.300

Work Effort

<---

Public Service
Motivation

.816

.144

.248

3.285

.001

Responsiveness

<---

Public Service
Motivation

.340

.481

.040

8.591

***

Responsiveness

<---

Selective
Enforcement

.098

-.107

.046

-2.144

.032

Responsiveness

<---

Reward Expectancy

.004

-.012

.016

-.282

.778

Responsiveness

<---

Work Effort

.020

.157

.005

3.747

***

Responsiveness

<---

Age

.060

-.096

.025

-2.371

.018

Responsiveness

<---

Intensity

.108

.211

.022

5.022

***

Responsiveness

<---

Gender

.190

.074

.103

1.837

.066

Responsiveness

<---

Education

.026

.039

.026

.977

.328

Responsiveness

<---

Department

-.006

-.024

.011

-.598

.550

SE7

<---

Selective
Enforcement

1.066

.479

.155

6.865

***

SE3

<---

Selective
Enforcement

1.000

.405

SE2

<---

Selective
Enforcement

1.449

.664

.201

7.218

***

SE1

<---

Selective
Enforcement

1.405

.623

.186

7.546

***

R1

<---

Responsiveness

1.010

.653

.089

11.325

***

R2

<---

Responsiveness

1.099

.620

.101

10.919

***

R3

<---

Responsiveness

1.224

.663

.105

11.637

***

R4

<---

Responsiveness

1.119

.569

.106

10.559

***

R5

<---

Responsiveness

1.121

.574

.098

11.389

***

RE9

<---

Reward Expectancy

.443

.420

.040

10.977

***

RE10

<---

Reward Expectancy

.426

.389

.044

9.605

***

RE11

<---

Reward Expectancy

.948

.805

.051

18.428

***

RE12

<---

Reward Expectancy

.961

.820

.044

21.690

***
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Unstandardized
estimate

Standardized
estimate

Standard
error

Critical
ratio

P

.050

18.266

***

RE13

<---

Reward Expectancy

.915

.773

RE14

<---

Reward Expectancy

1.000

.841

RE15

<---

Reward Expectancy

.961

.774

.047

20.346

***

PSM6

<---

Public Service
Motivation

.984

.620

.069

14.244

***

PSM5

<---

Public Service
Motivation

1.051

.655

.070

15.062

***

PSM3

<---

Public Service
Motivation

.715

.536

.059

12.115

***

PSM2

<---

Public Service
Motivation

.568

.440

.057

9.980

***

PSM7

<---

Public Service
Motivation

1.000

.744

PSM8

<---

Public Service
Motivation

1.151

.778

.065

17.782

***

PSM9

<---

Public Service
Motivation

1.042

.612

.074

13.992

***

PSM10

<---

Public Service
Motivation

.990

.578

.075

13.217

***

R6

<---

Responsiveness

1.000

.592

SE8

<---

Selective
Enforcement

.777

.387

.141

5.527

***

d10

<-->

d15

.202

.182

.045

4.530

***

d27

<-->

d33

-.175

-.237

.044

-4.007

***

d9

<-->

d10

.678

.502

.062

10.992

***

d20

<-->

d18

.088

.157

.025

3.568

***

d24

<-->

d25

.197

.254

.037

5.345

***

d13

<-->

d14

-.274

-.405

.043

-6.354

***

d11

<-->

d14

-.344

-.548

.042

-8.251

***

d9

<-->

d14

.216

.251

.049

4.371

***

d18

<-->

d17

.168

.312

.024

6.935

***

e1

<-->

e2

.060

.179

.018

3.276

.001

d10

<-->

d14

.153

.168

.051

2.998

.003
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Unstandardized
estimate

Standardized
estimate

Standard
error

Critical
ratio

P

d21

<-->

d17

-.083

-.139

.025

-3.356

***

d18

<-->

d24

-.070

-.113

.024

-2.901

.004

e5

<-->

e6

.045

.101

.022

2.043

.041

*** Regression weight is significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).

Assessment of model fit revealed that some goodness-of-fit indices were within the
acceptable limits. However, model modification was necessary to improve the model fit by
eliminating nonsignificant parameters in the generic model. Model-fit statistics for the revised
structural equation model are shown in Table 14.
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Table 14 Parameter Estimates for the Revised Structural Equation Model
Unstandardized
estimate

Standardized
estimate

Standard
error

Critical
ratio

P

.833

.149

.247

3.380

***

-.129

-.042

.126

-1.028

.304

.357

.508

.040

8.934

***

-.091

-.098

.045

-2.002

.045

.019

.151

.005

3.631

***

-.073

-.117

.025

-2.904

.004

.106

.206

.021

4.945

***

Work Effort

<--

Public Service Motivation

Work Effort

<--

Reward Expectancy

Responsiveness

<--

Public Service Motivation

Responsiveness

<--

Selective Enforcement

Responsiveness

<--

Work Effort

Responsiveness

<--

Age

Responsiveness

<--

Intensity

Responsiveness

<--

Reward Expectancy

-.003

-.008

.016

-.208

.835

SE7

<--

Selective Enforcement

1.064

.478

.155

6.866

***

SE3

<--

Selective Enforcement

1.000

.405

SE2

<--

Selective Enforcement

1.446

.664

.200

7.219

***

SE1

<--

Selective Enforcement

1.403

.623

.186

7.552

***

R1

<--

Responsiveness

1.008

.654

.088

11.411

***

R2

<--

Responsiveness

1.101

.623

.100

11.031

***

R3

<--

Responsiveness

1.226

.666

.104

11.743

***

R4

<--

Responsiveness

1.122

.573

.105

10.665

***

R5

<--

Responsiveness

1.120

.576

.098

11.479

***

RE9

<--

Reward Expectancy

.444

.420

.040

10.978

***

RE10

<--

Reward Expectancy

.426

.389

.044

9.605

***

RE11

<--

Reward Expectancy

.948

.806

.051

18.429

***

RE12

<--

Reward Expectancy

.961

.820

.044

21.690

***

RE13

<--

Reward Expectancy

.915

.773

.050

18.266

***

RE14

<--

Reward Expectancy

1.000

.841

RE15

<--

Reward Expectancy

.961

.774

.047

20.346

***

PSM6

<--

Public Service Motivation

.981

.627

.068

14.352

***

PSM5

<--

Public Service Motivation

1.041

.658

.069

15.098

***

PSM3

<--

Public Service Motivation

.710

.539

.058

12.188

***

PSM2

<--

Public Service Motivation

.572

.449

.056

10.123

***
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Unstandardized
estimate

Standardized
estimate

Standard
error

Critical
ratio

P

PSM7

<--

Public Service Motivation

1.000

.755

PSM8

<--

Public Service Motivation

1.100

.753

.064

17.175

***

PSM9

<--

Public Service Motivation

.953

.569

.075

12.699

***

PSM10

<--

Public Service Motivation

.972

.575

.074

13.193

***

R6

<--

Responsiveness

1.000

.594

SE8

<--

Selective Enforcement

.778

.388

.141

5.538

***

d10

<-->

d15

.202

.182

.045

4.531

***

d27

<-->

d33

-.176

-.238

.044

-4.018

***

d9

<-->

d10

.678

.502

.062

10.992

***

d20

<-->

d18

.089

.159

.025

3.607

***

d24

<-->

d25

.213

.265

.036

5.857

***

d13

<-->

d14

-.274

-.406

.043

-6.355

***

d11

<-->

d14

-.344

-.549

.042

-8.253

***

d9

<-->

d14

.216

.251

.049

4.368

***

d18

<-->

d17

.166

.310

.024

6.880

***

e1

<-->

e2

.061

.180

.018

3.309

***

d23

<-->

d24

.115

.207

.028

4.157

***

d21

<-->

d17

-.089

-.152

.025

-3.624

***

e5

<-->

e6

.046

.101

.022

2.055

.040

d10

<-->

d14

.153

.168

.051

2.997

.003

d18

<-->

d24

-.061

-.095

.024

-2.582

.010

*** Regression weight is significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).

Model Modification: At this stage, first the nonsignificant control variables, education,
department, and gender were removed from the model. However, the reward expectancy
construct, which indicated nonsignificant relationships with responsiveness and work effort, was
retained in the model because of its substantial role in the model. It was theoretically
hypothesized that both extrinsic (reward expectancy) and intrinsic (public service motivation)
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motivations influence responsiveness. Even though extrinsic rewards did not have an effect on
the work effort and responsiveness, the construct was not excluded from the model because prior
research and theory suggest that this particular construct must be part of the overall structural
model. After revisions were made, the final structural equation model that indicates the relations
among constructs of the study is illustrated in Figure 12. With the revised model, 37% of
variation in responsiveness was explained by the endogenous variables of the study.
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Figure 12 Revised Structural Equation Model for Factors Affecting Responsiveness
126

Parameter estimates for the revised structural model indicated that all regression values of
indicators and also correlation paths between error terms established during the measurement
model specification were significant at the .05 level. Goodness-of-model-fit indices are presented
in Table 15.
Table 15 Goodness of Fit Statistics for Generic and Revised Structural Equation Models
Criteria
Good fit
Acceptable fit

Index

Model indices
Generic
Revised

Chi-square (x²)

Low

Low

1388.787

969.390

Degrees of Freedom (DF)

>0

=0

449

357

Likelihood Ratio (x²/df)

≤2

≤4

3.093

2.715

P value

≥ .05

≥ .01

.000

.000

Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA)

≤ .05

≤ .08

.058

.053

Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual (SRMR)

≤ .05

≤ .10

.0747

.0724

Tucker Lewis Index (TLI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.829

.879

Comparative Fit Index (CFI)

≥ .97

≥ 90

.845

.894

Probability (p-close)

≥ .05

≥ .10

.000

.111

Hoelter's Critical N (CN)

> 200

> 75

221

254

The revised structural equation model indicated a considerably better model fit compared
to the generic model. A lower Chi-square value (969.390) was obtained after revision of the
model (1388.787). Similarly, the likelihood ratio (x²/df) was reduced to 2.715 from 3.093. Even

127

though RMSEA and SRMR were at acceptable levels in the generic model their values were
improved in the revised model. TLI and CFI indicated values very close to desired levels, even
although they did not exactly meet the criteria. P-close and Hoelter‘s Critical N (CN) indices
suggested a good model fit. The only fit statistic that did not meet its criterion was probability (P
value), indicating a significant value (.000). Because of its sensitivity to sample size this finding
needs to be interpreted with caution. Probablity value is more likely to be found significant in the
models with large sample size.
The revised structural equation model indicates that work effort mediates the relationship
between public service motivation and responsivines. However, the relationship between reward
expectancy and responsiveness was not mediated by work effort.
4.3. Hypothesis Testing
The aim of the structural equation analysis in the previous section was to observe the
relationships among study variables. The results documented in Table 14 were used to test the
hypotheses of the study.
H1: Reward expectancy of police officers positively affects their work effort in enforcing
the law.
The first hypothesis of the study was not supported. Even though it was hypothesized that
a positive relationship exists between reward expectancy and work effort, the results of the
analysis indicated that the relationship between the two variables is not statistically significant at
the .05 level. In addition, the regression weight of -.05 suggested that the direction of association
was negative, which was not expected. No empirical evidence was found to support the claim
128

that reward expectancy positively influences the work effort of officers. As a result, the study
failed to reject null hypothesis.
H2: Reward expectancy of officers positively affects their responsiveness to street
contingencies.
The second hypothesis was not supported. The regression weight for this hypothesis was
negative and very close to zero (-.01). The results revealed that there is no statistically significant
relationship between reward expectancy and responsiveness. In addition, the relationship
indicated a negative direction even though a positive one was expected. Statistical evidence was
not found in this study for the proposition that reward expectancy increases officers‘
responsiveness. Thus, the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.
H3: Public service motivation positively affects police officers’ work effort in terms of
enforcing the law.
The analysis revealed that the third hypothesis of the study was supported. The
relationship between public service motivation and work effort produced a regression weight of
.14, which indicated a positive and statistically significant relationship at the .05 level. These
results suggested that empirical evidence was found to support the claim that public service
motivation positively affects the work effort of respondents. The study rejected the null
hypothesis.
H4: Public service motivation positively affects police officers’ responsiveness to
contingencies at street level.
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This hypothesis was also supported by results of the data analysis. The observations
indicated that public service motivation was related to responsiveness. The relationship was
positive and significant at the .01 level. The relationship also was the strongest among others
with a regression weight of .49. Therefore the null hypothesis was rejected.
H5: Attitudes toward selective enforcement negatively affects responsiveness of patrol
officers.
The fifth hypothesis of the study, that selective enforcement negatively influences
responsiveness, was supported. The relationship was in the negative direction as proposed and
statistically significant at the .05 level. Therefore, based on the analysis of observations of the
study it was concluded that responsiveness was negatively influenced by selective enforcement
attitudes of respondents, and the null hypothesis was rejected.
H6: Police officers’ work effort positively affects their responsiveness to daily situations.
The results also supported the last hypothesis. The analysis revealed a positive and
statistically significant association between work effort and responsiveness. An increase in work
effort also increases responsiveness. Selective enforcement had a regression weight of .10. Based
on this positive and significant relationship, the null hypothesis was rejected.
4.4. Chapter Summary
This chapter reported the findings and results of the study. The first section of the
chapter was dedicated to findings on the response rate and frequency distributions of study
variables. Correlations among indicators of latent variables were also documented in this section.
Next, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted for each construct of the study, and
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goodness-of-fit values for each latent variable were evaluated based on predetermined criteria.
The fit to data for all proposed measurement models in the study ranged from acceptable to
perfect. Furthermore, results of reliability analysis indicated that dimensions of the questionnaire
had sufficient Cronbach‘s Alpha scores. The proposed structural equation model with its
goodness-of-fit statistics was illustrated, and the revised model indicated a good fit to data.
Finally, hypotheses of the study were tested based on the revised SEM model. Findings
suggested that public service motivation has a positive effect on responsiveness while selective
enforcement negatively affects responsiveness. No significant relationship was detected between
reward expectancy and responsiveness. Work effort mediated the relationship between PSM and
responsiveness.
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CHAPTER.5.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter begins with an overview of the study findings. Then, it provides a discussion
of the descriptive findings and the hypothesis-testing–related findings. It then discusses the
relationships among exogenous and endogenous variables and the role of control variables.
Theoretical, methodological, and policy implications of the results are also provided in this
chapter. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study and suggestions
for future research that could be conducted to overcome the study limitations.
5.1. Summary of the Findings
The study achieved a 71% response rate. Descriptive statistics indicated that the great
majority of respondents are male officers. Most of the surveyed officers were either 2-year high
school or 4-year university graduates. More than half were under 30 years old. Regarding their
intensity level, they perceived that their department and work units were more intensive
compared to other departments/units.
In terms of research hypotheses, reward expectancy, a particular type of extrinsic
motivation, did not have a statistically significant relationship with responsiveness. The study
also did not find a significant association between reward expectancy and work effort of officers.
Public service motivation, which represents the intrinsic motivation of respondents, on the other
hand, indicated a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship with both work effort
and responsiveness. As hypothesized, officer attitudes toward selective enforcement negatively
influenced officer responsiveness.
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Among demographic characteristics of the participants, only age of officer showed a
negative significant relationship with responsiveness. Intensity perceptions of respondents were
found to be positively associated with responsiveness.
5.2. Discussion of Research Hypotheses
The hypotheses regarding the impact of reward expectancy on work effort and
responsiveness were not supported. The relationships between these variables also indicated very
weak regression weights (-.04, -.01). Furthermore, the directions of associations were negative,
which was not expected. As discussed in previous chapters, the reward expectancy concept was
built on the assumptions of the expectancy theory of motivation. This theoretical framework
developed by Vroom (1964) suggested that employees must believe that (a) they have the
necessary abilities to perform the task that needs to be done, (b) they perceive that their
increasing performance will lead to rewards, and (c) the rewards offered for high performance
should be valuable to them in order for them to be motivated by external rewards. These three
components are conceptualized as expectancy, instrumentality, and valence. Even though this
study combined these beliefs into one latent variable, it was suggested that all three attributes
must exist at the same time to lead to motivation, and lack of any of them will result in lack of
motivation.
Descriptive statistics might help in explaining why extrinsic rewards do not affect the
responsiveness of officers. The descriptive findings on reward expectancy suggest that the
responses of participants accumulated around the ―neither agree nor disagree‖ option, indicating
that respondents have not clearly stated whether they believe that they have the ability to perform
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their job, that rewards are instrumental to receiving rewards, and that they value the rewards.
Further investigation of the scores of each component in the reward expectancy category also
supports this idea. More than one-third of respondents stated they neither agree nor disagree with
the items measuring their perception of their ability. Regarding the second component, more than
40% of respondents stated that they do not believe performance is instrumental in receiving
external rewards. More interesting, more than 60% of participants stated that they do not value
the rewards offered by their organization, such as salary reward, being appointed to a better unit,
or receiving an appreciation letter. This response pattern of officers gives an insight into why
officers working for the TNP are not motivated by extrinsic rewards. As explicitly stated by the
theory, it cannot be expected that employees who do not believe that the rewards are valuable
would be likely to increase their effort and perform better.
Studies that previously reported that extrinsic rewards do not increase work-related
outcomes suggested that this lack of increase might be caused by employee perceptions of
problems in distributing rewards among members of organizations. Promotion procedures and
distribution of extrinsic rewards have been seen as primary indicators of organizational fairness
(Greenberg, 1990). Employee perceptions about unfair distribution of rewards can diminish their
belief in procedural justice and destroy their trust in the organization. The reason why TNP
members might not see performance as instrumental in obtaining organizational rewards might
be because of perceptions about organizational inequity (Forest, 2008).
Previous research also demonstrated that extrinsic rewards do not lead to increases in
either work motivation or performance of employees. In a study conducted among federal
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managers, the reported motivation of managers did not increase when a performance-based pay
system was introduced. The authors attributed this result to difficulties in implementation of the
system. Amount of rewards received by low performers and high performers was not
significantly different. Failure of the system to motivate managers was explained by a perception
of unfair organizational procedures (Pearce & Perry, 1983). These results were also supported by
another study that concluded that overall performance levels in the organization were not
increased in a performance-based system. The study also reported that employees did not
perceive the system as rewarding fairly (Gaertner & Gaertner, 1985). A major survey conducted
in Georgia regarding that state‘s merit pay system, GeorgiaGain, found that ―over 90% of state
employees did not believe good performers were being rewarded with meaningful pay raises‖
(Kellough & Nigro, 2002, p. 163).
In short, monetary reward systems do not work unless they ensure organizational rewards
are distributed among employees based on procedural justice principles. Even though the TNP
does not implement a performance-based pay system, it does reward its members for their
achievements. The study findings imply that employees of the TNP do not believe that rewards
are distributed based on fair procedures. This condition breaks the perceived link between
responsiveness and outcome (reward). Absence of clearly stated policies on reward structures or
arbitrary implementation of these policies creates skepticism that a certain level of
responsiveness will lead to a certain level of reward.
Contrary to other research on performance-based pay, the police-discretion literature
found that police productivity can be increased by having the organization use extrinsic rewards.
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Using expectancy theory, for example, police problem-solving activities (Dejong et al. 2001),
arrest behavior in drug enforcement cases (Johnson, 2009a), and domestic violence arrests
(Johnson, 2010) were explained and positive effects of organizational rewards on these activities
reported. Thus caution needs to be taken in interpreting results of these other research studies,
since either they used secondary data that were not collected for purposes of testing expectancy
theory or they used training and shift as a measure of officer expectancy even though theory
suggests using how officers perceive their ability. Still, the studies offered insight in that welldesigned reward structures may have an impact on officer behavior when they are used,
especially for easy-to-measure outcomes such as arrest rate. Theory also was used for explaining
security-check activity of officers for crime prevention purposes, and it did not account for
officers‘ behavior in that case either. These findings were attributed to the activity‘s not being
easy to verify (Johnson, 2009b). Mastrofski et al. (1994) employed expectancy theory to account
for officer behavior in DUI-related arrests, and they reported that officer expectancy (capability
and opportunity for DUI arrests) and perceived incentives of the organization increased the
number of arrests. However, instrumentality, the belief that high performance leads to
organizational rewards, was found to be negatively associated with officer productivity.
Overall, the study findings that indicate no effect of reward expectancy on responsiveness
can be attributed to a few factors in light of empirical research in this field. First, the results are
consistent with the research on performance-based pay systems, which found no effect of
monetary rewards on either work effort or performance. This effect is particularly noted when
the implementation of the pay system is associated with concerns about possible inequitable
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outcomes. Even though responsiveness does not reflect the performance of officers, it is
plausible to consider it as a work-related outcome. Therefore, it is not surprising that the findings
of the study indicate no influence of extrinsic rewards on responsiveness, implying that TNP
officers distrust organizational procedures in the distribution of rewards.
Second, results of this study were also consistent with those findings that extrinsic
rewards are instrumental when they are structured to reward officers for their easily measurable
behaviors. Since this study focused on one of the intangible aspects of policing (responsiveness),
the expectancy perspective failed to explain variation in behavior. Therefore it did not produce
positive results regarding reward expectancy, as it did in the arrest-decision research.
Third, this study also supported the findings of one of the robust studies on police
discretion (Mastrofski et al., 1994) by indicating a negative relationship between reward
instrumentality and responsiveness.
Fourth, results of this study indicated that officers do not value organizational rewards.
According to one of the theory‘s assumptions, valence is one of the requirements in extrinsic
motivation models. Consequently, it cannot be expected that their reward expectancy will
increase without a valence component of motivation.
Public service motivation had the greatest impact on both work effort and responsiveness
of officers among the other variables. It is important to recall the three main proposals of public
service motivation theory to understand this finding. The theory, first of all, suggests that
individuals who have higher public service motives are more likely to prefer public agencies to
work at. According to the second assumption of the theory, public service motivation affects
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employees‘ performance in their job. Third, employees motivated by public service motives are
less inclined to be motivated by extrinsic rewards such as monetary and promotional rewards
(Perry & Wise, 1990).
It is not easy to draw conclusions about the first proposition of public service motivation
theory based on the analyses of this study, since the study was conducted only in the public
sector. However, findings of the study produced consistent results with the second and third
propositions of PSM theory and also previous research. Previous research reported that public
service motivation has an effect not only on performance but also on several other work-related
outcomes such as organizational commitment, job satisfaction, organizational citizenship
behavior, and work effort. This study‘s findings indicated that public service motivation also has
an impact on work effort and responsiveness of officers in the enforcement of law. In other
words, patrol officers with higher public service motivation are more likely to work harder than
those whose public service motives are lower, and they are more likely to give a higher response
about the cases on the street that require enforcement.
This finding supports both the theory‘s second assumption and empirical studies
conducted in this field. For instance, Frank and Lewis (2004) found that the work effort of
government workers tended to be higher even when they are paid less and given fewer
advancement chances. They also reported that ―interesting work and jobs that offer opportunities
to help others were more strongly related to work effort than were pay and promotion chances‖
(p. 46). When it is taken into account that public service motivation basically refers to working
for the well-being of society and the interests of others, it is likely that officers believe that
responding to street contingencies contributes to the well-being of the community. This motive is
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likely to increase responsiveness of patrol officers who are more public service oriented. Firsttime use of the concept of responsiveness in this study makes it impossible to compare the results
of public service motivation and responsiveness. However, previous research investigated the
impact of public service motivation on work outcomes. Public service motivation was reported to
be positively related to organizational commitment (Crewson, 1997, Leisink & Steijn, 2009),
organizational citizenship behavior (Kim, 2006), job satisfaction (Liu, Tang, & Zhu, 2008) and
job performance (Leisink & Steijn, 2009; Ritz, 2009). As responsiveness is considered a workrelated outcome, it was not surprising that public service motivation increases responsiveness of
participants.
The study also found that officers in the TNP are not inclined to be motivated by extrinsic
rewards offered by their organization. Even though this study did not aim to test the theory‘s
assumption that suggests that public employees are not motivated by contingency rewards, it
gives insight into this proposition by reporting higher public service motivation and no
relationship between reward expectancy and responsiveness.
Another finding of the study relates to the role of work effort in motivation studies. This
study followed those studies that separated the conceptualization of motivation and effort. They
found that work effort is a mediating variable between motivation and work-related outcomes
such as performance, organizational commitment, and organizational citizenship behavior
(Brown & Leigh, 1996). For that reason, it was hypothesized that work effort will mediate the
relationship between reward expectancy and responsiveness as well as the association between
PSM and responsiveness. However, the only relationship mediated by work effort was the one
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between PSM and responsiveness. As a result, this study partially supports the suggestion on the
mediating role of work effort in motivation/work outcomes models.
This study found that selective enforcement attitudes have a negative and statistically
significant effect on responsiveness. This finding suggests that officers who believe that the
police should enforce the law selectively are less responsive in situations that require police
response. The scarcity of research on the role of officer attitudes on their behavior makes it
difficult to compare the findings of this study with similar research. One of the rare studies on
police attitudes found that police officers differ in their attitudes. In that study, police officers
were asked to what degree they think law should be enforced selectively. Findings of the study
revealed that 63% of officers believe that some situations require selective enforcement of the
law (Paoline, 2004).
Another study that examined police discretionary decision-making in traffic enforcement
revealed that police leniency is very common in law enforcement. In traffic violations such as
speeding, red-light running, and not wearing seat belts, officers preferred giving verbal warnings
in 56% of the cases, indicating a high level of selective enforcement. The first reason for
selective enforcement was officers‘ own informal rules (54%), and the second reason was sense
of justice (20%) (Schafer & Mastrofski, 2005). Even though the literature does not provide
comparable studies in terms of selective enforcement‘s role on responsiveness or any other form
of discretion, the above-mentioned studies indicated that the findings of this study are not
unexpected. It was hypothesized that officers who believe that law should be enforced selectively
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will be less responsive than those who believe in full enforcement. Results of the analysis of data
collected from Turkish patrol officers supported this proposition.
5.3. Effect of Control Variables
This study revealed that officer age and perception of intensity have a significant impact on
responsiveness. In the literature, the number of years in service, rather than officer age, was
examined in terms of its effects on officers‘ productivity. In the TNP context, years in service
and age can be regarded as covariate to a certain degree. When we consider that age increases
with years of service, the findings of the study are consistent with the results of research that
reported that productivity of officers decreases as years of service increase (Mastrofski et al.
1994). However, this conclusion might be misleading, since these two variables are not
necessarily equivalent in all circumstances.
Intensity perceptions of officers was found to be related to responsiveness. As intensity
increases, responsiveness of officers also increases. This finding is unexpected and inconsistent
with the arguments of prior studies. It was expected that as the intensity increases in the
department, officers are less likely to find time to respond to minor crimes. This result might
result from this variable‘s dependency on officer perceptions. More verifiable measures of
intensity in a department might be used in future studies to detect its effect on responsiveness.
Departmental size, on the other hand, was investigated in several studies in an effort to
understand organizations‘ role in structuring police discretion. Overall findings of these studies
suggested that officers in smaller agencies are more likely to be responsive to street
contingencies and more productive in terms of arrest, stop, and search activities compared to
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their counterparts in larger police departments. This effect was attributed to close administrative
control mechanisms in the smaller departments and hierarchical structures in the larger
departments that leave room for officer discretion. This study however did not observe any
significant effect of departmental size.
Educational level and gender did not produce a significant relationship to
responsiveness. Studies examining their effect on officer behavior produced mixed results. The
findings supported the studies that did not find an impact of education and gender on police
behavior.
5.4. Implications
The results of the study suggested some implications. These implications are grouped
into three categories. In this section, the findings of the study are discussed in terms of their
theoretical, methodological, and policy implications.
5.4.1. Policy Implications
As noted earlier in this study, Perry and Wise (1990) proposed that individuals who are
dedicated to public service are more likely to choose public jobs. The results of this study
indicated that officers who work for the TNP are mostly public service–oriented employees. This
finding supports the proposition of PSM. Even though there is no existing policy that aims to
recruit applicants with strong public service motives, choosing to work for the TNP might be a
result of a public service–oriented individuals‘ own preference. At this point, it is plausible to
recommend that the TNP formulate and implement policies that ensure the continuation of the
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public service–oriented cadets‘ recruitment. Although this is a necessary policy to be
implemented, research suggests that it not enough to achieve the desired work outcomes unless
employees perceive that they contribute to serving a public interest by fulfilling a given duty in
the organization. As a matter of fact, Moynihan and Pandey (2007) emphasized ―the importance
of encouraging public employees to feel that they are personally contributing to an organization
that performs a valuable service, without unnecessary restrictions or controls on their efforts‖
(p. 47).
Persuading employees that they work for an organization that fulfills an important public
service may be achieved by effective leadership. In fact, leadership practices, especially a valuebased form of leadership, can promote the public service motives of employees in return, leading
to higher work effort and other work outcomes. The vision of the leader has an essential role in
motivating followers by providing a perspective that goes beyond employees‘ self interest and
personal goals. Leaders can make followers work for the interest of the public and the well-being
of society.
Empirical investigation of the study revealed that the TNP‘s current organizational
reward policies and practices are not effective instruments in motivating its members to be more
responsive. As discussed in previous sections, possible causes of this might be the perception of
officers that rewards are not distributed according to fair procedures or that higher
responsiveness does not necessarily lead to obtaining organizational rewards. In this regard, we
would suggest that the TNP choose one of following courses of actions: discarding the reward
system completely or revising/improving the system.
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The idea behind the elimination of the current reward structure would be the crowdingout effect of contingent rewards on intrinsic motivation, which was proposed by Deci (1975) and
supported by other research in motivation literature (Deci et al. 1999). Their basic argument is
that extrinsic rewards weaken intrinsic motivation. Since the intrinsic motivation originates from
the fulfillment of feelings of autonomy and desire to contribute to the public good by helping
others, any external intrusion breaks the link between internal motives and these types of
feelings. Forest (2008) observed that ―the reward obtained in return for achieving a level of
performance changes the ‗locus of causality,‘ the individual attributing his effort to a purely
external cause‖ (p. 329). Therefore, external rewards are perceived as the means of controlling
the individual‘s behavior and consequently reduce feeling of autonomy, impair the belief of
contributing to the social good, and finally diminish intrinsic motivation.
Since TNP members are motivated by PSM, which is a form of intrinsic motivation, it is
important not to crowd out their self-motivation by introducing rigid rules and policies on
rewards. Any reward may be perceived as controlling their willingness to work for the public
interest. Eliminating the external reward system might yield a positive impact on the intrinsic
motivation of TNP officers by providing them with more autonomy and giving them the
opportunity to work for the public interest without an external restriction. Moreover, discarding
the system may provide some savings to the agency through budget cuts on some types of
rewards such as salary rewards.
As a second alternative, TNP also can decide to implement another policy, namely
revising the existing organizational reward system. In this case, it is critical to determine easily
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understandable and visible rules that apply to all members of the TNP equally. If the TNP can
persuade its members that their responsiveness on the street will lead to organizational rewards
that are distributed based on fair criteria, extrinsic rewards can also be used as instruments to
motivate officers to be responsive. Currently, in the eyes of TNP officers higher responsiveness
does not lead to higher rewards such as being appointed to a better work unit, obtaining salary
rewards, getting higher performance appraisals, and so on. Interestingly, this study discovered
that officers working on the street do not value these types of organizational rewards.
Addressing these implementation problems first requires having the agency address the
perception of unfair procedures in the distribution of extrinsic rewards. The next step would be to
increase the perceived value of the rewards. Research in this area suggested that most employees
found the rewards insufficiently motivating. Consequently, increasing the monetary value of
rewards might contribute to the solution of the problem. These two measures, which can be
handled by the TNP administration, would seem to be candidates to motivate patrol officers to
increase their responsiveness.
However, as discussed earlier, caution needs to be taken in introducing new regulations
and reward structures, since their negative effect on intrinsic motivation has been widely
discussed and is supported by empirical evidence. Therefore, it is vital to design reward
structures so that they do not diminish employees‘ intrinsically motivated feelings of serving the
well-being of society.

145

5.4.2. Theoretical Implications
This study employed two motivational theories to investigate their role in shaping
employee behavior. To understand to what degree external motives influence officer
responsiveness, the expectancy theory of motivation was used. PSM theory was chosen to
explain how responsiveness of officers was affected by intrinsic motivation. Since no specific
theory of discretion exists in the literature, this study borrowed the proposition from socialpsychological theories that attitudes of individuals affect their behavior. Accordingly, the study
hypothesized that selective enforcement attitudes reduces responsiveness of patrol officers.
The findings made it evident that public service motivation theory was powerful in
explaining discretionary behaviors of officers, while the expectancy perspective was not
supported by the empirical findings of the study. These results provided support for recent
theoretical perspectives in the investigation of employee motivation, as stated by scholars:
―Behavior is not just the product of rational, self-interested choices but is rooted in normative
and affective motives as well. Simply studying motivation from a rational, incentive-driven
perspective provides only a partial understanding of motivation‖ (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007,
p. 41). It is suggested that normative and effective values of individuals should be studied. The
same point was also made by police discretion scholars: Mastrofski et al. (1994), for example,
used expectancy theory to examine arrest behavior of officers and noted that intrinsic factors
should be taken into account in understanding officer discretion since ―the activity may give a
sense of contributing to greater social good‖ (p. 119).
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One of the implications of this study is that work effort mediates the relationship between
public service motivation and responsiveness. However, it does not play a mediating role when
dealing with the relationship between reward expectancy and responsiveness. Consequently, the
argument of prior research was supported for the intrinsic motivation and work outcome
relationship.
Another theoretical application is that individual attitudes may play a role in shaping
officer behavior. The study found a significant negative relationship between selective
enforcement attitudes and responsiveness behavior. The results indicated that the effects of
officer attitudes need to be included in the research to explain variation in behavior.
5.4.3. Methodological Implications
Measurement models of the constructs were validated by using confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA), which allows researchers to determine whether a proposed measurement model
is valid. When work effort was excluded, all other variables in the study were designed as latent
variables that were measured by multiple indicators and validated by following rigorous
methodological steps. At the end, the study provided validated measurement models of reward
expectancy, public service motivation, selective enforcement, and responsiveness. In addition,
structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to determine the structural relationships among the
study variables. This implication of the study becomes more critical when it is taken into account
that no other study employed SEM in police discretion literature, to the researcher‘s best
knowledge.

147

5.5. Contributions of the Study
This study contributes substantially to the literature by taking a motivational and
attitudinal theoretical framework in the investigation of police discretion. It also makes
contributions in the field by reviewing the literature, using a robust analytical method, and
providing empirical evidence on discretion in a different organizational and cultural setting.
First, this study contributes to the discretion literature by developing a concept that is
suitable to the conceptualization of officer behavior on the street when dealing with discretionary
decisions on minor violations of the law. The concept of responsiveness was developed to
address officer decisions that are made in the absence of supervision during their unassigned
times. This concept covers both behavioral and nonbehavioral aspects of suspicion and acting
based on the suspicion. Furthermore, the measurement model of this concept was developed by
using six indicators, each representing a scenario. The measurement model of responsiveness
was validated by data collected from 613 officer responses to situations described in scenarios.
When it is considered that measurement of police discretion widely depends on arrest decisions
of officers, this more comprehensive conceptualization of discretion and its validation of
measurement using CFA becomes an essential contribution in this field.
As discussed in the methodological implications section, this study developed and
validated the measurement models of latent constructs. Only the public service motivation
concept was validated by Perry (1997) by using confirmatory factor analysis.
Second, this study provided empirical evidence on the relative roles of extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation as well as attitudes on police behavior. Prior literature primarily focused on
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organizational, individual, environmental, and situational determinants of police discretion.
Though a limited number of studies examined extrinsic motivation on arrest decisions, intrinsic
motivation‘s effect on decision-making was widely ignored. Similarly, although psychology
literature suggested that attitudes may affect behavior, empirical investigation of this proposition
is very rare. This is one of the rare studies that was intended to fill this gap in the literature by
empirically examining the impacts of both intrinsic motivation and attitude on police behavior.
Third, this study was conducted in a setting that differs from the usual police discretion
research locations. The study examined officer discretionary decisions and their determinants in
the Turkish National Police, which is a hierarchically structured centralized agency with almost
two-hundred-thousand employees. Most previous discretion research made efforts to understand
discretion in smaller local agencies. Being the first study that empirically investigates police
discretion among TNP members, this study not only provides valuable insights into discretionary
decision-making in the TNP but also makes possible a comparison of local and national agencies
in terms of decision-making practices and their determinants.
5.6. Limitations
It is important to note that there are several limitations of this study that constrain its
reported results. The first is related to a general limitation of survey research and its dependency
on self-reported ratings of respondents. There is always a possibility that participants of the study
may have reported what is generally supposed to be true instead of what they really believe.
Socially desirable responses constitute a common bias in social research. It needs to be
recognized that this study is not free from social desirability bias; respondents are likely to
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overreport their responsiveness and work effort, while selective enforcement might be
underreported because of its lower desirability.
Another possible issue is construct validity, which is a concern when study variables are
latent, in other words, not observable directly and not easy to measure. By considering the lack
of rigorous tools to assess officer discretion in the literature, this study attempted to measure it
using scenarios in which minor violations were described. It is always questionable whether all
items are included that are necessary to cover every aspect of discretion. For example, because of
legal restrictions on this issue in Turkey, no question was included in the questionnaire to
measure arrest behavior of officers.
For purposes of the study, motivational and attitudinal determinants of responsiveness
were included in the model. However, discretion is a broad concept that is prone to influence by
a broad range of factors, such as supervisory style, agency‘s policing approach, and officer‘s
orientation toward community policing. For a more in-depth understanding of police discretion a
more integrated model needs to be tested. Even though the literature on the study constructs was
carefully reviewed, there still might have been manifested variables that would have predicted
discretion better.
One of the major weaknesses of correlational research is that it does not easily allow the
inferring of cause–effect relationships. This study uses a well-established theoretical framework
to deal with this issue. Another limitation of correlational research is that it is not easy to avoid
confounding variables. This problem will always make interpretation of results difficult.
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5.7. Future Research
Based on the findings of the study, no significant relationship between reward expectancy
and responsiveness was observed, indicating that officers in the TNP are not motivated by
extrinsic rewards and consequently their responsiveness was not increased by these types of
rewards. This study, however, did not reveal the reasons why reward expectancy of officers did
not influence their responsiveness. The literature suggests that there might be at least two
different set of reasons for lack of extrinsic motivation. First, research on the role of monetary
incentives especially focused on failures of the implementation process of reward structures. In
particular, prior research emphasized that implications that erode fairness perceptions of
employees may diminish extrinsic motivations by reducing employees‘ belief in organizational
justice. To figure out why the current reward policy of the TNP does not increase police
responsiveness, future research should include organizational justice in the models that aim to
study external sources of officer motivation. Second, earlier studies argued that in some cases
rewards offered by organization are basically not enough to motivate employees to increase their
effort and work outcomes. Future studies also need to focus on whether the inadequacy of
monetary rewards is a factor that negatively influences extrinsic motivation.
Although some police discretion studies provided explanations on contingent rewards‘
impact on variation in arrest decisions, most of them did not question whether intrinsic sources
of officer motivation play a role in police discretion. This study reported that the public service
motives of officers increase their responsiveness in situations that require officer response. This
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result calls for more comparative research on the roles of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations in
police discretion.
Since responsiveness conceptualized for the purpose of characterizing officer discretion
was used for the first time in this study, further research questions arise that require the
examination of different organizational and cultural settings. For example, the same concept with
its measurement models needs to be tested further in local agencies in the United States and also
with European police organizations that have comparable characteristics to the TNP. These types
of studies will allow assessing the generalizability and validity of the constructs in cross-cultural
settings.
In addition, more research should be conducted to ascertain the determinants of police
responsiveness. Among the control variables included in this study (age, educational level,
intensity, and departmental size), only age and intensity were found to be related to the
responsiveness of officers. Even though previous studies produced mixed results on the effects of
demographics on officer discretion, departmental size was reported to be important in predicting
police behavior. While earlier studies suggested that officers in larger departments are more
likely to use discretion and be less responsive to street contingencies, this study detected no
departmental influence on officer responsiveness. This finding suggests that more research
measuring a department‘s impact on officer responsiveness is needed. Moreover, one of the
significant variables on officer behavior, intensity, was measured by officer perceptions. More
tangible measures of intensity, such as crime rate or number of incidents handled, should be
included in future studies.
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Q1. Please rate each of the following statements based on the following scale.
Strongly Agree

Agree

1

2

Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
3

Disagree
4

Strongly Disagree
5

[ ] The more I make vehicle stops the more I have the chance to capture criminals.
[ ] Success of an officer depends upon making vehicle stops and questioning persons.
[

]

I have appropriate training and all technical information to stop vehicles and

question people.
[ ] I have the required equipment to stop vehicles and question people.
[ ] I have the opportunity to make vehicle stops and question people in my unassigned
times.
Q2. Please rate each of the following statements based on the following scale.
Strongly agree

Agree

1

2

Neither agree
nor disagree
3

Disagree

Strongly disagree

4

5

[ ] When I perform better at my job I will receive a salary (cash) reward
[ ] When I perform better at my job I will receive an appreciation letter
[ ] When I perform better at my job I will be appointed to a better work unit
[ ] When I perform better in my job I will receive supervisory recognition
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[

]

When I perform better in my job I will receive a better performance evaluation

score

Q3. Please evaluate the importance of the following rewards for you based on the
following scale.
Strongly agree

Agree

1

2

Neither agree
nor disagree
3

Disagree
4

Strongly
disagree
5

[ ] Receiving a salary (cash) reward is important to me
[ ] Receiving an appreciation letter is important to me
[ ] Being appointed to a better work unit is important to me
[ ] Supervisory recognition is important to me
[ ] Receiving a better performance evaluation score is important to me

Q4. Please rate each of the following statements based on the following scale.
Strongly agree

Agree

1

2

Neither agree
nor disagree
3
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Disagree
4

Strongly
disagree
5

[ ] It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my
community.(R)
[ ] I unselfishly contribute to my community.
[ ] I consider public service my civic duty.
[ ] I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even
if it harmed my interests.
[ ] Serving other citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it.
[ ] Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements.
[ ] I think people should give back to society more than they get from it.
[ ] I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society.
[ ] I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss to help someone.
[ ] I believe in putting duty before self.

Q5. Please answer the following question based on the following scale.
How much effort do you think that you exert at your work when you consider your
capacity?
[ ]
0%
[ ]
55%

[ ]
5%
[ ]
60%

[ ]
10%
[ ]
65%

[ ]
15%
[ ]
70%

[ ]
20%
[ ]
75%

[ ]
25%
[ ]
80%
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[ ]
30%
[ ]
85%

[ ]
35%
[ ]
90%

[ ]
40%
[ ]
95%

[ ]
45%
[ ]
100%

[ ]
50%

Q6. Please rate each of the following scenarios based on the following scale.
Strongly agree

Agree

1

2

Neither agree
nor disagree
3

Disagree
4

Strongly
disagree
5

[ ] You are on routine patrol in your district. You notice that the car in front of your
cruiser increased its speed and suddenly turned into the first cross street as soon as its driver
realized the car was being followed by a police vehicle. Even though you are not sure, he looks
like a former burglar you know. Based on the information provided above, please indicate the
likelihood that you would stop the driver.
[ ] You are on routine patrol in your district. You ask someone to show his ID. He
states that he does not have ID with him and gives controversial responses to basic questions.
Please indicate the likelihood that you would initiate an investigation about that person.
[ ] You are on routine patrol in a low socioeconomic district with a high crime rate.
You noticed a 2009 SUV driven by a young driver who appears not to belong to that district.
Please indicate the likelihood that you would stop the vehicle.
[ ] You are on a routine patrol in your district. There are two people in a car who
appear to be in their late 20s. You notice the vehicle is a modified car with a loud exhaust and
tinted windows. Please indicate the likelihood that you would stop the vehicle.
[ ] You are on a routine patrol in your normal patrol district and you are driving the
speed limit. You notice a vehicle that passed your car. The driver is a male who appears to be
late 30s in age. The vehicle is an old 4-door sedan. You notice the driver is speaking on a
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handheld cellphone and the vehicle has a broken taillight. Based on the information in the above
case description, what is the likelihood that you would stop the driver?
[ ] You are on a routine patrol in your district. There are two people in the car who
appear to be in their late 20s. You notice the vehicle is a modified car with a loud exhaust and
tinted windows. Please indicate the likelihood that you would stop the vehicle.

Q4. Please rate each of the following statements based on the following scale.
Strongly agree

Agree

1

2

Neither agree
nor disagree
3

Disagree
4

Strongly
disagree
5

[ ] Police should just ignore minor offenses so that they can devote their time to really
important crime.
[ ] It is better for police not to get involved in disputes among families and friends.
[ ] Sometimes making stops and searches will cause a police officer more trouble than
it is worth.
[ ] Law cannot be regarded as black and white, and police need to consider the spirit of
the law before initiating a legal process.
[ ] The law is the law: police can make no exceptions.
[ ] If police don‘t enforce minor offenses, it will only encourage more serious crime.
162

[ ] Sometimes the best way for police to keep things running smoothly is to turn a blind
eye to some offenses.
[ ] Often police can intervene to solve a dispute without invoking the CJ process.

Q7. Demographics
Please provide the name of your department.

___________

How many years have your worked in TNP?
[ ] Less than 5 years [ ] 6-10 years [ ] 11-15 years [ ] 16-20 years [ ] 21 years
and more
What is your gender?

[ ] Male

[ ] Female

What is your age?
[ ] Under 30 years old

[ ] 30-39 [ ] 40-49 [ ] 50-59 [ ] Older than 59

What is your highest degree?
[ ] High School

[ ] Two-year college

[ ] Bachelor of Arts/Science

[ ] Master of Arts/Science

[ ] Ph.D.
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Türk Polis Teşkilatı Devriye Polislerinin İnsiyatif Kullanma Eğilimleri Anketi
1. Anket Hakkında
Bu çalışma, polisin günlük devriye görevini yerine getirdiği sırada ne derece kişisel
insiyatif kullama eğiliminde olduğunu ve polisin insiyatif kullanmasına etki eden faktörleri
araştırmayı hedeflemektedir.
Ankete katılımınız tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayalıdır. Katılımıcıların sorulara
verdikleri cevaplar saklı tutulacak, ve çalışma sonucunda elde edilen veriler akademik araştırma
maksadı dışında kullanılmayacaktır. Ankette sizlerden isim, adres ya da sicil numarası gibi
bilgileriniz istenmemektedir.Soruların tamamını cevaplamak yaklaşık 10-15 dakika kadar
vaktinizi

alacaktır.

Araştıma

ile

ilgili

olarak

her

türlü

sorularınız

için

benimle

htasdoven@gmail.com adresinden iletişim kurabilirsiniz. Ankete katıldığınız için şimdiden
teşekkür ederim.
2. Mesleğe İlişkin Tutumlar
Soru1. Aşağıdaki ifadeler polislerin meslekle ilgili tutularını yansıtmaktadır. Bu ifadelere
ne ölçüde katıldığınızı, size en uygun olan seçeneği işaretlemek suretiyle belirtiniz.
Tamamen
Katılıyorum

Katılıyorum

1
[

2

Kısmen
Katılıyorum

Katılmıyorum

3

4

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum
5

] Ne kadar çok araç durdurursam o kadar çok suç unsuru ele geçirme ve suçlu

yakalama şamsım olur.
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[ ] Bir memurun başarılı olması çok sayıda araç durdurmasına ve kimlik sormasına
bağlıdır.
[ ] Araç durdurma ve kimlik sorma için gerekli eğitim ve teknik bilgiye sahibim.
[ ] Araç durdurma ve kimlik sorma için gerekli her türlü araç ve gerece sahibim.
[ ] Devriye sırasında, diğer görevlerden artan zamanlarda araç durdurmak ve kimlik
sormak için yeterli fırsat bulabiliyorum.
3. Mesleki Başarı Ödülleri
Mesleki basarı ödülleri ve bu ödüllerin sizin için değeri ile ilgili aşağıdaki ifadelere ne
ölçüde katıldığınızı, size en uygun olan seçeneği işaretlemek suretiyle belirtiniz.
6. İşimde başarı gösterdiğim takdirde;
Tamamen
Katılıyorum
1

Katılıyorum
2

Kısmen
Katılıyorum
3

Katılmıyorum

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum

4

5

[ ] İşimde yüksek performans gösterdiğim takdirde maaş taltifi ile ödüllendirilirim.
[ ] İşimde yüksek performans gösterdiğim takdirde taktir belgesi ile ödüllendirilirim.
[ ] İşimde yüksek performans gösterdiğim takdirde daha iyi bir birime atanırım.
[ ] İşimde yüksek performans gösterdiğimde amirlerim beni sözlü olarak taktir eder.
[ ] İşimde yüksek performans gösterdiğim takdirde yüksek sicil notu alırım.
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7. Aşağıdaki ifadelerde yer alan hususların sizin için önem derecesini belirtiniz.

Çok önemli
1

Önemli
2

Kısmen Önemli
3

Önemli Değil
4

Hiç Önemli Değil
5

[ ] Maaş taltifi almak
[ ] Taktir belgesi almak
[ ] Daha iyi bir birime atanmak
[ ] Amirlerimden sözlü taktir almak
[ ] Sicil notumun yüksek olması
4. Kamu Hizmet Motivasyonu
Aşağıdaki kamu hizmet motivasyonu ilgili ifadelere ne ölçüde katıldığınızı, size en uygun
olan seçeneği işaretlemek suretiyle belirtiniz.
Tamamen
Katılıyorum

Katılıyorum

1

2

Kısmen
Katılıyorum

Katılmıyorum

3

4

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum
5

[ ] Toplumun sorunlarıyla yoğun bir biçimde ilgilenmek benim için kolay değildir.
[ ] Topluma özverili bir biçimde katkıda bulunuyorum.
[ ] Kamuya hizmet etmek benim için vatandaşlık görevidir.
[ ] Kişisel menfaatime uygun olmasa da, kamu görevlilerinin toplum için en iyi olanı
yaptıklarını görmek isterim.
[ ] Maddi olarak kazanç sağlamasa da, vatandaşlara hizmet etmek beni mutlu eder.
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[ ] Benim için, toplumda bir fark oluşturmak kişisel başarılarımdan daha önemlidir.
[ ] Toplumun bana kazandırdıklarını fazlasyla topluma geri verme gayreti içerisindeyim.
[ ] Toplum yararına büyük fedakârlıklarda bulunmaya hazırım.
[ ] Başkalarına yardım edebimek için kişisel kayıplarımı göze alırım.
[ ] Görevimin şahsımdan önce geldiğine inanırım.
5. Günlük Asayiş Olaylarına Müdahale
Aşağıdaki soruların her birinde devriye görevi sırasında karşılaşılabilicek bir durum
verilmiştir. Senaryoları okuduktan sonra, verilen ölçeğe göre size en uygun olan seçeneği
işaretlemek suretiyle soruları cevaplayınız.
Tamamen
Katılıyorum
1

Katılıyorum

Kısmen
Katılıyorum

2

3

Katılmıyorum
4

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum
5

[ ] Devriye sırasında ekip aracının önünde seyreden aracın, arkasındaki polis ekibini
farkeder etmez hızını arttırdığını ve ilk ara sokağa saptığını gördünüz. Emin olamamakla birlikte,
araç sürücüsünün daha önce hırsızlıktan tutuklanmış bir şahsa benzediğini farkettiniz. Bu
durumda aracı takip edip durdurur musunuz?
[ ] Devriye sırasında kimlik sorduğunuz kişi, üzerinde kimlik olmadığını beyan etti ve
sorduğunuz basit sorulara çelişkili cevaplar verdi. Şahıs hakkında yasal işlem başlatır mısınız?
[ ] 2009 model lüks bir aracı ekonomik seviyesi düşük bir mahallede, maddi durumunun
çok iyi olmadığı belli olan bir kişinin kullandığını farkettiniz. Bu durumda aracı takip edip
durdurur musunuz?
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[ ] Mıntıkanızda rutin devriye sırasında ekip aracınızı sollayan bir aracın yaklaşık 10
km/s kadar hız sınırını aştığını farkettiniz. Modifiye edilmiş(abart eksoz / arka tarafının yere
yakın) aracın 25 yaşlarında bir erkek sürücü tarafından kullanıldığını gördünüz. Araçta ayrıca 20
li yaşlarda ve yabancı uyruklu olduğunu tahmin ettiğiniz bir bayan bulunduğunu gördünüz.
Yukarıdaki bilgilere göre araçta bulunan şahısların kimliklerini kontrol eder misiniz?
[ ] Bölgenizde ikamet eden tanıdık bir şahsın gece geç saatte evinin yakınında alkollü
şahısların toplandığını ve şüpheli hareketlerde bulunduklarını size cep telefonunuzdan bildirmesi
halinde belirtilen adresi ve şahısların kimliklerini kontrol edermisiniz?
[ ] Mesai saatinin bitimine yakın, bölgenizde bulunan bir caddeye hızla yaklaşmakta olan
şüpheli bir aracın anons edildiğini duydunuz. Belirtilen yere geçerek aracın geçişini kontrol
edermsiniz?
6. Kanun Uygulamada Seçicilik
Kanunları seçici uygulama ile ilgili aşağıdaki ifadelere ne ölçüde katıldığınızı, size en
uygun olan seçeneği işaretlemek suretiyle belirtiniz.
Tamamen
Katılıyorum
1

Katılıyorum
2

Kısmen
Katılıyorum
3

Katılmıyorum
4

Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum
5

[ ] Polis, önemli suçlara vakit ayırabilmek için, küçük suçları görmezden gelmelidir.
[ ] Polisin, aile fertleri ve arkadaşlar arasındaki kavgalara müdahale etmemesi gerekir.
[ ] Bazen araç durdurma ve kimlik sorma polisin başına o iş için değmeyecek sorunlar
açabilir.
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[ ] Kanun beyaz ve siyah olarak görülemez; yasal işlem başlatmadan önce polis kanunun
ruhunu göz önünde bulundurmalıdır.
[ ] Kanun kanundur: polis herhangibir istisna yapamaz.
[ ] Polis küçük suçlara müdahale etmezse, bu durum, büyük suçların işlenmesine yol
açar.
[ ] İşlerin yolunda gitmesi için polis, bazı suçlara karşı gözü kapalı davranmalıdır.
[ ] Bazen polis yasal işlem yapmadan da anlaşmazlıkları çözebilir.
7. İş Yükü ve Kişisel Bilgiler
Bu bölümde katılımcılara ilişkin kişisel bilgiler ile iş yükü ile ilgili bilgilerin elde
edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Aşağıdaki sorularda size en uygun olan seçeneği işaretleyiniz.
32. Görvinizle ilgili olarak çalışma kapasitenizi göz önünde bulundurduğunuzda,
işinizde ne ölçüde gayret sarfettiğinizi düşünüyorsunuz?
[]
%0

[]
%5

[]
%10

[]
%15

[]
%20

[]
%25

[]
%30

[]
%35

[]
%40

[]
%45

[]
%55

[]
%60

[]
%65

[]
%70

[]
%75

[]
%80

[]
%85

[]
%90

[]
%95

[]
100

İldeki diğer şubelerle karşılaştırıldığında çalıştığım birimin iş yükü oldukça yoğundur.
[ ] Tamamen
Katılıyorum

[ ]
Katılıyorum

[ ] Kısmen
Katılıyorum

[ ]
Katılmıyorum

[ ] Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum

Diğer illerdeki benzer şubelerle karşılaştırıldığında çalıştığım birimin iş yükü oldukça
yoğundur.
[ ] Tamamen
Katılıyorum

[ ]
Katılıyorum

[ ] Kısmen
Katılıyorum
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[ ]
Katılmıyorum

[ ] Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum

[]
%50

Şu anda görev yaptığınız il
[ ] İstanbul

[ ] Ankara

[ ] İzmir

[ ] Diyarbakır

[ ] Adana [ ] Erzurum [ ]

Samsun
Cinsiyetiniz
[ ] Kadın

[ ] Erkek

Yaşınız
[ ] 30 yaşın altında

[ ] 30-39

[ ] 40-49

[ ] 60 yaş ve üstü

[ ] 50-59

Öğrenim durumunuz (en son tamamladığınız dereceyi işaretleyiniz)
[ ] Lise

[ ] 2 yıllık yüksekokul

[ ] Üniversite

[ ] Yüksek Lisans

[ ]

Doktora

Ankate
teşekkürler…
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katıldığınız

için

APPENDIX E. FREQUENCY TABLES AND CORRELATION MATRICES
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Table 16 The Frequency Distributions of the Responsiveness

Scale

Frequency Percent

Cumulative
percent

R1: You are on routine patrol in your
district. You notice that the car front of
your cruiser increased its speed and
suddenly entered into the first cross
street as soon as he realized he was
being followed by a police vehicle.
Even though you are not sure, he looks
like a former burglar you know. Based
on the information provided above,
please indicate the likelihood that you
would stop the driver.
R2: You are on routine patrol in your
district. You ask someone to show his
ID. He states that he does not have ID
with him and gives controversial
responses to basic questions. Please
indicate the likelihood that you would
initiate an investigation about that
person.

Very unlikely
Unlikely
Somewhat likely
Likely
Very likely

4
8
31
182
388

.7
1.3
5.1
29.7
63.3

.7
2.0
7.0
36.7
100.0

Very unlikely
Unlikely
Somewhat likely
Likely
Very likely

4
18
87
278
226

.7
2.9
14.2
45.4
36.9

.7
3.6
17.8
63.1
100.0

R3: You are on routine patrol in a low
socioeconomic district with a high
crime rate. You notice a 2009 SUV
driven by a young driver who appears
not to belong to that district. Please
indicate the likelihood that you would
stop the vehicle.

Very unlikely
Unlikely
Somewhat likely
Likely
Very likely

6
21
106
279
201

1.0
3.4
17.3
45.5
32.8

1.0
4.4
21.7
67.2
100.0
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R4: When you are on routine patrol in
your district, you realize that a car is
speeding by approximately 10 km/h.
You noticed the vehicle is a modified
car with a loud exhaust. The car is
driven by a male in his 20s. In addition,
you also realize that there is a female
foreigner in the car who appears in her
20s. Please indicate the likelihood that
you would ask the IDs of the people in
the vehicle based on information
provided above.

Very unlikely
Unlikely
Somewhat likely
Likely
Very likely

14
20
95
285
199

2.3
3.3
15.5
46.5
32.5

2.3
5.5
21.0
67.5
100.0

R5 A person who you know previously
called your cellphone and reported that
suspicious people were drinking alcohol
near
his
home
and
behaving
suspiciously. In this case, what is the
likelihood that you would check the
address and ask their ID‘s?

Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Somewhat likely
Likely
Very Likely

14
26
70
309
194

2.3
4.2
11.4
50.4
31.6

2.3
6.5
17.9
68.4
100.0

R6 You are about leave the job at the
end of your daily shift. Police radio
announces that a suspicious vehicle is
approaching a street within your
jurisdiction. How likely is it that you
would go the district and look for the
suspicious vehicle?

Very Unlikely
Unlikely
Somewhat likely
Likely
Very Likely

5
13
41
216
338

.8
2.1
6.7
35.2
55.1

.8
2.9
9.6
44.9
100.0

Total

613

100.0
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Table 17 The Frequency Distributions of the Work Effort
Scale
%
How much effort do you think that
you exert at your work when you
consider your capacity?

Cumulative
percent

Frequency Percent

5

1

.2

.2

10

2

.3

.5

15

3

.5

1.0

20

3

.5

1.5

25

2

.3

1.8

30

3

.5

2.3

35

3

.5

2.8

40

7

1.1

3.9

45

7

1.1

5.1

50

31

5.1

10.1

55

15

2.4

12.6

60

22

3.6

16.2

65

13

2.1

18.3

70

45

7.3

25.6

75

55

9.0

34.6

80

77

12.6

47.1

85

68

11.1

58.2

90

86

14.0

72.3

95

50

8.2

80.4

100

120

19.6

100.0

Total

613

100.0

Table 18 The Frequency Distributions of the Reward Expectancy

Attribute
RE1: The more I make vehicle
stops the more I have the chance

Strongly disagree
Disagree
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Frequency Percent
36
91

5.9
14.8

Cumulative
percent
5.9
20.7

to capture criminals.

Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

218
166
102

35.6
27.1
16.6

56.3
83.4
100.0

RE2: Success of an officer
depends upon making vehicle
stops and questioning persons.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

57
173
215
116
52

9.3
28.2
35.1
18.9
8.5

9.3
37.5
72.6
91.5
100.0

RE3: I have training and all
technical information to stop
vehicles and question people.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

10
39
129
280
155

1.6
6.4
21.0
45.7
25.3

1.6
8.0
29.0
74.7
100.0

RE4: I have the required
equipment to stop vehicles and
question people.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

43
137
188
167
78

7.0
22.3
30.7
27.2
12.7

7.0
29.4
60.0
87.3
100.0

RE5: I have the opportunity to
make vehicle stops and question
people in my unassigned times.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

39
114
214
195
51

6.4
18.6
34.9
31.8
8.3

6.4
25.0
59.9
91.7
100.0

RE6: When I perform better in
my job I will receive salary
(cash) rewards

Strongly disagree

176

28.7

28.7

Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

123
128
94
92

20.1
20.9
15.3
15.0

48.8
69.7
85.0
100.0
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RE7: When I perform better in
my job I will receive an
appreciation letter

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

138
124
162
113
76

22.5
20.2
26.4
18.4
12.4

22.5
42.7
69.2
87.6
100.0

RE8: When I perform better in
my job I will be appointed to a
better work unit

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

114
103
116
153
127

18.6
16.8
18.9
25.0
20.7

18.6
35.4
54.3
79.3
100.0

RE9: When I perform better in
my job I will receive supervisory
recognition

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

127
194
142
86
64

20.7
31.6
23.2
14.0
10.4

20.7
52.4
75.5
89.6
100.0

RE10: When I perform better in
my job I will receive a better
performance evaluation score

Strongly disagree

117

19.1

19.1

Disagree

174

28.4

47.5

Neither agree nor disagree

133

21.7

69.2

Agree

107

7.5

86.6

82

13.4

100.0

Strongly disagree

241

9.3

39.3

Disagree

168

7.4

66.7

Neither agree nor disagree

75

2.2

79.0

Agree

48

7.8

86.8

Strongly agree

81

13.2

100.0

Strongly disagree

224

36.5

36.5

Disagree

156

25.4

62.0

Neither agree nor disagree

97

15.8

77.8

Agree

57

9.3

87.1

Strongly agree

79

12.9

100.0

Strongly agree
RE11: Receiving a salary (cash)
reward is important for me

RE12: Receiving an
appreciation letter is important
for me
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RE13: Being appointed to a
better work unit is important for
me

RE14: Supervisory recognition
is important for me

RE15: Receiving a better
performance evaluation score is
important for me

Strongly disagree

248

40.5

40.5

Disagree

142

23.2

63.6

Neither agree nor disagree

76

12.4

76.0

Agree

77

12.6

88.6

Strongly agree

70

11.4

100.0

Strongly disagree

182

29.7

29.7

Disagree

151

24.6

54.3

Neither agree nor disagree

104

17.0

71.3

Agree

83

13.5

84.8

Strongly agree

93

15.2

100.0

Strongly disagree

258

42.1

42.1

Disagree

139

22.7

64.8

Neither agree nor disagree

70

11.4

76.2

Agree

51

8.3

84.5

Strongly agree

95

15.5

100.0

613

100.0

Total

Table 19 The Frequency Distributions of the Public Service Motivation

PSM1: It is hard for me to get
intensely interested in what is
going on in my community.(R)

PSM2: I unselfishly contribute
to my community.

PSM3: I consider public service
my civic duty.

Attribute
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
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Cumulative
Frequency Percent Percent
91
14.8
14.8
205
33.4
48.3
195
31.8
80.1
88
14.4
94.5
34
5.5
100.0
9
1.5
1.5
18
2.9
4.4
122
19.9
24.3
316
51.5
75.9
148
24.1
100.0
9
1.5
1.5
18
2.9
4.4

PSM4: I would prefer seeing
public officials do what is best
for the whole community even if
it harmed my interests.
PSM5: Serving other citizens
would give me a good feeling
even if no one paid me for it.

PSM6: Making a difference in
society means more to me than
personal achievements.

Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
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58
249
279
8
24
69
264
248
23
26
102
226
236
21
55
135
264
138

9.5
40.6
45.5
1.3
3.9
11.3
43.1
40.5
3.8
4.2
16.6
36.9
38.5
3.4
9.0
22.0
43.1
22.5

13.9
54.5
100.0
1.3
5.2
16.5
59.5
100.0
3.8
8.0
24.6
61.5
100.0
3.4
12.4
34.4
77.5
100.0

PSM7: I think people should
give back to society more than
they get from it.

8
24
110
294
177
13
36
134
263
167
36
109
200
181
87
22
76
148
207
160

1.3
3.9
17.9
48.0
28.9
2.1
5.9
21.9
42.9
27.2
5.9
17.8
32.6
29.5
14.2
3.6
12.4
24.1
33.8
26.1

Total
613
Table 20 The Frequency Distributions of the Selective Enforcement

100.0

PSM8: I am prepared to make
enormous sacrifices for the good
of society.

PSM9: I am one of those rare
people who would risk personal
loss to help someone

PSM10: I believe in putting
duty before self.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

Scale

1.3
5.2
23.2
71.1
100.0
2.1
8.0
29.9
72.8
100.0
5.9
23.7
56.3
85.8
100.0
3.6
16.0
40.1
73.9
100.0

Frequency

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

SE1: Police should just
ignore minor offenses so that
they can devote their time to
really important crime.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

135
200
161
90
27

22.0
32.6
26.3
14.7
4.4

22.0
54.6
80.9
95.6
100.0

SE2: It is better for police not
to get involved in disputes
among families and friends.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

148
246
123
72
24

24.1
40.1
20.1
11.7
3.9

24.1
64.3
84.3
96.1
100.0

SE3: Sometimes for a police

Strongly disagree

51

8.3

8.3
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officer to make stops and
searches will cause him more
trouble than it is worth.

Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

97
166
163
136

15.8
27.1
26.6
22.2

24.1
51.2
77.8
100.0

SE4: Law cannot be regarded
as black and white and police
need to consider the spirit of
the law before initiating a
legal process.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

12
46
114
278
163

2.0
7.5
18.6
45.4
26.6

2.0
9.5
28.1
73.4
100.0

SE5: The law is the law:
police can make no
exceptions (R).

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

196
230
102
66
19

32.0
7.5
6.6
10.8
3.1

32.0
69.5
86.1
96.9
100.0

SE6: If police don‘t enforce
minor offenses, it will only
encourage more serious crime
(R).

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

8
26
99
238
242

1.3
4.2
16.2
38.8
39.5

1.3
5.5
21.7
60.5
100.0
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SE7: Sometimes the best way
for police to keep things
running smoothly is to turn a
blind eye to some offenses.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

183
233
111
59
27

29.9
38.0
18.1
9.6
4.4

29.9
67.9
86.0
95.6
100.0

SE8: Often police can
intervene to solve a dispute
without invoking CJ process.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

29
32
175
262
115

4.7
5.2
28.5
42.7
18.8

4.7
10.0
38.5
81.2
100.0

Total

613

100.0
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Table 21 The Correlation Matrix of Responsiveness

R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

R6

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

R6

1.000
.
613
.457**
.000
613
.417**
.000
613
.377**
.000
613
.378**
.000
613
.402**
.000
613

1.000
.
613
.469**
.000
613
.373**
.000
613
.374**
.000
613
.356**
.000
613

1.000
.
613
.457**
.000
613
.449**
.000
613
.343**
.000
613

1.000
.
613
.443**
.000
613
.378**
.000
613

1.000
.
613
.447**
.000
613

1.000
.
613

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
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Table 22 The Correlation Matrix of Reward Expectancy

RE1
E1

Correlation
Coefficient

RE2 RE3 RE4 RE5 RE6

RE7 RE8 RE9

RE10 RE11 RE12 RE13 RE14 RE15

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed) .
RE2

N

613

Correlation
Coefficient

.601** 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N
RE3

Correlation
Coefficient

.

613
.190

613
**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N
RE4

Correlation
Coefficient

.062 .

613
.215

613
**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N
RE5

Correlation
Coefficient

613
**

.217 .426** 1.000
.000 .000 .

613
.263

.075 1.000

613
**

613
**

613
**

.246 .236 .351** 1.000

Sig. (2-tailed) .000

.000 .000 .000 .

N

613

613
RE1

613

613

613

RE2 RE3 RE4 RE5

RE6

RE7 RE8

RE9 RE10 RE11 RE12 RE13 RE14 RE15
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RE6

Correlation
Coefficient

-.110** 1.000
.114** .120** .132** .172**

Sig. (2-tailed) .006
N
RE7

Correlation
Coefficient

613
-.113

**

Sig. (2-tailed) .005
N
RE8

Correlation
Coefficient

613
-.197

**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N
RE9

Correlation
Coefficient

613
-.141

**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N
RE10 Correlation
Coefficient

613
-.191

**

.005 .003 .001 .000

.

613

613

613

613

613

-.066 .720** 1.000
**
*
**
.121
.091 .215
.003 .105 .024 .000

.000

613

613

613

613

613

-.043 .626
.181**
.098* .179**
.000 .290 .015 .000

.000

613

613

613

613

613

.471
.132** .120** .095* .153**
.001 .003 .018 .000

.000

613

613

613

613

613

-.063 -.078 .629
.165**
.139**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000

.000 .118 .053 .001

.000

N

613

613

RE11 Correlation
Coefficient

613
-.041

613

613

613

.
613
**

.574** 1.000
.000 .
613

**

613
**

.506 .386** 1.000
.000 .000
613

**

.

613
**

.614 .532

613
**

.000 .000
613
**

.000

613
**

.

613
**

.300** 1.000

.367

Sig. (2-tailed) .310

.019 .167 .082 .118

.000

.000 .001

.000

.000 .

N

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

.293

613
**

-.056 -.070 .063
.095*

613

.209 .132

.602** 1.000
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613

RE1
RE12 Correlation
Coefficient

RE3

RE4

-.115** -.189** -.034

-.053

-.060 .326** .296** .175**

.350** .356** .633**

1.000

.405

.189

.141

.000

.000

.

613

613

613

613

Sig. (2-tailed) .004
N
RE13 Correlation
Coefficient

.000

613
-.137

613
**

Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N
RE14 Correlation
Coefficient

613
**

Sig. (2-tailed) .002
N
RE15 Correlation
Coefficient

-.187

**

.000

613
-.144

-.129

**

.001

613
-.126

RE2

613
**

-.109

**

*

RE5

RE6

-.022

-.103

-.047 .190

.592

.011

.247

.000

613

613

613

613

-.023

-.046

.359
.086*

.563

.261

.033

.000

613

613

613

613

-.075

-.058

-.002 .331

RE7

.000

.000

613
**

.141

613
**

.000
.306

.128

.406

.438

613
**

.000
.446

.466

.589

1.000

.000

.

RE14

RE15

.695

613
**

.000

613
**

RE13

.570**

613
**

.000

613
**

.603

RE12

613
**

.000

613
**

613
**

613
**

.000

.000

613
**

.504

.247

RE11

.000

613
**

613
**

.000

613
.245

.241

.251

RE10

.000

.000

613
**

.000
**

.181

RE9

613
**

.000

613
**

RE8

.000

613
**

.623

.458** .000
.

613
**

.604

613
**

.637**

.000

Sig. (2-tailed) .000

.007

.062

.153

.960

.000

.000

.001

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

N

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

613

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 23 The Correlation Matrix of Public Service Motivation
Correlations

PSM1

PSM2

PSM3

PSM4

PSM5

PSM6

PSM1

PSM2

PSM3

PSM4

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation

1.000
.
613
-.026
.522
613
-.066
.103
613
-.115**

1.000
.
613
.475**
.000
613
.284**

1.000
.
613
.437**

1.000

Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.004
613
.023
.573
613
-.017
.678
613

.000
613
.313**
.000
613
.206**
.000
613

.000
613
.505**
.000
613
.343**
.000
613

.
613
.342**
.000
613
.297**
.000
613

PSM5

PSM6

1.000
.
613
.448**
.000
613

1.000
.
613
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PSM7

PSM8

PSM9

PSM10

PSM7

PSM8

PSM9

PSM10

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

PSM1

PSM2

PSM3

PSM4

PSM5

PSM6

PSM7

PSM8

PSM9

PSM10

-.024
.552
613
.033
.419
613
-.036
.373
613
-.048
.238
613

.385**
.000
613
.325**
.000
613
.266**
.000
613
.253**
.000
613

.453**
.000
613
.432**
.000
613
.283**
.000
613
.324**
.000
613

.287**
.000
613
.268**
.000
613
.182**
.000
613
.209**
.000
613

.459**
.000
613
.512**
.000
613
.371**
.000
613
.401**
.000
613

.464**
.000
613
.440**
.000
613
.368**
.000
613
.361**
.000
613

1.000
.
613
.572**
.000
613
.395**
.000
613
.426**
.000
613

1.000
.
613
.529**
.000
613
.490**
.000
613

1.000
.
613
.516**
.000
613

1.000
.
613

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 24 The Correlation Matrix of Selective Enforcement
SE1
SE1

SE2

SE3

SE4

SE5

SE6

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

SE2

SE3

SE4

SE5

SE6

SE7

SE8

SE7

SE8

1.000
.
613
.455**

1.000

.000
613
.226**

.
613
.206**

1.000

.000
613
.020

.000
613
.020

.
613
.172**

1.000

.628
613
.143**

.620
613
.196**

.000
613
-.016

.
613
-.307**

1.000

.000
613

.000
613

.690
613

.000
613

.
613

SE1

SE2

SE3

SE4

SE5

SE6

.275**

.261**

.011

.281**

-.437**

1.000

.000
613

.000
613

.794
613

.000
613

.000
613

613
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.

SE7

SE8

Correlation
.344**
.338**
.133**
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
.001
N
613
613
613
Correlation
.166**
.080*
.246**
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.048
.000
N
613
613
613
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

.148**

.117**

-.290**

.000
613
.117**

.004
613
.077

.000
613
.035

613
.181**

1.000

.004
613

.055
613

.389
613

.000
613

613
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1.000
.

.

APPENDIX F. GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS IN TURKEY
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Istanbul

: Marmara Region

Ankara

: Central Anatolia Region

Izmir

: Aegean Region

Diyarbakir

: Southeastern Anatolia Region

Adana

: Mediterranean Region

Erzurum

: Eastern Anatolia Region

Samsun

: Black Sea Region
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